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1.1 General Context
Health care payments are often the most important expenditure households make. All
around the world people pay for health care services using formal mechanisms thought up
by governments. Such mechanisms consist of collecting resources to pay for health care
through general taxation, health care contributions or out-of-pocket payments. However,
people may be compelled to use informal ways to compensate health care providers for the
services rendered. Studies show that such informal transactions are not unusual in many of
the Central Eastern European (CEE) and Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries
(Killingsworth et al., 1999; McPake et al., 1999; Lewis, 2000; Gaal et al., 2006; Mæstad and
Mwisongo, 2007).
CEE and FSU countries have faced similar challenges in reforming their health care
systems  after  the  fall  of  the  communism.  They  had  to  move  from  a  centrally  planned
economy, where health care for all was virtually achieved (McKee, 1991), to a model that
included decentralised decision making (Preker and Feachem, 1994; WHO, 1996). The
transition phase was characterised by the inheritance of an inefficient health system and the
over-supply of physicians1 (Goldstein et al., 1996; Lewis, 2000, Nuri and Tragakes, 2002)
who  were  not  very  well  paid2 (McKee, 1991). Investments during the communist regime
aimed to ensure access to health care rather than to improve quality of services and this had
a decaying impact on the health service infrastructure (McKee, 1991). The transition was
accompanied by the decline in public health funds and lack of good governance leading to
barriers in access to health care and high levels of out-of-pocket payments (Lewis, 2000;
Ensor, 2004).
The unregulated components of out-of-pocket payments are often labelled with
different names. They are called ‘under-the-table payments’, ‘envelope payments’, ‘under-
the-counter payments’, ‘gifts’, and  even ‘black money’. They can range from the ex-post
(gratitude-like) in-kind gifts (Adam, 1989) to the ex-ante (bribe-like) cash payments given to
the health care provider (Allin et al.,  2006).  There is no universally accepted definition for
informal payments and usually this varies depending on the range of services and products
included (see Table 1.1). Gratitude payments are most often defined as voluntary ex-post
payment to “benevolent” doctors (Balázs, 1996; Adam, 1989), while informal payments are
more generally defined as direct cash/in-kind unofficial payments to health care providers
and/or private purchases of health services and other products meant to be covered by the
health care system (Lewis, 1999; Killingsworth et al., 1999; Chawla, 1998; Thompson and
Witter, 2000; Balabanova and McKee, 2002; Allin et al., 2006).
1 Central and Eastern European countries have an over-supply of physicians with 4.1 per 1000
population compared to the established market economies with 2.5.
2 Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  at  the  end  of  the  1980s  spent  only  40%  of  recurrent  health
budgets on staff wages compared to the 60% OECD average.
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Table 1.1. Definitions of informal payments in health care
DEFINITION SOURCE
Medical gratitude payment is an informal money transaction between a doctor and a
patient, in the course of which the patient purchases a health service from the publicly
employed doctor.
Balázs (1996)
Hungary
A gratuity can be defined as a financial or other material benefit, given to a doctor by a
patient or his or her relatives after treatment has been terminated.
Adam (1989)
Hungary
Informal payments are payments to individual and institutional providers in-kind or cash
that are outside the official payment channels, or are purchases that are meant to be
covered by the health-care system.
Lewis (1999)
Unofficial health care fees at government health facilities can be defined as unauthorised
fee payments that co-exist with ‘free care’ and formally approved ‘official’ health service
charges collected at public facilities under the sanction of public policy.
Killingsworth JR. et
al. (1999)
Payments, in cash or in kind, made by patients, or others on behalf of the patients, to an
individual or institutional public health care provider directly or to any person arranging
for provision of health care from such public health care providers, for health services
received or expected to be received that the recipients of these payments are not authorised
to receive under existing laws of land, including the Constitution of Poland, 1997, and the
Health Insurance Act, 1997, or under the rules of business of the health facility.
Chawla (2000,cited in
Shahriari et al. 2001)
Poland
Informal payments can be described as payments made by individuals to state health
workers or institutions but that are not sanctioned by the authorities.
Thompson and
Witter (2000)
Informal payments are defined as a monetary or in-kind transaction between a patient and
a staff member for services that are officially free of charge in the state sector.
Balabanova and
McKee (2002)
The informal component of out-of-pocket is defined as the payments (in cash or in kind)
made to service providers (individuals or institutions) by those people who are entitled to
the services, in addition to any legally defined payment.
Belli (2002)
Informal, ‘under-the-table’ or ‘envelope’ payments are typically defined as direct
payments by patients for services they are entitled to for free, usually in a public health
system. Informal payments range from the ex-ante cash payment to the ex post gift-in-
kind.
Allin S, et al. (2006)
The definitions of informal payments adopted by researchers vary greatly between
studies and are shown to be linked to cultural differences, legal provisions, and also to data
availability (Stepurko et al., 2010). Despite these differences, informal payments in this
dissertation are also seen as a way to allocate scarce resources where the market prevails
over the rationing systems thought up by the government. This definition allows analysing
informal payments from both governance and market perspectives. Informal payments
reflect the financial inability of government to cope with the demand for health care and the
tolerance showed towards informal practices. On the other hand, the final amount paid
informally is a result of price negotiations between patients and medical staff over services
that patients would have not been able to get otherwise.
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The  incidence  of  informal  payments  varies  over  the  FSU  and  CEE  countries  and
comparative studies are few since measurements vary depending on the definitions used
(see above). However, empirical studies show that such payments are persistent all over the
region. Hence, almost 60 per cent of individuals visiting inpatient services have declared to
have paid an informal gift in Albania (World Bank, 2006), 57 per cent of all the interviewed
have  declared  to  have  paid  a  bribe  in  Poland (Watson,  2006)  and 18  per  cent  in  Romania
(Vl?descu,et al., 2008). The extent of such informal payments also varies depending on the
particular situation of the country. Table 1.2 shows the most recent data from some of the
FSU and CEE countries. The table indicates that informal payments constitute a considerable
share of total health expenditures in all of these countries.
Table 1.2. Expenditures on informal payments in selected FSU and CEE countries
COUNTRY INFORMAL PAYMENTS SOURCE
Albania, 2005
Informal gifts to medical staff amount to 6-7% of the total OOP
expenditures in outpatient while 25% in inpatient. World Bank, 2006
Armenia, 2005
Informal payments constitute 61% of all health care expenditure
compared with 22% coming from state budget. Aristakesyan et al., 2005
Bulgaria , 2003 Informal payments constitute 25% of health care expenditures. Daskalova et al., 2005
Moldova , 2005
Informal payments in Moldova are estimated at 30% of total
health care expenditures. Shishkin et al., 2006
Reasons and purposes of informal payments
The reasons and motivations for informal payments in CEE and FSU countries are
complex and often interrelated. Looking at the main reasons for such payments, Ensor
(2004) mentions the legacies of the past system, the culture of gifts, and the insufficient
public  funding  for  health  care.  Gaal  and  McKee  (2005)  list  factors  leading  to  informal
payments (grouping them in social-cultural, legal-ethical and economic factors). We can
broadly bundle these factors in three main groups: cultural, economic and governance.
The  cultural  group  of  explanations  relates  informal  payments  to  the  culture  of  gifts
prominent  in  some of  the  FSU countries  where  gifts  are  considered  as  an  integral  part  of
professional  relations  (Ensor,  2004)  or  the  elements  of  the  culture  of  gifts  reported  in  CEE
countries (Delcheva et al., 1997; Balabanova and McKee, 2002; Vian et. al., 2006). Given the
fixed  prices  and the  absence  of  other  motivators  during  communism,  the  gift  was  seen  as
indispensable to trade. Such cultural causes are often considered even older than the onset
of the ‘Semashko’ systems in these countries.
The economic group of explanations directly refers to the former ‘Semashko’ system in
CEE and FSU countries and the immediate gap between a growing demand and a rigid
supply (Gaal and McKee, 2005). Whenever the formal financial mechanisms fail to provide
an efficient allocation of resources, informal arrangements are used to fill the gap created
and to deal with the distribution of services. Individuals and medical staff are therefore
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constrained to find ways and develop strategies to cope with the shortage of public/pooled
financing and are privately engaged in negotiations between each-other. The decrease in
public spending on health care (Delcheva et al., 1997; Chawla et al., 1998; Ensor and Witter,
2001; Gordeev et al., 2010) and the decline in real wages of medical staff in CEE and FSU
countries (Ensor and Savelyeva, 1998; Ensor and Witter, 2001; Chawla et al., 1998; Lewis,
2002; Vian et al., 2006) are seen as the main reasons for informal payments.
The  lack  of  good governance,  as  an  explanation  for  informal  payments,  relates  to  the
lack of accountability in the health sector after the 90’s but also to unethical behaviour of
medical staff. As in other sectors, governments were tolerating such informal practices while
they were not able to raise the salaries of medical staff. Given the weak rule of law and the
absence of accountability mechanisms, medical staff were also tempted to break the model
of medical professionalism and use their market power to maximise their earnings (Miller et
al., 2000; Thompson and Xavier, 2002).
Patients  may  choose  to  pay  informally  to  contribute  to  the  costs  of  health  care  (i.e.,
payments for medical supplies, the purchasing of the pharmaceuticals by private
pharmacies, or payments to medical staff to compensate their low salaries), to have
additional services (i.e., better hotel services, more specialised treatments, etc) or simply
because physicians may misuse their market power (Ensor, 2004). In fact, it appears that
most often payments to medical staff attract most of the attention. Differentiating between
informal payments that fill  up the gap of low salaries and the misuse of market power for
extra  profits  always  remains  challenging.  In  many  cases  direct  payments  constitute  a
substantive part of medical staff’s formal salaries (Abel-Smith and Falkingham, 1995;
Delcheva et al., 1997; Chawla et al., 1998). The timing of the informal payments to medical
staff and the presence of voluntary actions by patients are believed to be valuable measures
in this regard. Requested payments that are given prior to health service delivery resemble
more to bribes than to gratitude payments and therefore, they are seen as more problematic
(Balabanova and McKee, 2002).
The effects of informal payments
The attitude towards informal payments in health care is very much determined by
their effects on the performance of health care systems and their effects at the individual
level.  The  ultimate  objective  of  health  care  systems  is  to  improve  the  health  of  the
population and to increase customer satisfaction (Gaal et al., 2006). Generally, informal
payments are considered harmful because of the illegal aspects involved (Lewis, 2007)3  but
also because they may be possible causes for harmful effects on the health system
performance (Gaal et al., 2006).
Informal payments fall outside of the formal financing and planning channels and
therefore, they may decrease the efficiency of the health care system. The misuse of market
power by medical staff is likely to lead to ‘monopoly-like’ situation where patients are
charged much more than the market price for services (Ensor, 2004) and thus, it creates
welfare  loss.  Moreover,  the  allocation  of  resources  to  health  care  would  not  be  optimal  as
3 Lewis (2007) mentions that such illegality arises as most often informal payments take place in
circumstances where citizens are meant to get free health care.
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resources would be allocated first to those who are able to pay informally and not to those
who need them most (Ensor, 2004; Tambor et al., 2010).
Informal payments affect the equity of the health care systems. Considered merely a
market mechanism (that kicks in when formal mechanisms fail), such payments do not
protect  the  poor  and  those  who  are  not  able  to  pay  for  frequent  service  use  (Szende  and
Culyer, 2006). Individuals may be denied access and/or quality care if they do not meet the
amount  expected  or  required  informally.  This  affects  much  more  the  poor  than  the  rich
(Falkingham, 2004). Evidence from CEE countries suggest that often there are no significant
differences between the poor and the rich (Hotchkiss et al., 2005) and the poor may pay even
more than the rich (Lewis, 2000).  Szende and Culyer (2006) find that informal payments in
Hungary are highly regressive because they do not vary across income groups and do not
correspond to the ability to pay.
Informal payments may obstruct future health care reforms. One of the reasons is
because they make the estimation of the overall expenditure on health care difficult
(Delcheva et al., 1997). As a consequence, parts of the health care costs are underestimated
making projections on future requirements difficult. Another reason is that informal
payments could stimulate the hostile attitude of medical staff towards reforms that seek to
limit the phenomenon. Physicians may be more interested in maximising their own income
(Gaal and McKee, 2004) and therefore may hinder any reforms that would weaken their
market power.
In this dissertation, the causes and effects of informal payments are analysed from the
perspective of the Albanian context.
1.2 The Albanian health care system
The  health  care  system  in  Albania  has  its  roots  in  the  Soviet  ‘Semashko’  model,
dominated by the public provision of the services. This system had been designed to cover
the entire country including every single village, following the communist ideology of “free
health care services for all”. The health sector during the communist period was
underfinanced and considered as a non-productive sector (Nuri and Tragakes, 2002). The
funds allocated to the health sector were low and the investments in health technology were
even lower. The priority of the government in health care was mainly related to providing
access to primary and secondary care. This led to a widely distributed web of primary
health care (PHC) posts and centres and to a relatively large number of local and regional
hospitals (most of which had outdated equipments and were overstaffed).
The reforms that followed immediately after the onset of the democratic regime were
focused  mostly  on  reorganising  the  responsibilities  of  health  care  centres.  Thus,  with  the
regionalisation that followed in 1993 (the creation of 12 prefectures) some administering
responsibilities were shifted to the local level. However, human resource policies and
financing for hospitals still remain highly centralised. The decentralisation process in the
mid-1990’s gave ownership rights of some health care facilities to local governments (mainly
PHC facilities in rural areas) while most of the policlinics and hospitals in urban areas were
still owned by the Ministry of Health (MoH) (Nuri and Tragakes, 2002). Nowadays most of
these facilities are owned by local governments while only hospitals remain under the MoH.
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The  PHC  policy  developed  by  the  government  in  1997  (World  Bank,  2006)  aimed  to
maintain a health post for each locality and a health centre for each commune centre.
According to MoH, in 1993, Albania had 2191 health posts (out of which only about half of
them were operational), and 770 health care centres. In 2008, this number had dropped to
about 1877 health posts and 580 health centres (MoH, 2010). Outpatient care in the public
sector is delivered mainly through these PHC facilities but also at polyclinics in urban areas.
The main reforms in PHC have sought to transfer the financing of the sector to the Health
Insurance Institute (HII) established in 1994 to cover primary health care visits, reimburse
approved drugs and cover the costs of secondary and tertiary care. Recurrent expenditures
and  wages  of  the  medical  staff  are  now  financed  directly  through  the  HII.  The  hospital
sector is still dominated by the public sector where the MoH is the owner and administrator
of all hospitals (World Bank, 2006). The number of operative hospitals was 41 in 2008 out of
which 4 are university hospitals in Tirana, 11 are regional hospitals, and 22 are district
hospitals (MoH, 2010). Interventions in the hospital sector have mainly sought to improve
the  infrastructure  of  the  sector  and  little  has  happened  in  terms  of  reforming  the  way
providers are financed during 2002-2008.
Figure 1.1. Health spending as % of GDP for different countries in 2008
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Source: WHO, 2010
Albania spent around 6.8 per cent of its GDP on health care in 2008 (WHO database).
This  is  relatively  high  comparable  to  other  former  communist  CEE  or  FSU  countries,  but
lower compared to the average 8.5 per cent for the EU15 countries (Figure 1.1).  However,
only about 50 per cent of this amount is coming from the general state budget. The share of
out-of-pocket expenditures remains high in Albania compared to similar countries (Figure
1.2).  The  utilisation  of  health  insurance  in  Albania  is  low  and  reported  out-of-pocket
spending  is  high.  Survey  data  report  that  for  the  lowest  quintile  the  share  of  total  out-of-
pocket spending in inpatient services goes up to 60 per cent of the total monthly household
expenditure (World Bank, 2006). This contributes both to increased inequalities and also to
barriers to access for the most vulnerable categories. Although inpatient care is in principle
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free  for  everyone,  in  reality,  most  of  the  people  visiting  this  service  report  to  have  paid
substantial amounts of out-of-pocket payments (World Bank, 2006).
Figure 1.2. Health spending by source for different countries in 2008
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Source: WHO, 2010
Public health expenditures are financed by social health insurance contributions and
revenues  from tax  collections.  The  health  insurance  contributions  are  collected  by  the  Tax
Authority and amount to 3.4 per cent of gross salaries of all formally employed individuals.
However, the total number of contributors remains low because of the large informal sector
in  the  labour  market.  Evidence  suggests  that  about  one  third  of  the  active  labour  force  in
2005 was currently contributing to health insurance (World Bank, 2006). The HII is
responsible for contracting health services with PHC and also selected services from
hospitals. Although the funding of PHC is done through the HII, most of the funds (almost
two  thirds  of  the  total  budget)  still  come  from  the  general  state  budget.  The  funding  of
hospitals in 2008 was still done through the MoH.
Health insurance in Albania covers most of the costs of primary health care and all the
costs of hospital care. Patients are required lately to pay a small fixed co-payment per visit
in a PHC or specialised treatment in hospital care (DGESAEO-EC, 2008). Despite the fact
that the law states that all citizens4  should be covered by health insurance, surveys show
that about 40-45 per cent of the population declares to have a health insurance booklet
(World Bank, 2006). Moreover, the same studies show that there are also large inequalities in
4 Apart from people paying health insurance through formal employment (or self declarations), the law
provides coverage also for other groups like; children below age one, unemployed, social assistance
recipients, soldiers, students, pensioners and war veterans, pregnant women, and other vulnerable
categories.
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health insurance coverage when considering different regions of Albania (i.e. only 20 per
cent of the population in mountainous areas have health insurance).
1.3 Informal payments in Albania
Albania’s limited public spending on the health care sector (as compared to other
Balkan or Eastern European countries) has resulted in an increased reliance on out-of-pocket
payments for both inpatient and outpatient care (Nuri and Tragakes, 2002). The supply of
health care is clearly limited, forming a perfect ground for cultivating informal payments.
In general, there is a lack of clarity between formal and informal payments in Albania.
The  changes  in  legislation  in  early  transition  years  imposed  co-payments  for  users  of
primary health care. Albanian health care seekers are therefore confronted with other formal
out-of-pocket payments for laboratory tests, medicines, and transportation costs. However,
it is not always clear whether such payments are paid formally or informally (Hotchkiss et
al., 2005). As the Albanian legislation prohibits direct payments to medical staff, most of the
informal payments studies focus exclusively on payments paid to medical staff.
Various studies confirm the high level of informal payments in Albania. Albanian
LSMS data of 1996 show that such payments amount to about 18 US$ per capita for those
who sought health care (Lewis, 2002). Hotchkiss et al., (2005) using data from Albania
Baseline Health Survey (2000) find that almost 24.7 per cent of acutely-ill outpatients pay
(informal) gifts to medical staff. Other estimates show that almost 60-78 % of the Albanian
patients paid informally in hospitals in 2000 and 2002 (MoH, 2000; Bonilla and Chacin,
2003).
Studies  of  health  care  services  in  Albania  have  provided  some  insights  on  the  main
reasons why people pay informally to medical staff. In a survey of patients in three districts
of  Albania,  Vian  et  al.  (2006)  have  asked  both  patients  and  providers  on  this.  The  main
reasons listed relate to the motivation of health care staff (i.e. recognition of their low
salaries),  gaining access to health care (denial of the service if  gift  was not paid),  getting a
better/faster health service, and paying as a gratitude (rewarding the medical staff). The fear
associated  with  denial  of  (or  poor)  service  is  also  mentioned  in  other  studies  (Vian  and
Burak, 2006; World Bank, 2006). The general perception is that the service gets much better if
the medical staff is paid informally. Both Vian et al. (2006) and Vian and Burak (2006) found
that  social  connections  between  patients  and  medical  staff  are  important  factors  in
determining the payments. Patients tend to be less likely to pay beforehand to medical staff
that  they  know  and  more  likely  to  pay  when  using  facilities  in  other  neighbourhoods  or
districts.
The amount paid informally to medical staff also differs (Vian et al., 2006). The main
factors  for  this  relate  to  attributes  of  patients  (i.e.  economic  status,  residence  in  the  same
locality, personal relations, and societal/political position) attributes of providers (specialists
vs. general practitioners, highly specialised medical staff, and availability), the type of
services (inpatient/outpatient, locality, specialty, complexity of treatment, and technology
involved), and other contextual factors (like urbanisation of the locality, social norms, etc).
Paying mechanisms also tend to differ and are complex. Despite the illegal nature of such
payments they are reported to take place in the open and often not something to be hidden.
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Patients may gather information from social networks but in many cases the nurses or
physicians induce directly the payments. Some of these strategies involve talking about the
low  salaries,  leaving  money  on  the  table  (to  show  that  others  have  also  paid),  requesting
them form patients or relatives accompanying the patient, acting unfriendly or delaying
care.
The amount paid informally also differs if looked at by type of care. Informal payments
are very sizeable for inpatient care (World Bank, 2006). Varying on their position and
medical profile, the official wages of hospital physicians may increase by a factor 3 because
of informal payments. Informal payments for outpatient physicians may amount to almost
50 per cent of their wages.5  The amount of informal payments for the auxiliary staff is pretty
low  (compared  to  their  official  wage  level)  both  in  inpatient  and  outpatient  care.  This
suggests an unequal distribution of these payments among health care staff. If the amount
paid from every patient is considered individually, it results that these payments have a big
impact on patient’s welfare.  The situation is particularly dramatic for people in the lowest
quintile of the expenditure distribution (World Bank, 2006).
Table 1.3 shows the breakdown of out-of-pocket health expenditures by the main sub-
categories for outpatient and inpatient care in 2002, 2005 and 2008 respectively. As can be
seen, the payments vary by types of services. Expenses on medicines are the highest in
outpatient care while payments for treatment are the highest expenses in inpatient care.
Table 1.3. Out-of-pocket expenditures6 by main components for outpatient and inpatient health care
service
YEAR TREATMENT
INFORMAL
PAYMENTS
MEDICINE
LABORATORY
WORK
TRANSPORT
EXPENDITURES
OUT-OF-POCKET
AS % OF
MONTHLY PER
CAPITA
CONSUMPTION
Outpatient care  - (Lek paid per health care visit for those who made payments)
Year 2002 302.68 101.86 1040.86 215.59 166.57 0.22
Year 2005 327.37 70.99 939.64 158.25 83.66 0.19
Year 2008 618.63 67.63 1198.45 289.7 194.08 0.12
Inpatient care - (Lek paid per day hospitalised for those who made payments)
Year 2002 4738.46 4903.6 2897.47 981.96 1126.44 1.98
Year 2005 6769.23 4825.37 8700.19 1912.73 1713.25 3.26
Year 2008 15729.2 4802.31 11664.11 3595.19 3272.06 2.55
Source: Own compilation using ALSMS 2002, 2005, 2008
The table shows that payments per health care episode occupy a substantive share of
total monthly per capita expenditures. In 2002, this share was 22 per cent in outpatient and
198 per cent in inpatient care, while it varies over the successive years reaching 12 and 255
5 These differences may be also due to the fact that outpatient patient pay less to these medical doctors
and that their salaries are higher on average (since they have a contract with health insurance).
6 WHO defines out-of-pocket expenditures as the sum of all out-pocket-payments made by individuals
at the time of delivery.
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per cent in 2008. Throughout all years, the highest burden is posed over the lowest quintiles
demonstrating  the  regressive  nature  of  such  payments.  The  table  shows  that  informal
payments  to  medical  staff  are  evident  in  both  services  but  are  much  higher  for  inpatient
care. Informal payments for outpatient care have declined over the years in real terms,
whereas these payments for inpatient services have not changed much from 2002 to 2008.
They represent a relatively low share of total out-of-pocket payments but if a more inclusive
definition of informal payments is used (see the definitions above) this share will be much
higher in inpatient care where the services are supposed to be free of charge.
1.4 Aim of the dissertation
The  main  goal  of  this  dissertation  is  to  shed  new  light  on  the  causes  of  informal
payments  in  public  health  care  services  and to  understand how such  payments  affect  the
allocation of resources at the micro-level between patients and medical staff and within
households in Albania. This study presents a new approach to test the determinants and
effects of such payments at the micro level by giving a perspective on the dynamics of the
relationships between patients and medical staff and between household members. The
following issues are addressed in the dissertation.
The  first  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  look  at  the  effect  of  out-of-pocket  and  informal
payments on household expenditures. Uninsured health care events may have catastrophic
consequences for households and hinder their long-term income generating capabilities.
Health care costs are considered catastrophic when they force individuals or households to
significantly decrease their standard of living now or in the future (Stiglitz, 1988). This may
not only push them into a closed circle of inter-generational transmission of poverty (Baeza
and Packard, 2006), but may also prevent them from getting necessary health care services.
But, are out-of-pocket and informal payments in Albania catastrophic to households? And if
yes, what is their effect on poverty? A decomposition of out-of-pocket payments by different
consumption quintiles is used to capture their effect on different population groups.
The  second  aim  is  to  test  if  informal  payments  to  medical  staff  in  a  post-communist
country like Albania are a consequence of cultural factors,  lack of resources and economic
factors, or lack of good governance. The causes of informal payments are mostly related to
the former ‘Shemasko’ systems and inefficiencies in provision of health care (McKee 1991).
Previous studies (Delcheva et al., 1997; Balabanova and McKee, 2002; Vian et al., 2006; Ensor
and Savelyeva, 1998; Ensor and Witter, 2001; Chawla et al., 1998; Lewis, 2002; Miller et al.,
2000; Thompson and Xavier, 2002; Gaal and McKee, 2005) have listed a series of factors that
may  lead  to  informal  payments  in  the  Eastern  European  countries.  The  long  term
persistence of informal payments in countries like Albania has proven that understanding
the causes and linking them to effective policies against informal payments it is not an easy
task.  Empirical  papers  have  shown  that  isolated  measures  like  increasing  the  salaries  of
medical staff and enforcing the links between health insurance and service provision will
not reduce informal payments (Lewis, 2002). A profound analysis of the main causes would
certainly help in identifying the remedies. The three main models explaining informal
payments in the country (a) cultural, (b) economic and (c) governance are tested for by using
results from modelling the amount paid using tobit and Heckman selection model.
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Propensity score matching technique is also used to investigate the change in individual
characteristics of people paying informally over different years (2002, 2005 and 2008).
Looking at the strategies that different households use when deciding on how to
allocate  their  resources  over  different  members  for  informal  payments  is  the  third  aim  of
this research.  The households here are divided in nuclear and extended according to the
kinship relation. Nuclear households include two generation families (the household head,
spouse and children) or single headed households. The extended households include
families with more than two generations, multiple couples living together, or couples living
together with more distant relatives. Households differ in the strategies employed to cope
with health care expenditures. They may decide to sell assets, use savings or simply allocate
strategically their scarce resources between household members. The human capital theory
predicts  that  when  faced  with  financial  constraints  households  prefer  to  invest  more  on
members with higher expected returns in the future. Household members with higher
income generating capabilities also have more bargaining power within the household.
These predictions imply that household members may be treated differently, and that
household’s  reaction  to  informal  payments  may  also  differ  depending  on  the  number  of
household members and the type of service required. To date, little is known on the impact
that decision-making within the household has on the amounts paid for different members.
In societies where the patriarchal structure is still in place, like in Albania, it is important to
see if decision making on health expenditure depends on future expected returns or the
position that the patient has in the household. The decision to distribute resources for
informal payments among household heads, spouses and children is compared between
nuclear and extended households.
The fourth aim is to measure the imperfect information that exists on the amount paid
informally to medical staff for inpatient care and measure its effect on the actual amount
paid. If  it  is  assumed that patients are willing to pay a certain amount and physicians are
expecting a certain minimum one. The difference with the actual amount reflects ‘ignorance’
of patients and physicians on this. The actual payment may therefore be influenced by the
information  that  each  party  have  on  it.  Studies  on  such  effects  are  scarce.  This  study
presents  a  new  approach  to  capture  such  effects  and  measure  imperfect  information.  The
indicators of patients and medical staff imperfect information on the amount that the other
party  is  requesting  or  willing  to  pay  respectively  are  captured  by  a  two-tiered  stochastic
frontier model. This allows measuring the extent to which patients pay more than the
amount medical staff expect and the extent to which medical staff request less than patients
are willing to pay.
The empirical analysis of this dissertation is performed using data from the Albanian
Living Standard Measurement Surveys (ALSMS) 2002, 2005 and 2008.7  The ALSMS uses a
7 LSMS is a national representative survey that collects information on different indicators of health,
education, economic activities, housing and utilities for households all around Albania. The 2002, 2005
and 2008 Albania Living Standard Measurement Surveys (ALSMS) provides individual level and
household level socio-economic data from households drawn from urban and rural areas in Albania.
The  sample  was  designed  to  be  representative  of  Albania  as  a  whole,  Tirana,  other  urban/rural
locations, and the three main agro-ecological areas (Coastal, Central, and Mountain). The survey was
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stratified geographical sample dividing Albania in four main areas; Tirana (the capital) and
three main other agro-ecological/economic areas (Coastal, Central and Mountainous). The
survey is therefore representative for all areas. The cities and the villages were divided into
enumeration areas (EAs) according to the 2001 General Census of Population and Housing.
The sample size was set to 450 EA and in each EA 8 households were selected (World Bank
and INSTAT, 2003).8 So, the total sample size of the LSMS aimed was 3599 in 2002, 3640 in
2005, (Tirana has been oversampled by 25 EA in 2005 due to the migration process) and 3600
in 2008. The questionnaires include information on household demography, education,
labour, income, health status and health care episodes, and health care payments. The health
module  includes  questions  on  visits  to  public  hospitals  in  the  last  12  months  (hereafter
referred to as inpatient services), and health care posts/centres/polyclinics in the last 4 weeks
(hereafter referred to as outpatient services).
1.5 Outline of the dissertation
This dissertation is conceptualised as a series of studies investigating different aspects
of informal payments of the Albanian health care system. The dissertation starts by giving a
general overview of the impoverishing effect of out-of-pocket and informal payments and
narrows down in more analytical studies of informal payments.
Chapter  2  looks  at  the  effect  that  out-of-pocket  and  informal  payments  have  on  the
expenditures of households and poverty. The analysis uses newly available data from
ALSMS 2002, 2005, and 2008 to decompose this effect by different consumption quintiles.
 Chapter  3  looks  at  the  main  determinants  of  informal  payments  to  medical  staff  in
Albania. Inpatient and outpatient care are analysed separately so that the differences in the
organisation of these two services are taken into account. The analysis uses household level
data (ALSMS 2002, 2005 and 2008) for those patients who have visited outpatient and
inpatient care. The effect of the individual characteristics (visiting health care services) on
informal payments is explored using tobit and Heckman selection models and their
dynamics over time are explored using propensity score matching techniques.
The intra-household allocation of resources for informal payments to medical staff is
analysed in chapter 4.  The differences between nuclear (spouses and children) and
extended (spouses, children and others) are tested for using a generalised Hausman
specification test for both outpatient and inpatient care. The analysis compares how nuclear
and extended households allocate resources for informal payments to household heads,
spouses and children, using ALSMS 2002 and 2005.
Chapter 5 looks at the price determination process between patients and medical staff
in inpatient service. Imperfect information of patients and medical staff is estimated using a
two-tiered stochastic frontier model. Patient’s maximum willingness to pay informally and
carried out by the Albanian Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) with the technical and financial assistance of
the World Bank and the Department for International Development (DfiD).
8 Given a certain level of non-response expected, for each of the sample EA there were selected 4 reserve
units.
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medical staff’s minimum expected amounts are also estimated using pooled data from
ALSMS 2002 and 2005.
Chapter 6 draws the main conclusion from the empirical analyses in the previous
chapters. The conclusion provides the basis for main recommendations on effective policies
to eliminate informal payments for health care. Such policies should not only limit informal
payments  but  also  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  health  sector  while  protecting  the  most
vulnerable groups.
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Chapter 2. ARE HEALTH CARE
PAYMENTS IN ALBANIA
CATASTROPHIC? EVIDENCE
FROM ALSMS 2002, 2005
AND 2008
Part of the analysis in this chapter is used for:
World Bank, 2011 (expected). "Out-of-Pocket Payments in Albania’s Health System" Country policy
report,  Accountability  for  Better  Governance  AAA  task  (P107759),  Europe  and  Central  Asia  Regional
Office, World Bank, Washington DC
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Abstract
The absent or poorly functioning risk pooling mechanisms and high amounts of out-of-
pocket payments for health care expose households to financial risks associated with major
illnesses or accidents. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the extent to which out-of-pocket
health spending impoverish households in Albania. The study augments the existing
evidence by analysing the dynamics of such payments over different years and the weight
that informal payments have in the total out-of-pocket health spending.
The data used in this study come from the Albania Living Standard Measurement
Survey (ALSMS) for 2002, 2005 and 2008. We measure headcount catastrophic payments
using different thresholds and the decomposition of indicators by expenditure quintiles to
understand better their effects. We find that out-of-pocket and informal payments have
increased in real value throughout the years. Even though their catastrophic effect has gone
down (due also to declining trends in absolute poverty), the effect for the poorest
expenditure quintiles remains high. Out-of-pocket payments deepen the poverty headcount
and also enlarge the poverty gap and again the effect is larger for the poorest quintiles.
Future policy interventions should provide better protection mechanisms for the poor by
providing exemption criteria or subsidised transport and should seek to address the
widespread informal payments in the country.
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2.1 Introduction
High  levels  of  out-of-pocket  payments  for  health  care  expose  households  to  financial
risks associated with major illness (World Bank, 1993, 1995a; WHO 2005). Expecting
households to make some financial contribution for their health care is reasonable even in
wealthy countries with sophisticated public and private health insurance, and particularly
for frequently occurring conditions that are inexpensive to remedy. However, an over
reliance on out-of-pocket payments for health care may endanger households’ customary
standards of living and disrupt household welfare (Berki, 1986; O’Donnell et al., 2005 &
2008; Gertler and Gruber, 2002; Xu et al., 2003), particularly for serious, less-frequently
occurring conditions for which the costs of treatment can quickly mount. Households,
especially in developing countries, may not be able to insure their basic needs (World Bank
1993, 1995a) and uninsured health care events can therefore increase the risks of loss of
incomes from reduced labour supply or lower productivity. This can cause long-term
consequences pushing them into a “trans-generational cycle” of poverty (Baeza and
Packard, 2006). High out-of-pocket payments for health care can also prevent some people
from seeking necessary health care creating thus barriers to access for the most poor (Xu et
al., 2007).
In essence, health care costs can be considered catastrophic when they force individuals
or households to significantly decrease their standard of living now or in the future (Stiglitz,
1988). A survey of 89 countries has showed that almost 150 million people globally suffer
financial catastrophe because of high out-of-pocket health care expenditures (Xu et al., 2007).
Giving that one of the main objectives of health care systems should be ensuring the equity
among health care seekers, households should be protected against such catastrophic
medical expenditures (WHO 2000).
While cross country comparisons show that out-of-pocket payments are prevalent in
most Western Balkans Countries, recent studies (Bredenkamp et al., 2010) show that
catastrophic out-of-pocket payments (including informal payments) in Albania are higher
than in most other countries. When this finding is examined alongside the much higher
share of out-of-pocket over total health financing in Albania and the much higher incidence
of informal payments, concern that these payments are further raising barriers to care and
increasing the financial vulnerability of households grows.
This chapter looks at the effect of out-of-pocket and informal payments on household
expenditures by exploring the existing and the newly available ALSMS (Albania Living
Standard Measurement Survey) data for 2002, 2005 and 2008. The chapter focuses on two
main  aspects  of  out-of-pocket  payments:  (i)  the  incidence  and  intensity  of  ‘catastrophic’
health care expenditure, and (ii) the effect of out-of-pocket payments on poverty headcount
and poverty gap measures. The main questions that this chapter attempts to answer are:
Does out-of-pocket health spending impoverish the households in Albania? And what
weight do informal payments have in increasing the burden of out-of-pocket health
spending? The chapter uses the decomposition of out-of-pocket payments in health care by
main expenditure quintiles to look at the particular burden for different categories. Further
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decomposition  of  such  payments  by  main  components  and  public/private  sector  aims  to
give a ‘panoramic’ picture of the main developments over the years.
2.2 Data and methodology
Out-of-pocket expenditures for health care in Albania are assessed in this chapter using
ALSMS data for three different years, 2002, 2005 and 2008. The data are representative for
Albania and are collected using a similar methodology. However they can only offer cross-
section features and lack the longitudinal dimension. Longitudinal data would be ideally if
we want to estimate the extent to which living standards are disrupted by the purchase of
medical  care  in  response  to  illness  shocks  (O’Donnell  et  al.,  2008).  This  allows  to  see  how
household well-being is affected by certain health shocks (Gertler and Gruber, 2002;
Wagstaff, 2007). However, as often only cross-section data are available, it has been
proposed to define out-of-pocket payments as catastrophic if they exceed a critical share of
households’ resources during one year (Berki, 1986; Russell, 2004; Wagstaff and van
Doorslaer,  2003;  Xu  et  al.,  2003).  In  this  chapter  we  exploit  the  same  definitions  used  in
different ALSMS to compare the trends of out-of-pockets and their impoverishing effects
over the years.
One of the debatable points in the literature is the choice of the comparators of out-of-
pocket payments (O’Donnell et al., 2008). The two possibilities are to calculate out-of-pocket
as a share of household’s income, consumption or expenditure. All measures have
advantages and disadvantages. Income is often argued to be a better denominator as it is
completely irresponsive of health care expenditures. However, this advantage is offset by
the fact that an out-of-pocket-to-income ratio will not account for the use of other resources
available  to  some  of  the  households  and  not  available  to  others  (e.g.  the  use  of  savings).
Total expenditures on the other hand may be more responsive to health care.  For example
for the poor households resources tend be directed to items that are indispensable (i.e. food).
Given  this  the  poorest  will  always  tend to  spend more  on  such  subsistence  items  leaving
little to health care. One of the solutions mentioned in O’Donnell et. al. (2008) is to consider
catastrophic payments as the share of out-of-pocket payments to the non-necessity total
expenditures (defined often as the expenditure on non-food items). Because of the non-
indispensable nature, non-food expenditure may distinguish better between the poor and
the  rich.  Given  these  reasons  and  also  the  fact  that  poverty  measures  in  countries  like
Albania are based primarily on expenditures rather than income (World Bank, 2006) we
present here the estimated catastrophic health payments based on non-health expenditure.
To  test  for  the  consistency  of  the  results  when  expenditures  on  non-food  items  are
considered we have also estimated the tables for the catastrophic effect of out-of pocket
payments on such expenditures (see also Table A2.1 in the Appendix 2A).
Health economists have not yet agreed on a uniformly accepted threshold of out-of-
pocket spending that triggers alarm or that unambiguously motivates a policy response.
Different researchers have used varying thresholds from 5 percent (Berki, 1986), 10 percent
(Waters  et  al.,  2004)  and  up  to  40  percent  when  non-subsistence  spending  is  used  as  a
denominator (Xu et al., 2003; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003). In order to test the
sensibility of our estimations we discuss here the results for different thresholds.
CATASTROPHIC HEALTH CARE PAYMENTS IN ALBANIA
19
2.3 Out-of-pocket spending in Albania
Previous work on Albania and other Western Balkan countries has shown that out-of-
pocket  payments  remain  high  for  most  of  these  countries  (Bredenkamp et  al.,  2010).  Such
spending has been reported to amount to more than 6 % of the per capita expenditures in
Albania. However, the aggregate figures can only tell about the overall impact of these out-
of-pocket expenditures. The separate effects of private and public expenditures or formal
and informal payments over the last years are less known.
Table 2.1 gives the mean per capita expenditures on health and non-health items
(indexed with 2002 prices). As it can observed the gross per capita expenditures for
households who have paid out-of-pocket payments have increased in real value during the
years from 11092 Albanian Leks (ALL)9  in 2002 to 11923 in 2008.
This is consistent with the decrease in the headcount poverty indexed throughout the
same years (INSTAT, 2009). On the other hand, this increase has been mostly dedicated to
both out-of-pocket expenditures and other non-health expenditures. Spending on all out-of-
pocket items was on average 808.30 ALL in 2002 and increased to 1125.65 in 2008. The same
trend  is  almost  true  for  all  the  items  of  spending  (formal  payments,  informal  payment,
transport or expenditures on private health care providers and drugs purchased on own
initiative). Formal payments and payments in the health sector are two categories with the
largest increase over the years. Formal payments per capita have increased with almost
500ALL from 2002 to 2008 (from 767ALL to 1269ALL) while expenditures on private sector
have increased with 175ALL over the same period (from 298ALL to 473ALL). The value of
informal payments per capita has also increased substantially over the years from 220ALL
in 2002 to 384ALL in 2008. The constant increase of such payments throughout the whole
period demonstrates once more their prevailing incidence in the health sector (despite any
measures taken).
The dynamic of categories of payments over the years is also interesting. Payments for
most of the categories, i.e. formal payments, transport or payments in private, seem to have
decreased in real value from 2002 to 2005 while they have increased substantially in 2008.
The increase in formal payments may be due to a more aggressive policy in enforcing the
referral system or increasing the fees paid for both outpatient and inpatient care. On the
other side, the increased share of the private sector is more evident in 2008 causing also a
substantial  increase  in  the  money  spent  in  this  sector.  While  the  increase  in  total  out-of-
pocket payments in 2008 seems warring, another warring trend is the distribution of
informal payments between quintiles of per capita expenditure. As it can be observed, the
amount that the lowest quintiles pay informally have increased almost five times over the
years (from 121 in 2002 to 777ALL in 2008) while this is accompanied by a more moderated
increase in the amount paid informally by the other higher quintiles. The formal payments
for  the  same  quintile  have  almost  doubled  for  the  same  period,  demonstrating  that  the
effects of any increase in fees are mostly transmitted to the lowest quintiles.
9 All prices are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in June 2002 (Bank of Albania, 2010).
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Table 2.1. The mean per capita expenditures on health and non-health items (in Albanian Leks)
Non-health
expenditure
quintiles
Per capita gross
expenditure (health
payment inc)
Per capita
health
expenditures
on formal
payments
Per capita
informal
payments in
public health
care
Per capita
health
expenditures
on transport
Per capita
total
expenditures
in private
health sector
Overall per
capita health
expenditures
Per capita net
expenditure
(health
payments exc)
YEAR 2002
Lowest
quintile
4296.69*** 475.14*** 121.17*** 101.82*** 144.49*** 493.94*** 3802.75***
2 6230.03*** 659.04 165.96 188.14 183.04*** 653.82** 5576.20***
3 7915.78*** 591.48*** 177.93* 128.94** 265.7 698.51* 7217.28***
4 10317.47*** 777.19 229.42 248.82 236.42* 780.42 9537.05***
Highest
quintile
18077.70*** 1041.31*** 318.72*** 286.27* 471.78*** 1071.82*** 17005.89***
Total 11092.29 767.10 220.98 193.93 298.44 808.30 10284.00
YEAR 2005
Lowest
quintile
4394.93*** 496.82*** 152.64*** 104.60** 157.97*** 519.44*** 3875.50***
2 6446.95*** 639.36 278.78 128.55 179.59*** 617.97 5828.98***
3 8698.88*** 749.24 267.69 127.79 271.39 763.44 7935.44***
4 11147.78** 753.25 252.24 141.84 264.33 708.37 10439.42**
Highest
quintile
19054.34*** 1041.77*** 348.80** 202.30* 381.92*** 902.40*** 18151.94***
Total 10801.00 748.55 256.89 136.39 267.80 723.05 10077.95
YEAR 2008
Lowest
quintile
5438.88*** 865.67* 777.96 182.29 203.18*** 849.31 4589.57***
2 7655.03*** 1039.79 208.58 150.78* 327.82 866.62 6788.40***
3 9520.95*** 972.28* 230.17 186.8 307.83* 769.02** 8751.93***
4 12837.11** 1494.32 426.61 288.23 727.13 1463.46 11373.65**
Highest
quintile
21422.69*** 1797.93* 336.94 236.36 658.98* 1520.30* 19902.39***
Total 11923.66 1269.22 384.54 208.19 473.96 1125.65 10798.01
Note: Stars indicate if the mean for the particular group is significantly different from the mean of all other groups (***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Expenditures are given as mean for each of the categories only for those households which have actually spent for that
particular category. Per capita health expenditures on formal payments include out-of-pocket expenditures on medical
fees, laboratory works and drugs purchased in public outpatient and inpatient care (expenditures incurred in hospitals
outside from Albania are omitted in the table). Informal payments include gifts paid to medical staff for public
outpatient and inpatient care. Health expenditures in private sector include out-of-pocket expenditures on medical
fees, laboratory works, drugs purchased and gifts to medical staff for private care.
Similarly to the previous table, Table 2.2 above shows the distribution of health and
non-health expenditures across each of the quintiles. The table shows that generally the
most poor, i.e. the lowest quintile, spend much more in non-direct costs, i.e. transportation
or informal payments, compared to the other items. Moreover, the table shows that such
figures have increased substantially over the years for this lowest quintile. Hence, in 2008
almost 30 per cent of all the amount of informal payments and 21 per cent of all
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transportation costs belonged to the lowest quintile (while these shares were 7 and 9 per
cent respectively in 2002).
Table 2.2. Financing budget shares on health and non-health items
Non-health
expenditure
quintiles
Per capita
expenditure
gross of health
payments
Per capita
health
expenditures
on formal
payments
Per capita
informal
payments in
health care
Per capita
health
expenditures
on transport
Per capita
private
expenditures
in private
sector
Overall per
capita health
expenditures
Per capita
expenditure
net of
payments
YEAR 2002
Lowest quintile 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.04
2 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.07
3 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.11
4 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.19 0.22 0.20
Highest quintile 0.57 0.39 0.40 0.29 0.47 0.41 0.57
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
YEAR 2005
Lowest quintile 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.06
2 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.12 0.16 0.11
3 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.15
4 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.23
Highest quintile 0.45 0.31 0.32 0.22 0.40 0.33 0.46
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
YEAR 2008
Lowest quintile 0.08 0.13 0.30 0.21 0.08 0.13 0.08
2 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12
3 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16
4 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.34 0.28 0.22
Highest quintile 0.42 0.31 0.20 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.43
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: 1) Per capita health expenditures on formal payments include out-of-pocket expenditures on medical fees,
laboratory works and drugs purchased in public outpatient and inpatient care (expenditures incurred in hospitals
outside from Albania are omitted in the table). 2) Informal payments include gifts paid to medical staff for public
outpatient and inpatient care. 3) Health expenditures in private sector include out-of-pocket expenditures on medical
fees, laboratory works, drugs purchased and gifts to medical staff for private care.
The same could be said for other health expenditures like the formal payments or
private costs which have increased to 13 per cent respectively for this quintile.
Unfortunately,  this  increase  in  the  relative  shares  of  out-of-pocket  payments  has  not  been
accompanied by a similar increase in the relative per capita non-health expenditure (which
has only increased from 4 to 8 per cent for the poorest quintile). This shows again that policy
measures through 2002 and 2008 have had a negative impact on the poorest quintiles. In
2008  the  poorest  households  have  on  (average)  relatively  less  budget  than  the  rich  if
compared to 2002, but they face higher out-of-pocket payments. The dramatic increase in
non-direct health care costs demonstrates that these people now face more barriers to health
care than before.
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2.4 Catastrophic payments in health care in Albania
When total expenditure is used as the denominator the most common threshold
employed in the literature to measure catastrophic spending is 10 percent – the threshold at
which  prior  research  has  found  households  can  be  forced  to  sacrifice  basic  necessities
(Pradhan and Prescott, 2002; Rason, 2002; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003).
Table 2.3 presents alternative measures for out-of-pocket payments for health care for
each quintile of household non-health expenditure, over the three waves of the ALSMS.
Table 2.3. Incidence and intensity of catastrophic health payments defined with respect to total
expenditure
THRESHOLD BUDGET SHARE
CATASTROPHIC PAYMENTS MEASURES
Thresh. 5% Thresh. 10% Thresh. 15% Thresh. 25%
YEAR 2002
Headcount (H)
Lowest quintile 45.2 29.9 20.6 12.2
2 41.1 26.7 18.2 8.9
3 37.2 24.1 15.1 8.6
4 33.8 20.6 13.4 6.5
Highest quintile 25.3 11.7 7.3 4.1
Total 36.5 22.6 14.9 8.1
Overshoot (O) 5.4 4.0 3.1 2.0
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 45.2 29.9 20.6 12.2
YEAR 2005
Headcount (H)
Lowest quintile 42.9 28.7 20.6 13.2
2 39.1 22.3 14.4 5.8
3 33.6 18.5 12.8 6.4
4 25.6 11.8 6.7 2.8
Highest quintile 17.2 6.8 3.5 1.7
Total 31.6 17.6 11.6 6.0
Overshoot (O) 3.9 2.7 2.0 1.2
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 12.4 15.6 17.4 19.9
YEAR 2008
Headcount (H)
Lowest quintile 28.9 20.0 13.8 10.0
2 25.0 14.8 10.7 6.3
3 22.4 12.0 7.9 4.5
4 20.1 11.3 7.9 3.5
Highest quintile 15.9 8.4 5.0 2.9
Total 22.5 13.3 9.1 5.4
Overshoot (O) 5.0 4.1 3.5 2.8
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 22.1 30.8 38.9 52.2
The headcount (incidence) in this table is the share of individuals for whom the
proportion of out-of-pocket payments for health (shown as a percentage of total spending),
exceeds a number of set thresholds, ranging from 5 per cent to 25 per cent. In 2002 22.6 per
cent of the population paid health care out-of-pocket costs that exceeded 10 per cent of their
total per capita budget.  Encouragingly, this incidence declined to 17.6 per cent in 2005, and
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further to 13.3 in 2008. The largest drop occurred between 2005 and 2008 and may be related
to the general fall in poverty during that period (INSTAT, 2009). However, as observed
previously, households in the lowest quintile seemed to have suffered the most from
catastrophic payments (according to this threshold) throughout the period of analysis. The
share  of  individuals  in  the  lowest  quintiles  paying  more  than  10  per  cent  of  their  total
expenditures for out-of pocket health care was about 29-30 per cent in 2002 and 2005 and
only decreased to 20 per cent in 2008.
The  second  part  of  Table  2.3  also  gives  information  on  the  measures  of  catastrophic
overshoot for each of the years. This measure represents the average extent by which health
care expenditure (as a proportion of total non-health expenditure) exceeds the respective
threshold. In other words it measures the intensity of catastrophic out-of-pocket payments.
This is important as it  complements the headcount measure of catastrophic payments (the
incidence). The table shows that the intensity of catastrophic payments drops as the
threshold is raised from 5 to 25 per cent of total non-health expenditure throughout all
years. The mean positive overshoot on the other hand gives an idea of the average spending
on out-of-pocket for all those exceeding the threshold. Hence, we observe that households
spending more than 10 per cent of their expenditures on out-of-pocket spend on average
39.9 per cent in out-of-pocket in 2002, 25.6 per cent in 2005 and 40.8 per cent in 2008.10  As
these numbers show the mean of out-of-pocket amount paid as a share of total non-health
expenditure has increased sharply over the period 2005 and 2008. This reinforces our
previous finding regarding the dramatic increase in certain categories of health care
expenditure like the formal payments and the expenditures on private health care.
2.5 The impoverishing impact of out-of-pocket expenditures in
Albania
Most societies care if the households paying catastrophic out-of-pocket payments
belong to the poorest quintiles rather than the richest ones. The concentration index CE
displayed in Table 2.4 can estimate such effect. A positive value of such concentration index
shows that the better-off households have a greater tendency to fall into catastrophic
payments and a negative value shows a greater tendency among the poorest. As we can see
from the table in fact at every threshold we choose over the years, the poorest have a greater
tendency to fall into catastrophic payments.
Table 2.4. Distribution-sensitive catastrophic payments measures – concentration index
THRESHOLD BUDGET SHARE
CONCENTRATION INDEX, CE
Thresh. 5% Thresh . 10% Thresh . 15% Thresh . 25%
Year 2002 -0.114 -0.161 -0.182 -0.201
Year 2005 -0.168 -0.257 -0.299 -0.364
Year 2008 -0.121 -0.178 -0.207 -0.278
10 The mean of out-of-pocket payment as a ratio of total expenditures for households exceeding a certain
threshold is  given as  the  sum of  the  threshold and MPO (Z+MPO).  For  example  in  2002  for  the  10  %
threshold the mean of amount spent from those exceeding the threshold is 10%+ 29.9%=39.9%.
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Table 2.5 shows that out-of-pocket health expenditures have increased the percentage of
the poor Albanian households.
Table 2.5. Measures of poverty based on per capita expenditure gross and net of spending for health
care.
POVERTY
HEADCOUNT
POVERTY GAP
NORMALISED
POVERTY GAP
NORMALISED MEAN
POSITIVE POVERTY GAP
YEAR 2002
Pre-payment headcount 26.58 300.25 6.14 23.10
Post-payment headcount 33.07 489.49 10.01 30.26
Poverty impact- percentage
point change
6.49 189.24 3.87 7.17
Percentage change 24.42 63.03 63.03 31.03
YEAR 2005
Pre-payment headcount 19.45 215.71 4.41 22.68
Post-payment headcount 23.79 336.57 6.88 28.92
Poverty impact- percentage
point change
4.34 120.86 2.47 6.25
Percentage change 22.33 56.03 56.03 27.54
YEAR 2008
Pre-payment headcount 12.19 110.18 2.25 18.47
Post-payment headcount 15.80 296.11 6.05 38.31
Poverty impact- percentage
point change
3.61 185.93 3.80 19.84
Percentage change 29.60 168.75 168.75 107.38
The poverty headcount has decreased from 2002 to 2008, but the post-payment poverty
headcount are much higher if considering out-of-pocket expenditures for health care.
Poverty increases by 6.49 percentage points in 2002, by 4.34 in 2005 and by 3.61 in 2008. The
poverty gap after payments has consistently been higher than the pre-payment one during
all analysed years. The percent point impact for the poverty gap has increased from 189.24
in 2002 to 185.93 in 2008 showing the significant increase in inequalities due to out-of-pocket
payments.
The  catastrophic  impact  that  out-of  pocket  expenditures  have  on  households  can  be
seen visually in Figure 2.1. The graphs are based on Jan Pen’s parade of “dwarfs and a few
giants” (see also Cowell, 1995; O’Donell et al., 2008) and give the impact of health care
expenditures by plotting household expenditures gross and net of total out-of-pocket
payments. The x-axis represents the cumulative proportion of households ranked by their
total expenditures and y-axis gives the level of total expenditures and out-of-pocket
payments  in  Albanian  Leks.  The  two  moments  are  represented  by  the  pre  and  post
expenditure per capita and are compared against the food poverty line (the horizontal line)
that amounts to 3047ALL per capita.  The drops in the expenditure levels are given by the
vertical bars (which represent the exact amount of health care expenditures per capita).
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Figure 2.1. Poverty impact of health expenditure on the distribution of non-health expenditure
a) Year 2002
b)  Year 2005
c) Year 2008
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All graphs show that there are many households whose expenditures fall below the
extreme poverty line if we assume that they forego other consumption for health care. Such
effects are not only observed for the lowest quintiles but also for all the others. Out-of-
pocket health expenditures tend to be higher for the higher quintiles (see Table 2.1) and
when they are not insured they may drive also such quintiles in poverty. Graph (c) in Figure
2.1 shows that for 2008 catastrophic health care expenditures tend to be more severe for
certain households. This is due to the increase in private health care expenditures and also
the rise of formal payments. Such increases can be problematic even for the highest quintiles
and show that can be problematic in the long-run if no forms of insurance are taken against
them.
2.6 Discussion and conclusions
The weak role of national health insurance in Albania, especially for inpatient care (see
also  Chapter  1  and  Chapter  3),  exposes  households  to  the  financial  risks  associated  with
accidents  and  sickness.   A  large  share  of  the  health  services  have  to  be  paid  for  out-of-
pocket, sometimes up front at the point of service. Such payments include formal and
informal payments to medical staff.  Health insurance in Albania should cover most of the
formal costs of primary health care and all the costs of hospital care. Patients are formally
required to pay small,  fixed co-payments per visit  in PHC or for specialised treatments in
hospital care. However, evidence from ALSMSs show that until 2008 the amounts reported
as formal out-of-pocket payments remained high. This leads to believe that a large share of
such payments is very likely to be defined as informal payments if  a broader definition is
employed (see also Table 1.1 in Chapter 1).11
The analysis of the trends of out-of-pocket payments over the different years in Albania
has shown that they have increased in real value from 2002 to 2008. The increase has not
been the same for all the categories and expenditure quintiles. Formal/informal payments
and expenditure in the private sector have increased significantly from 2002 to 2008 while
expenditure on transport has remained more or less stable. The data show that the poorest
households remain the most financially vulnerable to the cost of health care. Generally the
poorest people (in households in the lowest expenditure quintile) spend much more in non-
direct health costs, i.e. transportation or informal payments, when compared with other
items.   This  category  of  spending  has  also  increased  substantially  over  the  years  for
households in the lowest quintile. The catastrophic headcounts for all thresholds show that
out-of-pocket spending may lead to catastrophic health care expenditures in Albania.
Considering a 10 percent threshold of total per capita expenditures these numbers are 22.6
per cent in 2002, 17.6 in 2005 and 13.3 in 2008. But eventhough catastrophic payments have
declined substantially over the years, the decline for the poorest quintiles has not been in the
same range remaining to 20.0 per cent in 2008.
Moreover, out-of-pocket health expenditures can contribute to poverty among Albanian
households.  Both  poverty  rates  and  poverty  gaps  after  the  occurrence  of  out-of-pocket
expenditure for health become higher. This demonstrates an increased risk of falling in
11 Payments for health care or medicals that otherwise should have been provided free are also consider
informal payments under one for the definitions given in Table 1.1 in Chapter 1.
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poverty or extreme poverty among health care seekers. Such issues may also be more
serious as we expect an underestimation of the figures presented here for the lower end of
the income distribution. Generally these people face higher obstacles and financial
constraints when seeking health care and therefore are more likely to not seek it at all.
Overall, the results show that Albanian authorities should consider more seriously the
reduction of out-of-pocket payments through ensuring the effectiveness of prepaying
mechanisms for health care. The impoverishing effects of such payments call for more
attention from the policy makers. One of the possible interventions recommended would be
revising the structure of user fees so that it reflects the income distribution (as the poor seem
more likely to suffer the effects). This would include reinforcing fee exemptions for
vulnerable groups (e.g. unemployed, recipients of social assistance, pregnant women, the
disabled, people suffering severe illnesses, etc). Another potential policy measures are also
price subsidies which have proven effective in reducing catastrophic payments in other
countries (Pradhan and Prescott, 2002). Giving that particular items like informal payments
or transportation costs have a significant contribution to overall out-of-pocket expenditures,
the government should also have clear policies in addressing them. While informal
payments are more difficult to address (as they require integrated measures dealing with
governance, accountability and availability of resources), transportation costs may be cut
down more easily through measures like subsidised transportation for the poor or simply a
better distribution of health care centres.
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2.7 Appendix 2A
Table A2.1. Incidence and intensity of catastrophic health payments defined with respect to total
non-food expenditure
THRESHOLD BUDGET SHARECATASTROPHIC PAYMENTS
MEASURES Thresh. 5% Thresh. 10% Thresh. 15% Thresh. 25% Thresh. 40%
YEAR 2002
Headcount (H)
Lowest quintile 45.2 29.9 20.6 12.2 5.5
2 41.1 26.7 18.2 8.9 4.4
3 37.2 24.1 15.1 8.6 3.4
4 33.8 20.6 13.4 6.5 3.8
Highest quintile 25.3 11.7 7.3 4.1 1.4
Total 36.5 22.6 14.9 8.1 3.7
Overshoot (O) 5.4 4.0 3.1 2.0 1.2
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 14.9 17.6 20.6 24.7 31.4
YEAR 2005
Headcount (H)
Lowest quintile 60.8 49.1 43.9 31.6 22.1
2 54.7 43.7 36.1 28.3 15.8
3 48.5 38.7 31.3 20.9 12.1
4 44.6 30.4 22.3 13.6 6.0
Highest quintile 33.0 21.6 14.7 8.0 4.5
Total 48.3 36.7 29.6 20.5 12.1
Overshoot (O) 17.2 15.1 13.4 11.0 8.6
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 35.6 41.1 45.3 53.5 70.7
YEAR 2008
Headcount (H)
Lowest quintile 42.9 33.0 29.3 21.3 16.8
2 41.1 31.5 24.7 17.6 13.0
3 34.0 27.4 22.2 15.2 8.9
4 35.4 25.8 19.7 13.2 7.1
Highest quintile 26.1 19.3 14.4 8.8 5.2
Total 35.9 27.4 22.0 15.2 10.2
Overshoot (O) 17.0 15.5 14.3 12.5 10.6
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 47.5 56.5 64.8 81.9 103.8
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Chapter 3. PAYING INFORMALLY IN
PUBLIC HEALTH CARE IN
ALBANIA: SCARCE RESOURCES
OR GOVERNANCE FAILURE?
This chapter is based on the following article:
Tomini S, Maarse H. (2011). How do patient characteristics influence informal payments for inpatient
and  outpatient  health  care  in  Albania:  Results  of  logit  and  OLS  models  using  Albanian  LSMS  2005..
BMC Public Health 2011, 11:375doi:10.1186/1471-2458-11-375
Part of the analysis in this chapter is used for:
World Bank, 2011 (expected). "Out-of-Pocket Payments in Albania’s Health System" Country policy
report,  Accountability  for  Better  Governance  AAA  task  (P107759),  Europe  and  Central  Asia  Regional
Office, World Bank, Washington DC
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Abstract
Informal payments for health care are common in most former communist countries.
This chapter explores the demand side of these payments in Albania. By using pooled data
from the Albanian Living Standard Measurement Survey 2002, 2005 and 2008 we control for
individual determinants of informal payments in inpatient and outpatient health care. Using
tobit and Heckman selection models we test three models to explain informal payments: the
cultural, economic and governance model. Propensity score matching techniques are used to
investigate the changes in the characteristics of people paying informally over the different
years.
Our  findings  suggest  that  cultural  factors  in  Albania  may  only  be  seen  as  one  of  the
reasons for the existence of informal payments in health care. Other factors relating to
economic and governance models better explain how widespread and high such payments
are.  We  also  show  that  economic  factors  may  play  a  role  in  determining  the  amount  of
informal payments to medical staff, while governance issues are more closely linked to the
incidence  of  such  payments.  The  differences  over  the  years  show  that  factors  that  have
contributed to the limitation of informal payments in the early years (like the role of health
insurance or the increase of GPs wages) are losing their effectiveness in the long-run. This
was due to lack of a follow up on reforms and the indexation of wages over the years. The
effects of the latest policy measures in inpatient care should be closely monitored giving the
long-term results of reforms in outpatient care.
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3.1 Introduction
Informal payments for health care providers are widespread not only in the former
communist countries (Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union) but also in
other  middle  income  and  developing  countries  (Killingsworth  et  al.,  1999;  McPake  et  al.,
1999; Lewis, 2000; Gaal et al., 2006; Vian et al., 2006). They are usually defined as payments
made to health care providers for services, which are supposed to be provided at no charge
to  the  patient  (Lewis,  2000).  Informal  payments  in  health  care  can  be  conceptualised  as
strategies adopted by both the demand and supply side to cope with the lack of resources
and poor performance (Lewis, 2000; Vian et al., 2006). Patients pay informally to jump the
queue, receive higher quality of health services or more care (Lewis, 2000; Vian et al., 2006;
Liaropoulos et al., 2008). For providers of medical care, informal payments can turn into an
instrument to cope with low salaries or to satisfy the desire for a higher income (Liaropoulos
and Tragakes, 1998).
In countries like Albania, informal payments to medical staff have accompanied the
transition from a central planned economy to a market economy. Informal payments were
very common in Albania, especially in inpatient health care, which because of state funding
was officially free of charge for the entire population. The situation was particularly
dramatic for people in the lowest quintile of income distribution (World Bank, 2006).
This chapter looks at how patients’ characteristics influence informal payments to
medical staff in outpatient and inpatient care. We test three models (i) cultural, (ii) economic
and (iii) governance to explain the occurrence and the extent of informal payments. By
controlling for the main demand-side factors,  we seek to identify who pays,  for what,  and
how much. We use pooled data from Albania LSMS 2002, 2005, 2008 and employ a tobit and
Heckman selection model to identify individual determinants and propensity score
matching to investigate how characteristics of patients paying informally have changed over
years.
3.2 The determinants of informal health care payments
The causes and origins of informal payments have long been debated. Researchers have
suggested  many  factors  influencing  informal  payments  including:  a)  a  culture  of  gifts
(Delcheva et al., 1997; Balabanova and McKee, 2002; Vian et al., 2006); b) low income of staff
(Ensor and Savelyeva, 1998; Chawla et al., 1998; Ensor and Witter, 2001; Lewis, 2002; Vian
and Burak, 2006); c) lack of resources and material supplies (Delcheva et al., 1997; Chawla et
al., 1998, Ensor and Witter, 2001); d) bargaining power of medical doctors (Miller et al., 2000;
Thompson and Xavier, 2002); and e) lack of regulation and unresponsive government
(Lewis, 2000; Ensor and Witter, 2001). We base our theoretical framework on the main
explanatory factors for informal payments identified by Gaal and McKee (2005).  We group
them  in  three  models:  (i)  the  cultural  model,  (ii)  the  economic  model,  and  (iii)  the
governance model (see also Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1. Causes of informal payments and observed effects
MODEL PRESUMED CAUSAL FACTOR OBSERVED EFFECTS
1. Cultural
1. Culture of gratitude gifts and tipping 1. Money and in kind gifts paid to medical staff
(usually after the services received).
2. Patients declare gifts to medical staff mostly
as voluntary.
3. A relatively moderate incidence of such
payments, usually of modest value.
2. Economic
1. Demand side factors
- Free heath care access
2. Supply side factors
- Inadequate funding
- Low salaries of health care staff.
- Investments oriented more towards
access rather than quality of services.
1. Unequal amounts paid for inpatient and
outpatient health services.
2. Informal payments resemble a ‘fee-for-
service’ model (as patients may use informal
payments as top ups or for getting better quality
of service).
3. High income patients will pay higher
informal payment.
4. Having health insurance will lower the
probability of paying informally.
3. Governance
1. Lack of control and accountability
leading to unethical behaviour of medical
staff.
2. Weak rule of law and corruption
control.
1. High incidence of explicitly requested
payments.
2. Probability of paying informally is
dependent on the knowledge and bargaining
power of the patients.
3. Low numbers of prosecuted cases of
corrupted medical staff.
The cultural model considers informal payments to be a particular type of behaviour of
care seekers who express their gratitude in the form of gifts.  This model is found in many
countries, in particular in Central and Eastern European (CEE) and Former Soviet Union
(FSU) countries.  The culture of gifts has its roots in values and traditions (Balabanova and
McKee, 2002), and it can be conceptualised as institutionalised behaviour of patients. Seen as
voluntary behaviour, it is sometimes argued that a gift does not put any particular burden
on patients. The value of gifts is only modest and depends on the wealth of patients.
Payments are supposed to improve the motivation of health care staff, ensure a personal
relation, and provide incentives for physicians to feel appreciated (Gaal et al., 2006).
If this model is valid, we would expect a widespread incidence of informal payments.
Furthermore, the amount of money paid is expected to be relatively low (i.e. compared to
the total amount paid as out-of-pocket) and positively correlated to the patient’s ability to
pay (e.g. total consumption or income).
The economic model links informal payments to the increased demand for health care,
inadequate budget, as well as ineffective investment policies. The demand side factors relate
to the increased demand for health care. The communist system established in CEE and FSU
countries after the Second World War propagated a free access to health care policy under
the legacy of the ‘Shemasko’ health care system. Free health care access led to an unlimited
demand which created a supply shortage (Gaal and McKee, 2005). After the fall of the
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communist  regimes,  governments  in  these  countries  were  not  financially  capable  to
maintain an inefficient and universal health care system. With state revenues declining in
many CEE and FSU countries in the early 1990s, health expenditures also fell but with little
concomitant change in the number of staff or beds (Ensor and Witter, 2001; Lewis, 2002).
The inevitable result was a large health system with underpaid and sometimes even unpaid
staff.  Albania’s  limited  public  spending  on  health  care  sector  has  resulted  in  an  increased
reliance on out-of-pocket payments for both inpatient and outpatient care (Nuri and
Tragakes, 2002). According to the World Bank (2006), in 2005, about 97 per cent of private
health expenditures were out-of-pocket expenditures, while they accounted for 59.7 percent
of total health expenditures in the country. A rural-to-urban brain drain (Lerberghe et al.,
2002) resulted in physicians’ moving from rural areas to urban areas with better working
conditions. This created a physician shortage in rural areas and small towns (especially
visible in inpatient care). The lack of resources to respond to the growing demand led to a
situation  where  informal  payments  were  considered  as  coping  strategies  for  both  patients
and medical staff. Finally, due to political sensibility, the investment continued to be
directed mainly towards access rather than quality (Nuri and Tragakes, 2002). This made
patients more willing to pay extra amounts in order to get better quality of care.
If  informal  payments  are  driven  by  economic  reasons,  we  would  expect  significant
differences in the amounts paid for inpatient and outpatient care. Severity of illnesses
treated in these two different services differs greatly and so do the costs associated to
treatments in these services. Moreover, the consequences of not getting the (appropriate)
treatment are larger for inpatient care and therefore patients are likely to pay higher
informal  payments  to  medical  doctors  in  hospitals  than  to  general  practitioners.  As
payments are used to upgrade services or get better quality treatment they would resemble
more a ‘fee-for-service’ model depending on the type of service being delivered. Wealthier
and better educated patients would be more willing to pay extra amounts of money in order
to get better quality of services. Having paid for health insurance may lower the probability
of paying as patients are more aware of their contribution to the costs of these services and
treatments.
An  efficient  health  care  system  relies  on  an  effective  combination  of  (financial  and
human) resources and an accurate delivery system that covers the entire territory of a
country (Lewis, 2006). In the Albanian context, the lack of public policies to protect the most
poor, the lack of accountability for medical staff, weak rule of law and corruption control
(Gaal and McKee, 2005) unequal shares of the total budget distributed among different
regions and underfunded services have created ground for informal payments in health
care. The presence of widespread informal payments to medical staff is generally seen as an
indicator of governance failure in the health care sector (Lewis and Petterssen, 2009). The
incapability to maintain the rule of law leads to non-ethical behaviour of medical staff.
Patients are not protected by public authorities and as a consequence are more exposed to
exploitation from physicians. Physicians, despite their commitment to the model of medical
professionalism (Wynia et al., 1999), are tempted to use their bargaining power to increase
their earnings (Miller et al., 2000; Thompson and Xavier, 2002). The general low probability
of being detected or penalised when engaging in such practices contributes directly to the
spread of informal payments. At the same time, the widespread informal payments in the
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health  care  system  (especially  for  the  poorest  groups  of  the  population)  can  be  directly
linked to the failure of public policies in maintaining an equitable system (Tambor et al.,
2010).
If  governance  is  to  be  the  main  reason  for  informal  payments,  we  expect:  (i)  a  high
incidence of informal payments (direct payments to physicians are forbidden by law in
Albania and therefore asking for a gift/payment will certainly indicate unethical behaviour);
(ii) the probability of paying informally to be dependent on the information and bargaining
power of patients (lower educated and lower informed people have less bargaining power
and are therefore easily exploited by medical staff), and (iii) corruption cases to be generally
tolerated (i.e. number of prosecuted cases for corrupted medical staff is very low).
In summary, these three models provide a good basis for analysing informal payments
in Albania and their main causes. However, it should be noted that they are not meant to be
exclusive to each other. In countries where such payments are widespread, the policy
options need to account for the interdependence of these models.
3.3 Informal payments and recent reforms in the health care sector in
Albania
Albania, as most of the other ex-communist countries, has inherited a health care
system based on the former Soviet ‘Semashko’ model (see for details Chapter 1).
Figure 3.1. Corruption and bribes in the health sector for different countries in 2008
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The health care system in Albania remains highly reliant on publicly delivered services
and is one of the most quoted sectors for bribes in the country (IDRA, 2010). Recent surveys
of Gallup International (2008) show that 45 per cent of the interviewed perceived medical
services in Albania as extremely corrupted, showing one of the highest rates in the Western
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Balkans countries. Figure 3.1 shows that almost 21 per cent of the interviewed declared to
have been requested a bribe, and 63 per cent had paid a bribe in 2008 for health care. This is
much higher than in any other Western Balkan country.
The  Ministry  of  Health  (MoH)  in  Albania  (National  Health  Sector  Strategy,  2004)  has
recognised informal payments in health care as widespread both in inpatient and outpatient
care. However the government has not succeeded to contain such informality so far.
Table 3.2. Responsibilities in the health care sector
YEAR
MINISTRY OF HEALTH IS RESPONSIBLE
FOR:
HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR:
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR:
2002
- Salaries of medical staff12
- Capital investments (hospitals
only)
- Operating costs
- Human resources planning
- Salaries of GPs
- Salaries of PHC medical staff in
Tirana
- Durres hospital (pilot project)
- Drugs reimbursement
- PHC operating costs
2005
- Salaries of medical staff2
- Capital investments for hospitals
- Operating costs
- Human resources planning
- Salaries of GPs
- Salaries of PHC medical staff in
Tirana
- Durres hospital (pilot project)
- Diagnostic reimbursements for
expensive tests
- Drugs reimbursement
- PHC capital investments
(conditional grants)
2008
- Salaries of medical staff in hospitals
- Capital investments for hospitals
- Human resources planning
- Contracting of PHC services (420
PHC units since 2007)
- Durres hospital (pilot project)
- Diagnostic reimbursements for
expensive tests
- Drugs reimbursement
- PHC capital investments
(conditional grants)
2009-
2010
- Capital investments for hospitals
- Human resources planning
- Contracting of PHC services
(salaries and operating costs)
- Contracting of hospital services
(salaries and operating costs) –
ongoing
- Drugs reimbursement
- PHC capital investments
(conditional grants)
Source: World Bank 2006, MOH 2004, HII 2010
The reforms in the period 2002-2010 have mainly focussed on shifting the management
and financial responsibilities from the MoH to the Health Insurance Institute (HII) and local
government units (LGU). Table 3.2 gives an overview of the changes in responsibilities for
health care throughout the recent years. As it can be seen from table 3.2, the main changes
between years 2002 and 2005 relate to consolidating the financing of the Primary Health
12 This excludes the salaries of general practitioners, primary health staff in Tirana and medical staff in
Durres hospital which are paid directly by the Health Insurance Institute.
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Care (PHC) through the HII (but limited in the salaries of general practitioners) and
transferring PHC capital investments to LGUs. The reforms between 2005 and 2008 consist
in further increasing the HII role in contracting PHC services. The first changes began in
2007 but to our best knowledge no evaluation of the effects exists. Generally, reforms
between 2002 and 2008 were focused on primary health care and outpatient service. Little
was  done  with  regard  to  inpatient  care  (the  contracting  of  such  services  from the  HII  will
only be implemented in 2009-2010 and the effects are still to be seen).
Figure 3.2. Health Insurance Institute Expenditures for Primary Health Care Centres and Hospital
Services
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Source: Health Insurance Institute 2010. Note: All amounts are in Albanian Leks are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL =
0.73 Euros in June 2002 (Bank of Albania, 2010)
Administrative data show that the funds going through the HII have increased
throughout the years. The reforms in contracting the PHC services in 2007 and the hospital
services in 2009 have further increased the allocation of funds going through the HII (Figure
3.2). This increase is mainly due to the transfer of administrative responsibilities. The overall
effect on informal payments to medical staff is still to be seen.
Figure 3.3. Monthly salaries of General Practitioners (in 000 ALL)
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Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2006) and Health Insurance Institute (2010). Note: All amounts are in
Albanian Leks are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in June 2002 (Bank of Albania, 2010)
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One of the measures linked to informal payment has been the increase of medical staff’s
salaries. Between 2002 and 2005 such salaries have significantly increased for the general
practitioners (GPs) which were paid through the HII. Figure 3.3 shows the average salary
level of GPs between 2000 and 2008 both in nominal value and real terms (adjusted for
Consumer Price Index).  This increase has been substantive in real terms between 2000 and
2005, but there is a decline of average salaries in real terms between 2006 and 2008.
Salaries of medical staff in the inpatient sector have also constantly increased during the
same period (and especially after 2005), but the average wage for medical specialists in this
sector still remains below the average wage of the medical staff in PHCs.
3.4 Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in this study come from Albania Living Standard Measurement Survey
(ALSMS) 2002, 2005 and 2008. These are cross sectional surveys representative for four main
stratified regions; Tirana (the capital), mountainous, coastal and central areas. The
households sampled were 3599 in 2002, 3640 in 2005, and 3600 in 2008. The questionnaires
include information on household demography, education, labour, income, health status,
health care episodes and out-of-pocket payments in health care. The variables that we have
used in our analysis all come from identical questions in these three years.
For the purpose of our analysis we restrict our samples to individuals that have visited
outpatient care during the last four weeks (visited public ambulatory services), or
individuals that have been visiting inpatient care in the last 12 months (hospitalised in the
public hospitals). The selected individuals are then asked separately about the amount they
have paid informally as payments to the medical staff.
Table 3.4. The share of patients paying informal payments to medical staff in outpatient and
inpatient health care (ALSMS data 2002-2008)
CONSUMPTION
QUINTILES
YEAR 2002 YEAR 2005 YEAR 2008
Outpatient care
1 0.228 (0.041) 0.268 (0.042) 0.221 (0.047)
2 0.293 (0.042) 0.244 (0.046) 0.158 (0.035)
3 0.268 (0.032) 0.203 (0.039) 0.200 (0.040)
4 0.327 (0.042) 0.222 (0.035) 0.215 (0.035)
5 0.271 (0.028) 0.162** (0.029) 0.150 (0.032)
Total population 0.281 (0.021) 0.218 (0.021) 0.190 (0.021)
Nr of observations 2120 1463 1151
Inpatient care
1 0.479* (0.063) 0.548 (0.060) 0.465 (0.071)
2 0.569 (0.060) 0.602 (0.056) 0.495 (0.085)
3 0.654 (0.048) 0.586 (0.061) 0.351 (0.080)
4 0.644 (0.049) 0.529 (0.057) 0.445 (0.078)
5 0.598 (0.048) 0.517 (0.055) 0.434 (0.086)
Total population 0.597 (0.030) 0.559 (0.032) 0.439 (0.041)
Nr of observations 707 677 377
Note: Quintiles refer to total per capita consumption quintiles. Standard errors are in brackets. Stars indicate if the
mean for the subgroup is significantly different from the mean of all other subgroups. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
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The incidence of informal payments is relatively high throughout the years. However,
incidences of the informal payments for outpatient and inpatient care differ significantly
when the two types of services are compared. Informal payments are less frequent in
outpatient than in inpatient care. Hence, 28.1 per cent of the total patients pay an informal
payment to medical staff for 2002 in outpatient care and 19 per cent in 2008. For inpatient
care these number are 59.7 per cent in 2002 and 43.9 per cent in 2008.
These informal payments are widespread also across consumption quintiles, with the
lowest quintiles having a large incidence of such payments. What is more interesting is that
while there is a general declining trend of such payments in 2005 and 2008, the poorest
quintiles are the ones to feel less such effect. In fact in the outpatient care in 2005 and 2008
the poorest quintile is the one with the highest incidence of informal payments (26.8 and
22.1 per cent respectively). The same holds to a lesser extent for inpatient care (54.8 and 46.5
per cent respectively). This tendency is certainly signalling that whatever measures were
taken between years these were certainly not targeted to the poor (see Table 3.4).
The amounts paid informally to medical staff for inpatient care (per admission) are
much  higher  than  those  paid  in  outpatient  care  (per  visit).  Over  the  years  we  observe  a
decline (in real terms) for the average amount paid in outpatient care, while there is an
increase for the inpatient care between 2002 and 2005 and a slight decrease between 2005
and 2008. Again, as for the incidence of payments, the poorest quintiles are the most
disadvantaged ones (see Tables 3.5).
Table 3.5. The mean of the amount paid informally per outpatient visit and per day hospitalised
(ALSMS data 2002-2008)
CONSUMPTION
QUINTILES
YEAR 2002 YEAR 2005 YEAR 2008
The mean of the amount paid informally per outpatient visit in Albanian Leks (series with 2002 prices)
Quintile 1 74.733 (20.639) 82.088 (20.486) 67.548 (16.590)
Quintile 2 76.037* (11.757) 71.665 (17.044) 38.499 (9.838)
Quintile 3 86.652 (20.342) 80.278 (21.037) 53.222 (11.613)
Quintile 4 125.885 (37.708) 71.945 (14.106) 59.052 (11.992)
Quintile 5 122.419 (23.090) 52.283 (10.410) 35.356* (7.874)
Total Population 103.163 (12.875) 71.110 (9.866) 50.810 (6.206)
Nr of observation 2120 1463 1151
The mean of the amount paid informally per inpatient admission in Albanian Leks (series with 2002 prices)
Quintile 1 2698.463*** (612.398) 4292.778 (899.461) 2564.909 (710.817)
Quintile 2 3348.461** (679.372) 4809.482 (753.513) 4127.072 (1676.403)
Quintile 3 4739.347 (828.564) 5020.699 (1033.697) 2090.516 (709.647)
Quintile 4 6097.601 (935.214) 5289.257 (1188.339) 4924.746 (1483.995)
Quintile 5 6470.973* (1193.826) 7679.654 (1904.738) 3396.170 (1003.774)
Total Population 4835.322 (450.216) 5284.280 (574.326) 3341.701 (525.999)
Nr of observation 697 660 354
Note: Quintiles refer to total per capita consumption quintiles. Standard errors are in brackets.
Stars indicate if the mean for the subgroup is significantly different from the mean of all other subgroups. *** p<.01, **
p<.05, * p<.1
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3.5 Empirical strategy
The descriptive statics show clearly that certain characteristics of the individuals (e.g.
economic status) might be associated closely with the amount paid. There are also distinct
changes between the years and between expenditure categories. In order to further explore
this we look at how patients’ characteristics influence informal payments during the years.
3.5.1. Determinants of informal payments
Albania LSMS it  is  not a panel survey so we have to rely on cross section analysis for
determining the effect of individual characteristics on the amount paid informally to
medical staff.  To do this we pool the data from ALSMS 2002, 2005 and 2008.
Our first  goal is to get more insights on the individual characteristics determining the
amount  paid  informally.  In  this  case,  the  amount  of  informal  payments  is  determined  by
individual characteristics of individuals:
iii xy eb += '
*  ,  i = 1, 2, 3 … ,N (1)
where, iy refers  to  the  amount  paid  informally  to  medical  staff  in  outpatient  or
inpatient care, ix denotes a vector of exogenous and observed individual characteristics,
b represents a vector of estimated coefficients corresponding to the such characteristics,
and ie is a vector of residuals errors having a normal distribution.
Not all patients that have reported to have visited health care have reported informal
payments to medical staff. Therefore we have a share of people reporting zero payments.
We suspect this may be linked to two possible reasons: 1) the left censoring at zero, or 2) a
possible selection problem.
The left censoring means that the dependent variable is represented by a latent variable
*y that is not observed when 0<iy . The distribution has full support within the interval
( )+¥¥- ; but we can only observe values that are equal or above 0. The observed variable
is thus related to the latent variable through the below observation rule:
*y if 0* >y
0    if 0* £y   (2)
As we are dealing here with informal payments in health care it is completely feasible
to imagine a negative value for such payments (some people may be just aware that they
should get treatment at no costs, as they have already contributed to the public health care
either  directly  by  paying  health  insurance  or  through  taxes).  Therefore  it  is  completely
feasible that the data can be better described by such model.
The possible selection bias may be a classical case when the selection and the outcomes
are determined by different probability functions.  This is a two part model where the first
part is a binary outcome modelled as the probability that the binary variable is bigger than
0, and the second part uses a linear regression to model the outcome if the outcome is bigger
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than 0. The model introduces a latent variable *1y and the outcome
*
2y which is observed if
0*1 >y .  In  our  case
*
1y defines the probability that the patient pays informal payments,
*
2y defines the level of these payments,
*
1
*
1 yy ¹ .
The model includes two equations, the first one being a selection equation for 1y , where:
1 if 0*1 >y (3)
0 if 0*1 £y
and the resultant outcome for 2y , where
*
2y  if 0
*
1 >y (4)
-      if 0*1 <y
The Heckman selection model is used to check whether there exist any potential biases
with the selection of the respondents (i.e. people that under the given circumstances will not
pay  informal  payments  but  that  are  included  in  our  analysis).  This  model  is  supposed  to
capture the overall effect that certain observable characteristics may have on the selection.
This is a very important aspect if we want to avoid any biases associated with the estimates
from the tobit model. Results from the two models are compared with each other to check
for inconsistencies.
3.5.2. Impact over the years
Evaluating the between-years changes in individual informal payments for health care
requires a panel survey that would follow the same individuals over the years and measure
the incidence and amounts paid informally. In the absence of such panel survey, we could
use the potential of similar representative surveys for 2002, 2005 and 2008 and employ
propensity score matching (PSM). PSM helps in identifying individuals with similar
characteristics  over  different  years  in  the  absence  of  an  experimental  set  up,  where  we
would be able to construct counterfactuals. After these counterfactuals are identified we can
use  them  to  observe  the  changes  over  the  years  for  those  paying  informal  payments  and
those  not  paying.  This  would  capture  the  real  change  over  the  years  not  for  the  total
population but for people having similar characteristics and therefore produce more
accurate estimates. Thus, PSM creates a situation equivalent to an experiment where
everyone has the same probability of participating in the consecutive year, and this
probability is balanced among the participants and not participants and conditional on
observed variables.
We assume
iy1 to be the participation outcome for individual i when this individual is
subject  to  participating  in  the  current  and  previous  survey  and iy0 to  be  the  outcome  in
absence of the participation for the same individual (see also Deheija and Wahba, 2002;
Dabalen et al., 2008). The effect for an individual is:
iti yy 01 -=t (5)
and population effect can therefore be defined as:
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( ) ( )0|1| 01 =-== iiiii TyETyEt (6)
where T indicates the participation in the survey, and iT is equal to 1 if individual i
participates in the survey and 0 if not. As the “treatment” here refers to the consecutive year
of the survey we do not observe outcomes that would have materialised if corresponding
individuals had not participated in the survey ( )1|0 =ii TyE .  In  our  case  the  “treatment”
involves entire population and therefore the participation is independent of potential
outcomes ( )iii Tyy ^01 , . The average participation effect for the population participating is:
( ) ( )0|1| =-== iiii TyETyEt (7)
The variables used for matching correspond to observable characteristics of individuals
that  are  stable  over  the  years.  The  random  selection  of  participants  in  the  surveys  makes
sure that the qualities of the participants and not participants are identical in terms of the
distribution of the observed characteristics. Given that all surveys were country
representative, we can assume that individuals had the same probability of participating in
the consecutive survey, and that both participants and not participants came from the same
economic environment. Both the condition of random selection of participants and the
similarities in the background (Heckman et al., 1997) are fulfilled in our analysis.
3.6 Results
Results are presented separately for outpatient and inpatient care.
3.6.1. Results for outpatient care
Table 3.6 gives the results of tobit  and Heckman selection model for the amount paid
informally in outpatient care. The exclusion instruments used for non-random assignment
of systematic non-payers (patients that will  not pay an informal payment under the given
circumstances) are the dummies corresponding to having health insurance, having
difficulties to pay for health care, and being a health practitioner (as the profession of the
patient). These instruments are chosen so that they relate more to the probability of paying
informally and not to the amount paid. The overidentifying restriction tests (Sargan, 1958;
Barmann, 1960) indicate whether the exclusion instruments fulfil the requirement of being
exogenous  to  the  amount  paid  informally  (while  correlated  to  the  probability  of  paying).
The  outcomes  of  the  tests  do  not  reject  the  null  hypothesis  (the  lower  part  of  Table  3.6)
showing that our exclusion instruments can be considered valid.13  At the same time we also
test for the validity of the selection correction. The likelihood-ratio test for rho=0 rejects its
null hypothesis showing that OLS estimates without the selection correction would be
inconsistent.
13 A statistically significant test statistic always indicates that the instruments may not be valid. A non-
significant test indicates that the instruments may be considered as valid.
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Table 3.6. Informal payments for outpatient health care – Results from tobit and Heckman selection
models
TOBIT MODEL HECKMAN SELECTION MODEL
VARIABLES Log of the amount paid
informally Selection model
Log of the amount
paid informally
(Year 2002)
Year 2005 -0.683*** (0.150) -0.240*** (0.050) 0.123** (0.058)
Year 2008 -0.672*** (0.175) -0.220*** (0.058) -0.041 (0.069)
Rural area 0.039 (0.146) -0.003 (0.049) 0.147*** (0.050)
(Stratum central)
Stratum coastal 0.486*** (0.153) 0.187*** (0.051) -0.162*** (0.055)
Stratum mountain -0.870*** (0.183) -0.293*** (0.061) 0.063 (0.071)
Stratum Tirana -0.983*** (0.221) -0.316*** (0.073) 0.111 (0.090)
Gender (“0” male, “1” female) 0.091 (0.126) 0.031 (0.042) 0.007 (0.045)
Age (in years) 0.009 (0.014) 0.002 (0.005) 0.008 (0.005)
Age squared -0.000** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000* (0.000)
Chronic illness 0.008 (0.176) -0.001 (0.059) 0.063 (0.062)
(Health rate: bad)
Health rate: average -0.034 (0.158) -0.010 (0.053) -0.035 (0.057)
Health rate: good -0.237 (0.198) -0.066 (0.066) -0.094 (0.072)
(Primary/No education)
Secondary education 0.014 (0.171) -0.007 (0.057) 0.122** (0.061)
University education -0.471 (0.322) -0.164 (0.108) 0.223* (0.129)
(Nuclear families)
Extended families 0.116 (0.135) 0.038 (0.046) -0.008 (0.048)
Quintile 1 -0.033 (0.214) -0.016 (0.072) 0.050 (0.077)
Quintile 2 -0.008 (0.206) 0.013 (0.069) -0.104 (0.073)
(Quintile 3)
Quintile 4 0.460** (0.189) 0.154** (0.064) -0.003 (0.067)
Quintile 5 0.307 (0.197) 0.080 (0.066) 0.186*** (0.069)
Has health insurance -0.748*** (0.142) -0.256*** (0.047) - -
(Have no difficulties to pay for health care
services)
Have difficulties to pay for health care
services 0.266* (0.140) 0.090* (0.046) - -
Health practitioners -0.653 (0.495) -0.215 (0.166) - -
Constant 2.031*** (0.386) -0.357*** (0.128) 5.625*** (0.173)
N (Left-censored N) 4734 (3634) 4734 (3634)
Log likelihood -4294.121 -3603.754
Pseudo R2 0.0317
Rho: Correlation of error terms -.394*** (0.120)
LR test of independent eqns. (H0: rho
= 0),[Prob>chi2] 5.80 [0.016]
Wald chi2 [Prob>chi2] Whole model 69.72 [0.000]
Overidentification tests:
 Sargan (score) chi2 (H0: Instruments are exogenous to log of
amount paid informally) [Prob>chi2]
1.140 [0.566]
Basmann chi2  (H0: Instruments are exogenous to to log of
amount paid informally) [Prob>chi2] 1.135 [0.567]
Note: Stars indicate: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1; Reference categories in italics. Standard errors are in brackets. Results of
the middle column “Selection model” should be interpreted as the increase
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As we can see,  the effects of individual characteristics on the amount paid informally
(expressed here as the natural logarithm) vary slightly across tobit and Heckman selection
models. The results show that the mean of amount paid informally for outpatient care has
decreased over time. Patients pay lower amounts informally in 2008 and 2005 compared to
2002. However, the use of exclusion instruments in the selection model suggests that such
decrease  is  mainly  due  to  a  lower  probability  of  paying  in  these  later  years  (some
individuals are not likely to pay and their share increases over the years). The table shows
that for every patient in 2005 the logs of paying informally decrease 0.24 times (compared to
2002) and in 2008 decrease 0.22 times. If we correct for this (the log of amount paid on the
right part of the table), then the effect is not as large as before and also turns positive (and
statistically significant) for 2005.
Residents of rural areas pay larger amounts of informal payments for outpatient care
compared to residents of urban areas. The selection correction shows that such difference is
statistically significant only for the amount paid and negative (not statistically significant)
for the probability of paying. This shows that patients coming from rural areas are less likely
to pay (for every patient from rural area the logs of paying informally decrease by 0.003
times compared to urban area patients), but pay in general higher amounts. Such differences
can be a result of a mix of visits in health care centres located in rural or urban areas. Due to
social connections they are less likely to pay informally in their own localities (Vian and
Burak, 2006), but pay higher amounts in urban areas where such connections are lacking
and higher opportunity costs are involved (e.g. higher transportation costs, staying over,
etc).
The results of the geographic divisions (stratums) show that there exist significant
regional differences in paying informally to medical staff. Results from tobit and Heckman
selection models differ at this point. Residents of coastal areas seem to be more likely to pay
in outpatient care compared to others areas but they pay lower amounts (after the selection
correction). On the other hand, residents of mountainous areas and Tirana are less likely to
pay informally compared to residents of coastal and central areas. This difference may be
due to the fact that mountainous areas and Tirana are on average poorer than central and
coastal areas (World Bank, 2006; INSTAT 2009).
Older people pay higher informal payments in outpatient care. This increase is related
to the higher predisposition of getting health care (older people have a higher demand for
health care). The negative slope of the age squared variable indicates an inverted-U shape of
the  amount  paid  informally  to  age.  This  shows that  working-age  adults  are  the  ones  who
pay larger amounts informally and this can be linked to their higher income generating
capabilities and higher opportunity costs. As expected, patients in the higher expenditure
quintiles generally spend more for informal payments in outpatient care. However, we can
also observe some deviations from this general rule. The selection correction shows that
patients in quintile 1 may have a lower probability of paying but pay (for every patient from
rural area the logs of paying informally decrease by 0.003 times compared to urban area
patients) larger amounts than higher quintiles (though results are not statistically
significant),  or that quintile 4 may pay lower amounts than the lower ones (the coefficient
for the logarithm of amount paid is negative but again not statistically significant). This
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shows that informal payments do not follow the trend of the income distribution and that
the lowest quintiles may be the more disadvantaged ones.
Health insurance is among the exclusion correction instruments we have chosen. As we
have shown it reduces significantly the probability of paying informally in outpatient care
(this also explains its significance in the tobit  model) but does less so for the amount paid.
The use of the other correction instruments shows that people who have difficulties to pay
for health care are more likely to pay informally. This demonstrates the unfairness of
informal payments and also indicates that vulnerable groups (e.g. those who are also less
likely to be protected by health insurance) are more prone to such payments. On the other
hand, results show that groups with more social connections and information, like health
practitioners, have a lower probability of paying informal payments for health care (though
results are not statistically significant showing that informal payments are nevertheless
spread across all groups).
The matching findings reported in Table 3.7 show that there were no big differences in
the average amount paid informally in outpatient care between years 2002 and 2005, but
there is a decrease in the average amount of such payments between years 2005 and 2008
(statistically significant). The effect of different measures (i.e. financing health services and
wages  directly  from the  HII  and increasing  the  wages  of  GPs)  could  only  be  seen  in  later
years. Even though this could be considered as a positive step a 11 or 12.5 per cent decrease
of the average amount (in real terms) paid between 2002 and 2008 can be considered as a
relatively small achievement in this regard.
Table 3.7. Propensity Score Matching results for outpatient care – Time impact on the average
amount paid informally to medical staff
OUTPATIENT HEALTH CARE SERVICE
Year 2002 – 2005
Nearest – neighbour matching 0.021 (0.059)
Kernel matching 0.020 (0.053)
Year 2005 – 2008
Nearest – neighbour matching -0.152** (0.067)
Kernel matching -0.180*** (0.063)
Year 2002 – 2008
Nearest – neighbour matching -0.111* (0.065)
Kernel matching -0.125** (0.058)
Note: Stars indicate: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1; Standard errors are in brackets.
Table  3.8  shows  the  time  impact  on  the  main  characteristics  of  patients  paying
informally when individuals are matched following similar characteristics. For the
geographical areas we notice that the share of patients paying informally does not change in
a similar direction over the years.
Results show that residents of the central area and Tirana become more likely to pay
informal payments in outpatient care if years 2005 and 2008 are compared to 2002. Patients
living in the mountainous area are more likely to pay informally in 2008 compared to 2002.
Only  patients  living  in  the  coastal  area,  which  is  among the  wealthier  areas  (World  Bank,
2006), become less likely to pay informal payments over the observed years. Tobit and
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Heckman selection models show that patients living in coastal area have the highest
probability to pay compared to all other areas and therefore the decline over the years can
be attributed to the effectiveness of policy measures in this particular area. However, such
policy measures fail to affect deprived regions (i.e. the mountainous areas, whose residents
are less likely to pay in 2002 and 2005 but more likely to pay informally between 2002 and
2008).
Table 3.8. Propensity Score Matching results for outpatient care – Time impact for patients paying
informally
VARIABLES
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
YEARS (2002-2005)
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
YEARS (2005-2008)
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
YEARS (2002-2008)
Rural area -0.139*** (0.040) -0.039 (0.050) -0.061 (0.047)
Stratum central 0.174*** (0.037) 0.036 (0.049) 0.170*** (0.044)
Stratum coastal -0.090** (0.041) -0.144*** (0.048) -0.274*** (0.045)
Stratum mountain -0.150*** (0.028) 0.087*** (0.032) 0.011 (0.035)
Stratum Tirana 0.066*** (0.023) 0.021 (0.035) 0.093*** (0.030)
Gender (“0” male, “1” female) 0.028 (0.040) -0.203*** (0.049) -0.128*** (0.047)
Age (in years) -0.023 (1.999) 1.644 (2.493) 0.071 (2.282)
Age squared 144.518 (158.960) 181.639 (204.370) 183.316 (186.134)
Chronic illness -0.020 (0.040) 0.014 (0.049) -0.007 (0.046)
Health rate: bad 0.025 (0.037) -0.005 (0.047) 0.047 (0.044)
Health rate: average -0.036 (0.038) -0.008 (0.048) -0.107** (0.046)
Health rate: good 0.020 (0.038) -0.001 (0.047) 0.062 (0.044)
Without  education -0.017 (0.014) -0.004 (0.015) -0.018 (0.018)
Primary education 0.059 (0.041) -0.010 (0.050) 0.080* (0.048)
Secondary education -0.072** (0.032) 0.056 (0.042) -0.035 (0.041)
University education -0.039*** (0.013) -0.001 (0.013) -0.065*** (0.016)
Nuclear families -0.049 (0.040) -0.431*** (0.042) -0.494*** (0.039)
Extended families 0.034 (0.040) 0.440*** (0.043) .486*** (0.040)
Quintile 1 0.080*** (0.029) 0.037 (0.041) .052 (0.035)
Quintile 2 0.031 (0.031) -0.065* (0.038) -.029 (0.035)
Quintile 3 -0.042 (0.032) 0.019 (0.041) -.005 (0.039)
Quintile 4 -0.010 (0.035) -0.007 (0.043) .026 (0.042)
Quintile 5 -0.059* (0.034) 0.016 (0.038) -.044 (0.039)
Has health insurance 0.043 (0.041) 0.145*** (0.049) 0.133*** (0.046)
Have difficulties to pay for
health care services
-0.025 (0.039) -0.095* (0.049) -0.156*** (0.046)
Health practitioners -0.022** (0.009) 0.011 (0.008) -0.008 (0.012)
Note: Results are displayed for the matching using 5-nearest neighbour estimator. The caliper width is 0.01. Stars
indicate: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1; Standard errors are in brackets. Results should be interpreted as the differences in
means for a particular group paying informal payments to medical staff (e.g. the number of identical rural residents
paying informal payments to medical staff has gone down by 0.139 from to 2002 to 2005).
People with university education are less likely to pay informally in outpatient care if
years 2005 and 2008 are compared to 2002. This effect shows that higher educated people
have become more aware of their rights or are in a better negotiation position with medical
staff. The time effect turns positively only for people with primary education if year 2008 is
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compared to 2002 showing that they become more likely to pay informally in outpatient
care. Having very basic education reduces the chances to be formally employed (and
therefore  to  benefit  from health  insurance)  and may also  limit  the  social  connections  with
medical staff (the same table shows that being a health practitioner lowers the probability of
paying over the years because of these connections).
The share of people in the highest quintile paying informal payments in outpatient care
went down between years 2002 and 2005 and the same trend is more or less maintained for
the three top quintiles throughout the years (even though not statistically significant). The
contrary has happened for the first or second quintiles. The first quintile becomes
consistently more likely to pay informally throughout all years confirming our previous
findings and showing a regressive effect of measures taken to reduce informal payments in
the Albanian outpatient care.
In the tobit and the Heckman selection models we have found that having health
insurance reduces the probability of paying informally in outpatient care. Despite this, the
effect of health insurance over the years has not been moving in the same direction. Patients
having health insurance become more likely to pay if year 2008 is compared to 2002 and
2005. The positive (and statistically significant) coefficients show that the effect of health
insurance in lowering the probability of paying has decreased over the years. In fact, it looks
like that the lack of further policy measures between years 2005 and 2008 has created reverse
incentives for participation in the social health insurance scheme.
3.6.2. Results for inpatient services
Table 3.9 gives the results for the tobit  and Heckman selection models for the amount
paid informally to medical staff in inpatient care. The exclusion instruments we have used
here are similar to those in outpatient care and correspond to dummies for having health
insurance,  having  difficulties  to  pay  for  health  care,  and  being  a  health  practitioner.  The
overidentifying restriction tests do not reject the null hypothesis (the lower part of Table 3.9)
proving  that  our  exclusion  instruments  can  be  considered  valid  as  in  outpatient  care.  The
likelihood-ratio test for rho=0 rejects its null hypothesis showing that OLS estimates without
the selection correction would be inconsistent.
The results of the tobit model show that the amount of informal payments in inpatient
care has decreased with years and especially between years 2005 and 2008. The correction
for  the  selection  model  shows that  in  fact  such  results  should  be  mainly  attributed  to  the
decrease in the probability of paying informally. The negative coefficients in the third
column of the table show that such probability has decreased significantly both in 2005 and
2008, showing that the share of non-payers (individuals having a probability close to 0 on
paying informally) has increased.
However, the Heckman selection model shows that the change in the amount paid over
the years turns to be positive and significant. In other words, in 2005 and 2008 people may
be less likely to pay informally for inpatient care than they were in 2002 but those who pay
informally, pay higher amounts.
PAYING INFORMALLY: SCARCE RESOURCES OR GOVERNANCE FAILURE
47
Table 3.9. Informal payments for inpatient services – Results from tobit and Heckman selection
models
TOBIT MODEL HECKMAN SELECTION MODEL
VARIABLES Log of the amount paid
informally Selection model
Log of the amount
paid informally
(Year 2002)
Year 2005 -0.080 (0.305) -0.033 (0.071) 0.192* (0.111)
Year 2008 -1.044** (0.405) -0.230** (0.092) 0.354** (0.155)
Rural area 0.224 (0.320) 0.046 (0.073) -0.049 (0.113)
(Stratum central)
Stratum coastal 0.900** (0.359) 0.169** (0.085) 0.055 (0.132)
Stratum mountain -1.799*** (0.339) -0.328*** (0.077) -0.416*** (0.129)
Stratum Tirana -1.388** (0.540) -0.270** (0.122) 0.144 (0.205)
Gender (“0” male, “1” female) 0.265 (0.279) 0.060 (0.064) -0.057 (0.104)
Age (in years) 0.024 (0.031) 0.004 (0.007) 0.033*** (0.011)
Age squared -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
Chronic illness -0.864** (0.397) -0.180** (0.091) -0.020 (0.149)
(Health rate: bad)
Health rate: average 0.023 (0.387) -0.071 (0.088) 0.437*** (0.144)
Health rate: good 0.496 (0.452) -0.008 (0.104) 0.650*** (0.166)
(Primary/No education)
Secondary education 0.547 (0.363) 0.113 (0.084) 0.025 (0.132)
University education 0.777 (0.711) 0.088 (0.166) 0.380 (0.255)
(Nuclear families)
Extended families -0.094 (0.298) -0.035 (0.069) 0.182* (0.109)
Quintile 1 -0.981** (0.426) -0.192** (0.097) -0.016 (0.160)
Quintile 2 -0.149 (0.416) -0.043 (0.095) -0.084 (0.153)
(Quintile 3)
Quintile 4 0.163 (0.427) 0.052 (0.099) -0.064 (0.155)
Quintile 5 0.599 (0.441) 0.103 (0.103) 0.295* (0.159)
(Have no difficulties to pay for health
care services)
Has health insurance -0.952*** (0.310) -0.216*** (0.062) - -
Have difficulties to pay for health
care services
0.563* (0.313) 0.152** (0.062) - -
Health practitioners -0.368 (0.888) -0.091 (0.170) - -
Constant 2.026** (0.910) 0.252 (0.205) 5.964*** (0.322)
N (Left-censored N) 1711 (788) 1711 (788)
Log likelihood -3418.707 -2669.832
Pseudo R2 0.021
Rho: Correlation of error terms -0.798** (0.537)
LR test of independent eqns. (H0:
rho = 0),[Prob>chi2] 14.65 [0.000]
Wald chi2 [Prob>chi2] Whole model 101.23 [0.000]
Overidentification tests:
 Sargan (score) chi2 (H0: Instruments are exogenous to log of
amount paid informally) [Prob>chi2] 0.218 [0.896]
Basmann chi2  (H0: Instruments are exogenous to to log of
amount paid informally) [Prob>chi2] 0.215 [0.897]
Note: Stars indicate: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1; Reference categories in italics. Standard errors are in brackets.
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Being a rural resident does not have a statistical significant effect on the amount paid
informally for inpatient care. This is evidence that the amounts paid informally in inpatient
care do not differ significantly between patients living in rural or urban areas. However, we
notice more differences when checking for the geographical area of the patients. Patients
living in coastal areas pay higher amounts as informal payments to medical staff compared
to patients living in central areas (though again the selection correction shows that this is
due to the higher probability of paying rather than the amount paid). On the other hand,
patients coming from mountainous areas pay smaller amounts. This may relate again to the
poverty levels in these areas (see above).
We observe for inpatient care a positive correlation between age and both the
probability of paying informally and the amount paid. The negative coefficient for age
squared re-confirms the inverted-U shape of such relation (working age adults are again the
ones to pay the higher amounts informally). On the other hand, chronic illness reduces the
amount paid informally to medical staff in inpatient care. The selection correction indicates
that a good part of the statistical effect could be dedicated to the fact that such patients are
simply  less  likely  to  pay  informally.  The  reasons  behind  this  may  relate  to  the  financial
burden  of  long-term  illnesses  but  also  to  their  better  knowledge  on  how  the  system  of
informal payments works (as they tend to return to hospitals).
Similarly to outpatient care, the two highest consumption quintiles pay higher amounts
informally compared to other quintiles. However, coefficients are not always statistically
significant showing that differences between quintiles are not clearly drawn. The effect of
our exclusion variables is also similar to that in outpatient care. The major contribution of
health insurance is that it lowers the probability of paying informally (for every patient with
health insurance the logs of probability to pay informally go down with 0.216 times
compared to patients without insurance). Individuals facing difficulties to pay for health
care are again more likely to pay informal payments and health care practitioners are less
likely to pay to their colleagues (though the effect is again not statistically significant). For
every  patients  working  in  health  sector  the  logs  of  probability  to  pay  informally  go  down
with 0.091 times compared to other patients.
Table 3.10. Propensity Score Matching results for inpatient care – Time impact on the amount paid
informally to medical staff
INPATIENT HEALTH CARE SERVICE
Year 2002 – 2005
Nearest – neighbour matching 0.113 (0.113)
Kernel matching 0.062 (0.106)
Year 2005 – 2008
Nearest – neighbour matching -0.026 (0.152)
Kernel matching -0.044 (0.138)
Year 2002 – 2008
Nearest – neighbour matching 0.096 (0.145)
Kernel matching 0.094 (0.136)
Note: Stars indicate: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1; Standard errors are in brackets.
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The  matching  findings  reported  in  Table  3.10  show  that  the  trend  of  the  average
amount  paid  informally  in  inpatient  care  over  the  years  is  similar  to  what  we  found  for
outpatient care. There is an increase in the average amount paid informally between years
2002 and 2005, but there is a decrease in these amounts between years 2005 and 2008
(though not statistically significant if both matching techniques are used). This change
makes the overall effect between years 2002 and 2008 positive (but statistically not
significant). Again, it looks like there have been more incentives to reduce informal
payments between years 2005 and 2008 than there were between years 2002 and 2005.
The time impact of different patient characteristics for inpatient care in Table 3.11
shows that changes between the years are similar to those for outpatient care.
Table 3.11. Propensity Score Matching results for inpatient care – Time impact for individuals
paying informally
VARIABLES
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
YEARS (2002-2005)
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
YEARS (2005-2008)
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
YEARS (2002-2008)
Rural area 0.060 (0.039) 0.066 (0.051) 0.109** (0.051)
Stratum central 0.047 (0.035) 0.109** (0.050) 0.177*** (0.049)
Stratum coastal -0.064* (0.037) -0.053 (0.045) -0.150*** (0.046)
Stratum mountain -0.030 (0.037) -0.006 (0.046) -0.014 (0.046)
Stratum Tirana 0.047** (0.020) -0.049* (0.031) -0.013 (0.028)
Gender (“0” male, “1”
female)
0.007 (0.039) -0.228*** (0.051) -0.220*** (0.050)
Age (in years) 1.101 (1.746) 4.686** (2.278) 5.367** (2.159)
Age squared 185.505 (140.670) 377.037* (202.331) 522.859*** (194.429)
Chronic illness -0.084** (0.039) 0.057 (0.052) -0.026 (0.052)
Health rate: bad 0.084** (0.035) -0.058 (0.048) 0.081* (0.046)
Health rate: average -0.092*** (0.033) 0.005 (0.040) -0.080* (0.043)
Health rate: good 0.043 (0.039) 0.009 (0.051) 0.017 (0.051)
Without  education -0.011 (0.009) 0.012 (0.009) -0.011 (0.013)
Primary education 0.062 (0.039) -0.038 (0.051) 0.049 (0.051)
Secondary education -0.060* (0.032) 0.077* (0.044) -0.009 (0.045)
University education -0.032* (0.017) -0.007 (0.019) -0.038* (0.020)
Nuclear families -0.129*** (0.039) -0.439*** (0.042) -0.535*** (0.040)
Extended families 0.117*** (0.039) 0.413*** (0.044) 0.501*** (0.042)
Quintile 1 0.076*** (0.029) 0.054 (0.043) 0.043 (0.041)
Quintile 2 0.034 (0.032) -0.036 (0.043) 0.001 (0.041)
Quintile 3 0.033 (0.033) -0.051 (0.040) -0.077* (0.039)
Quintile 4 -0.053* (0.032) -0.040 (0.041) -0.016 (0.042)
Quintile 5 -0.090*** (0.032) 0.073* (0.040) 0.048 (0.042)
Has health insurance -0.022 (0.039) 0.176*** (0.051) 0.169*** (0.051)
Have difficulties to pay for
health care services
-0.023 (0.036) -0.093* (0.049) -0.105** (0.048)
Health practitioners -0.027** (0.012) 0.001 (0.011) -0.023 (0.016)
Note: Stars indicate: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1; Standard errors are in brackets. Results should be interpreted as the
differences in means for a particular group paying informal payments to medical staff (e.g. the number of identical
rural residents paying informal payments to medical staff has gone up by 0.060 from to 2002 to 2005).
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Rural area residents become more likely to pay informally if year 2008 is compared to
year 2002 and this confirms that the burden is shifting towards those with higher
opportunity  costs  (due  to  longer  distances)  or  fewer  social  connections  and  information
(since hospitals are mostly located in Tirana and urban areas). Similarly to outpatient
services there are differences between residents of geographical regions of the country.
Patients living in central Albania become more likely to pay informally in inpatient care if
year 2008 is compared to 2002 while patients coming from other regions become less likely
to pay informally (though differences are not always significant). These between-areas
differences could be a consequence of higher resources allocated to certain geographical
areas (e.g. higher salaries for medical staff willing to work in remote hospitals, etc).
The  effect  of  informal  payments  over  the  years  increasingly  falls  over  the  poorest
members of the society. Patients from the lowest quintile become more likely to pay if
different years are compared, while this is different for other patients. The effect of health
insurance over the years is again questionable. People having health insurance become less
likely  to  pay  if  year  2005  is  compared  to  year  2002  (but  the  effect  is  not  statistically
significant). On the other hand they become more likely to pay if we compare year 2008 to
2002 (or year 2008 to 2005). This effect is similar to what we found for outpatient care and
calls for attention towards the declining role of health insurance in reducing informal
payments over the last years.
Many  of  the  other  determinants  follow  the  same  trends  as  in  outpatient  care.   For
example, older people become more likely to pay over the years (and this is significant if we
compare year 2008 to 2005), higher educated individuals have a lower probability of paying
informally throughout the years, etc.
3.7 Discussion
By using the results for inpatient and outpatient care, we aimed to test whether the
causes of informal payments could be better explained using any of the three theoretical
models: cultural, economic, and governance. Considering the cultural similarities between
Albanian and other CEE and FSU countries (Bakacsi et al., 2002), we initially expected the
cultural model (Delcheva et al., 1997; Balabanova and McKee, 2002) to be a strong model for
explaining  informal  payments.  However,  our  data  and  results  do  not  confirm  this
expectation. We have found that patients are more likely to pay for inpatient care than for
outpatient care. About 43.9 per cent of patients in 2008 pay informally for inpatient care
while  only  19.0  per  cent  pay  for  outpatient  care  (see  Table  3.4).  These  findings  are  not  in
accordance with the cultural model which would predict no differences in the probability of
paying informally for outpatient and inpatient care. The big difference on the amount paid
between outpatient and inpatient care speaks also against the cultural model. Referring to
table 3.5, the amount that patients pay informally in inpatient care is around 66 times higher
than in outpatient care.
While  cultural  factors  in  Albania  may  only  be  seen  as  one  of  the  reasons  for  the
frequently encountered informal payments in health care, other factors relating to economic
and governance models explain better how widespread and high such payments are. The
highest informal payments are paid by groups of patients such as residents of coastal areas,
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patients in the highest consumption quintiles, or higher educated. These results are in
accordance with the economic model (those who can afford will pay more to fill in the gaps
created by the lack of resources and to get better services).
On the other hand, the high incidences of informal payments among certain groups of
payers  (e.g.  rural  residents,  lower  educated  patients,  and those  with  difficulties  to  pay  for
health care) support the governance model. The significant effects of having less information
on the amount required (as with patients with basic or no education) or having less social
connections  (as  with  rural  residents  seeking  health  care  in  urban  areas)  clearly  indicate  a
governance failure in the system and demonstrate that not all causal factors are exclusively
linked to scarcity of resources as claimed by the economic model. Moreover, certain
categories seem to be more disadvantaged than others. Patients belonging to the lower
consumption quintiles pay similar amounts compared to the middle quintile, while rural
residents pay higher amounts for outpatient care. This shows that they are very vulnerable
to informal payments. The government fails to protect these categories that are left to cope
with  market  mechanisms  (You  need  care?  You  have  to  pay  for  it!).  It  is  clear  that  lack  of
government support and lower bargaining power of these groups will make them more
susceptible to poverty in the long-run.
Having national health insurance lowers the probability of paying informally both in
outpatient  and  inpatient  care.  This  may  be  due  to  the  greater  bargaining  power  of  these
patients in interacting with medical staff. They are better informed on what their rights are.
However, such relation was proven to be fragile in the long-term as we showed that the role
of health insurance has become weaker from year 2005 to 2008. This frail status of health
insurance  in  Albania  calls  for  more  attention  to  evaluating  the  effect  of  ongoing  reforms
especially in the inpatient care.
Other aspects we have tested were also the effects of particular policy changes taking
place mostly between 2002 and 2005 (such as the contractual agreement between HII and
outpatient care and the increase of GPs salaries). Assuming that most of the changes took
place in outpatient care (in terms of reorganisation and financing primary health care
centres), we expect most of effects associated to this service. In fact, the matching techniques
show that the amount paid by individuals did not change much during the first years after
2002.  Moreover,  the  direction  of  the  changes  was  not  always  as  expected.  Some  of  the
unexpected results included: the increase in average the amount paid between year 2002
and 2005 in outpatient care; the gradual increase of the probability of paying among patients
having health insurance between 2002 and 2005/2008; and the relatively high amounts (and
probability) paid for patients in lower quintiles or patients having difficulties to pay. This is
evidence for some debatable effects of the reforms or measures and clearly indicates that
weak governance remains one of the biggest challenges in the sector.
Previous  research  has  highlighted  government  failure  as  one  of  the  main  causes  for
informal payments in health care (Lewis, 2006). When the government fails to enforce
accountability or fails to prevent non-ethical behaviour of medical staff, the most vulnerable
will bear the consequences. Our findings show that in the Albanian context one of the main
reforms directly linked with the underpaid health care staff (the increase of GPs wages), has
proven ineffective in the long run in reducing informal payments. This was due to lack of a
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follow up on reforms and the indexation of wages over the years. The evidence shows that
even  though  economic  factors  may  play  a  role  in  determining  the  amount  of  informal
payments to medical staff, governance issues are more closely linked to the incidence of
such payments.
Although this chapter sheds more light on important determinants of informal
payments it has some limitations because of the available data. ALSMS’s do not allow us to
distinguish between payments made to physicians or other staff, nor does it capture the
payments  made  in  kind  or  through  favours  rendered.  Our  analysis  was  based  on  the
information  on  ‘gifts  made  to  medical  staff’.   As  mentioned  in  the  first  chapter  of  this
dissertation,  the  questionnaires  do  not  ask  explicitly  for  the  overall  amount  of  payments
flowing outside formal channels (which would also include other payments, for example
payments for pharmaceuticals or other medical materials that should have been provided
free of charge). Furthermore, we are not able to determine whether social connections (e.g.
knowing the physician beforehand) influence informal payments.
This  chapter  has  mostly  concentrated  on  patient  characteristics.  The  ALSMS  data  for
2002, 2005 and 2008 provide limited information on the hierarchical position of physicians.
Moreover medical staff’s particular professional background would give more insights on
who is requesting payments and who gets what. Information on the general culture towards
corruption in particular health centres or hospitals (i.e. anti-corruption measures taken and
number of punished medical staff for having accepted informal payments) would allow for
better estimates of the effect of governance measures on informal payments.
One last limitation of this chapter is that, even though we explore the determinants of
informal payments, we can not say anything about the causal effects. Data availability on
key variables limit the use of statistical methods to explore more on this important aspect.
3.8 Conclusions
Informal payments to medical staff are widespread in Albania both for outpatient and
inpatient care. Most of the evidence coming from ALSMS data for 2002, 2005 and 2008
support scarcity of resources and governance failures in health care as the main reasons
behind them. The past reforms and reorganisation of the primary health sector have only
managed to achieve small reductions in the amounts and incidence of informal payments.
The empirical evidence shows that even though the wages of primary care medical staff
have doubled (in real value) over the years the informal payments remain widely spread.
The  vulnerable  groups  of  the  society  remain  less  protected  against  such  payments  and
policy measures have not reached the most deprived regions of the country.
Patients  and  physicians  are  using  informal  payments  as  coping  strategies  to  ease
problems  brought  by  lack  of  resources  and  poor  governance.  Judging  from  the  evidence
provided  by  ALSMS  data  for  2002,  2005  and  2008,  the  most  effective  policy  measure  in
Albania  from a  supply-side  perspective  would  be  to  include  inpatient  care  in  the  benefits
package of the health insurance scheme. The direct contracting of inpatient services from the
health insurance fund would increase efficiency and accountability in inpatient care
provision.  Such  measures  have  only  started  to  be  implemented  in  2009.  The  effects  on
inpatient care are yet to be seen while the experience with outpatient care calls for more
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attention on the outcome of this reform. The data analysis in this chapter demonstrated that
the people suffering the effects of informal payments are the poorest or regionally
disadvantaged (i.e. residents of rural areas). Providing better protection for the most
vulnerable groups of the population and adjusting the regional distribution of resources will
certainly help in this direction. Moreover, every extension of health insurance to inpatient
care  must  be  combined  with  policy  measures  to  protect  the  chronically  ill  and  the
uninsured. It goes without saying that the increased efficiency in financing the health care
system would also require taking measures to eliminate the informal payments. Experiences
from other countries (see also Lewis and Pettersson, 2009) have shown that providing more
incentives for physicians (e.g. revenue sharing) and increasing control and accountability
would contribute in this regard.
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3.9 Appendix 3A
Table A3.1. Logit results (dependent variable =1 if the individual participates in the next year
survey)
VARIABLES YEARS 2002 - 2005 YEARS 20025- 2008 YEARS 2002 - 2008
Rural area -0.057* (0.033) -0.040 (0.034) -0.058* (0.034)
Household size -0.082*** (0.009) -0.045*** (0.009) -0.133*** (0.010)
Religion 0.260*** (0.013) -0.205*** (0.018) 0.011 (0.021)
(Stratum central)
Stratum coastal 0.105*** (0.033) -0.024 (0.033) 0.052 (0.034)
Stratum mountain 0.098*** (0.034) -0.329*** (0.035) -0.302*** (0.035)
Stratum Tirana 0.191*** (0.042) 0.359*** (0.049) 0.478*** (0.048)
Gender (“0” male, “1”
female)
0.007 (0.027) -0.079*** (0.029) -0.074*** (0.029)
Age (in years) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001)
Has health insurance 0.005 (0.030) -0.041 (0.031) -0.028 (0.032)
(Primary/No education)
Secondary education 0.231*** (0.034) -0.013 (0.035) 0.213*** (0.036)
University education 0.345*** (0.060) 0.352*** (0.062) 0.692*** (0.062)
Quintile 1 0.351*** (0.046) 0.111** (0.045) 0.479*** (0.047)
Quintile 2 0.077* (0.044) 0.050 (0.045) 0.139*** (0.046)
(Quintile 3)
Quintile 4 -0.264*** (0.043) -0.073 (0.045) -0.347*** (0.045)
Quintile 5 -0.567*** (0.045) -0.163*** (0.048) -0.766*** (0.048)
_cons -0.055 (0.071) 0.409*** (0.075) 0.456*** (0.076)
Note:  The results are used to estimate the propensity score for the matching of individuals over the years. Stars
indicate: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1; Reference categories in italics. Standard errors are in brackets.
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Chapter 4. INFORMAL PAYMENTS
AND INTRA-HOUSEHOLD
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES
IN ALBANIA
This  chapter  is  based on the  paper  by  Tomini  S,  Groot  W,  Pavlova M.  (2011).  Informal  payments  and
intra-household allocation of resources for health care in Albania.
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Abstract
Informal payments for health care services can impose financial hardship on
households. Many studies have found that the position within the household can influence
the decision on how much is spent on each household member. This study analyses the
intra-household differences in spending on informal payments for health care services by
comparing the resources allocated between household heads, spouses and children.
Pooled data from two cross sectional surveys, the Albanian Living Standard
Measurement Survey 2002 and 2005, are used to analyse both the probability and the
amount paid in inpatient and outpatient health care services. A generalised Hausman
specification test is used to compare the coefficients of probit and OLS models for nuclear
and extended households. We find that due to the widespread informal payments there are
no significant differences between households in the incidence of informal payments for
households’ members, but there are more differences in the amount paid informally. Results
suggest that households strategically allocate their resources on health care by favouring
individuals with higher earning potential who have invested more in human capital.
Extended households pay higher amounts for spouses with higher education compared to
nuclear households. On the other hand, nuclear households choose to pay higher amounts
for children with a higher level of education compared to extended households. The
differences between households should be taken into account by public policies which
should compensate this by redistribution mechanisms targeting disadvantaged groups.
Governments should implement effective measures to deal with informal patient payments.
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4.1 Introduction
Health care expenditures are idiosyncratic risks imposed on households that can cause
financial hardship, especially if the costs are uninsured. In many Central and Eastern
European  (CEE)  countries  and  the  Former  Soviet  Union  (FSU)  informal  payments  for
health care are reported to be high and since they are informal, they are not covered by any
formal insurance mechanism. The available strategies to cope with such risks can vary
from digging into savings, selling assets, increasing labour supply, or reallocating
resources within the household (Lewis, 2000; Sauerborn et al., 1996; Leive and Xu, 2008).
The position within the household and the number of household members may influence
the decision on how much is spent on informal health care payments. Nuclear and wealthy
households are believed to be better able to protect their children against higher
expenditures associated with health care use than extended households. On the other
hand, the amount allocated to adult household members may depend on their contribution
to household income but also on the type of household (Behrman, 1988).
This chapter looks at how different types of households respond to informal payments
to medical staff when multiple household members use health care. We analyse the effect
characteristics of household heads, spouses and children have on the probability or the
amounts paid informally, and test for differences between these members of households.
For this purpose, we use data from the Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey
2002 and 2005.  The chapter contributes to the existing literature on intra-household
allocation of resources by providing insights on how households cope with unregulated
payments  in  health  care  when the  government  policies  fail  and little  is  known about  the
actual prices.
The literature on informal payments has concentrated on the main causes and
consequences of such payments (see also Chapters 1 and Chapter 3). Little is known on the
impact that the decision-making within the household has on the amounts paid for
different members of the household. The theory of social risk management (Holzmann and
Jorgensen, 1999) predicts that when governments fail to provide protection, the family and
social network may help in coping with particular shocks. In the case of informal payments
in health care, household members may support each other by redirecting financial assets
or being involved in direct care during the hospitalisation periods.
In countries like Albania, where many households have preserved their patriarchal
structure and gender inequalities are prevalent (Martiri, 2009), it is important to see if
decision making on health expenditure depends on the severity of illness or on the position
that the patient has in the household. Such information is relevant not only to understand
the dynamics of intra-household allocation of resources but also to guide policies that aim
at redistributing income between household members. This can help to increase the
effectiveness of programs like social cash transfers or health care subsidies to reach out to
more household members (e.g. children or spouses).
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4.2 General background
The high incidence of informal payments in most CEE and FSU countries is frequently
attributed  to  the  similarities  in  health  care  systems  and  the  common  difficulties  in  the
transition from planned to market economies (see also Chapter 3). The ideology adopted
by the communist regimes emphasised universal access to health care but did not focus on
improving efficiency and quality of such services (Belli, 2002). The fall of communism
brought new challenges for these health care systems. The high number of hospital beds,
overstaffed health facilities, underpaid health care professionals, and the reduction of the
investments provided the conditions for informal payments (Lewis, 2000; Sauerborn et al.,
1996; Vian et al., 2006).
The health sector in Albania has followed the same trends as other ex-communist
countries where the health sector was underfinanced and considered a non-productive
sector (Nuri and Tragakes, 2002). As explained in chapter 1 after the 1990s the public
health  care  system  is  characterised  by  a  low  level  of  investments,  a  limited  number  of
physicians (mainly concentrated in the big cities and the capital of the country), low
quality of health care, unqualified staff, unmotivated medical personnel, and frequent lack
of medicines in public hospitals. According to the WHO database, Albania spends around
6.5 per cent of its GDP on health. This level of spending is comparable to other countries in
the  region.  However,  only  half  of  this  amount  is  publicly  financed  and  out-of-pocket
payments remain considerably high.
Public health spending in Albania is financed by social health insurance contributions
and general tax revenues. Health insurance in Albania should cover most of the formal
costs of primary health care and all the costs of hospital care. Patients are formally required
to pay small, fixed co-payments per visit for outpatient care or for specialised treatments in
hospital care, but until 2005 the amounts required were very low. Payments or gifts made
directly  to  medical  staff  are  not  foreseen  in  the  financing  of  health  care  and  episodes  of
‘under-the-table’ payments requested by medical staff are considered as acts of bribery and
punishable  by  law.  However,  a  general  lack  of  accountability  and  good  governance
combined with the lack of resources has contributed to a high incidence of informal
payments in the public health sector (see also Chapter 3). Informal payments account for at
least one quarter of hospital costs in 2005 (World Bank, 2006), even though by law
inpatient care is free of charge.
In the literature, informal payments are defined as direct cash/in-kind unofficial
payments to health care providers and/or private purchases of health care and other
products meant to be covered by the health system (Lewis, 1999; Thompson and Witter,
2000). Country specific factors and data availability have a large influence on the use of this
definition.  Most  of  the  previous  papers  in  Albania  based  on  LSMS  (Living  Standard
Measurement Survey) data have identified informal payments as “gifts paid to medical
staff” (World Bank, 2006). The same definition is also employed in this chapter.14
14 Even though such definition does not fully capture all the informality in the health sector (e.g.
payments for medicines or other materials that are otherwise provided free of charge), it clearly
distinguishes the part of the out-of-pocket payments paid directly to medical staff. As the data show,
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The informal nature of such payments makes them unpredictable for individual
households that find themselves exposed to the financial risks of health care events.
Previous studies have shown that these payments directly influence the welfare of the
household.  Households  may  have  to  cope  by  using  their  savings,  selling  assets  or
borrowing money (Lewis, 2000; Falkingham, 2004).
The informal nature and the dependence on health status and income rank informal
payments among the most severe burdens imposed on individuals. In the absence of
formal arrangements or a market for insurance against such risks (in Albania informal
payments are also paid by a large share of individuals entitled to health insurance benefits)
the burden is left to households and their social networks (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999).
This refers mostly to support from other household members and to the coping strategies
that the households employ on such occasions.
Previous research has shown that households facing catastrophic health care
expenditures resort mostly to intra-household strategies for raising money to pay rather
than to receiving help from extended households’ members (Sauerborn et al., 1996).
Households may decide to alter labour supply (i.e. if the household head falls ill other
members  may  decide  to  work  to  substitute  for  the  loss  of  incomes),  sell  property  (or
livestock in rural areas), or borrow money from relatives/banks (Lewis, 2000; Mwabu, 1986;
Dercon and Krishnan, 2000). The strategies employed by households may differ depending
on the available resources, severity of the health impairment and treatment needed, the
level of the payments demanded, or the household member in question.
 There are various theories on how resources within the household are allocated over
members. It has been shown that the share of contributed income determines the share of
expenditures on each of the household members (Bourguignon et al., 1993; Thomas, 1993;
Browning et al., 1994). Other studies showed that female-headed households allocate
resources more towards children, hence contributing to a better health status and higher
enrolment rates (Thomas, 1990; Handa, 1994).
We can view informal payments as an investment in health care. Medical care,
together with education and training are investments in human capital (Becker, 1962). The
amounts invested in health care depend on the expected returns from such capital. Such
expected returns are higher if health more critically depends on receiving health care, if
remaining life expectancy is higher,  if  earnings are higher,  etc.  If  we accept that informal
payments help patients to obtain better treatment (and thus improve their health status)
then  we  can  assume  that  households  will  be  more  willing  to  allocate  resources  towards
individuals with higher returns on health (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). In this case, higher
income earners would be favoured to invest upon i.e.  households would be more willing
to  spend  on  women  or  spouses  earning  wages  or  in  children  as  they  have  a  longer
remaining life expectancy than adults.
Households also differ in their decisions to spend on health care. This may depend on
the number of household members. Gary Becker (Becker, 1962) links the “quality” of
such  payments  may  be  voluntary  or  requested  but  their  incidence  is  high  for  both  inpatient  and
outpatient.
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children (the amount spent on each child) to the number of children in the household.
Households tend to spend relatively more on each child if the number of children is lower.
This theory will also have direct consequences for health care expenditures and informal
payments. It implies that households with more children and extended households will be
less willing to pay higher amounts for health care on each child.
Households in Albania rely on their social network for getting the support that public
policies  cannot  offer.  Previous  studies  have  demonstrated  that  family  is  the  main  source
for  borrowing  money  (Carletto,  2005).  Households  also  rely  to  a  greater  extent  on  their
social network for avoiding informal payments or improving the delivery and the quality
of services (Vian and Burak, 2006). Albanian social attitudes (especially in rural or
deprived communities) tend to favour men. This creates gender inequalities and may also
affect attitudes towards paying for health care. Such gender inequalities in Albania are
reported in employment, health care, education and social life (Martiri, 2009).
4.3 Descriptive statistics and methodology
The data used in this study come from the Albanian Living Standard Measurement
Survey (ALSMS) 2002 and 2005. Both samples in these two cross sectional surveys are
country representative. The households sampled numbered 3600 in 2002 and 3638 in 2005.
For our analysis we pool data for these two years. The questionnaires include information
on household demography, education, incomes, type of illness (sudden or chronic) and
health care payments. In addition, information is available on the ways that households
raise money to pay for health care. All the variables that we have included in our analysis
come from identical questions in these two years. Chapter 1 provides more information on
the set up and health care variables included in ALSMS.
The informal payments to medical staff include both in-kind gifts and in-cash
payments (all converted to their monetary value). The number of individuals who have
visited ambulatory services was 358315 while the individuals hospitalised numbered 138416
from a total of 31101 individuals in the sample.  We have further divided households in
two types: nuclear and extended. The division is based on the type of kinship relations
between household members. Nuclear households include only two generation families.
Household members here are the household head, the spouse and children (single headed
households are also included in this category). The extended households include more
than two generations, multiple younger couples living together, or couples living together
with more distant relatives.
Table  4.1  shows that  about  26  per  cent  of  the  patients  in  outpatient  care  and 59  per
cent of those using inpatient care have paid informally to medical staff.  The incidence of
payments varies little over nuclear or extended households. However, nuclear households
are more likely to pay informally for their members (both in outpatient and inpatient care)
and at the same time pay higher amounts for household members in both services.
Informal payments paid per admission in inpatient care are much higher compared to
15 From this total 2120 individuals have visited ambulatory services in 2002 and 1463 in 2005.
16 From this total 707 individuals have been hospitalized in 2002 and 677 in 2005.
CHAPTER 4
62
those paid for outpatient care. Patients pay approximately 55 times more (5019.79/91.25)
per visit for inpatient than for outpatient care. This shows once again that such informal
payments are in fact implicit payments imposed by medical staff.
Table 4.1. The incidence and amounts paid informally for outpatient and inpatient health care
OUTPATIENT CARE INPATIENT CARE
HOUSEHOLD TYPES The incidence of
informal payments
Amount paid
informally
(per visit)
The incidence of
informal
payments
Amount paid
informally
 (per admission)
Nuclear household 0.27 104.78** 0.60 5203.23
Extended household 0.25 73.74** 0.58 4792.98
Mean for the total sample 0.26 91.25 0.59 5019.79
Note: Amounts are in Albanian Leks. All prices are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in June 2002 (Bank
of Albania, 2010). All series are deflated with 2002 prices. Stars indicate if the mean for the particular group is
significantly different from the mean of all other groups..  *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
Table 4.2 gives a detailed overview of the characteristics of children and spouses by
household type. As we can observe, the education level of spouses in extended households
is much lower than in nuclear households. Almost 71 per cent of the spouses in extended
households have only primary education (8 or less years of education) and only 4 per cent
of them have university education. Spouses in extended households are also older (with an
average age of 48.85 years).
Table 4.2. Characteristics of spouses and children in nuclear and extended households
SPOUSE OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD CHILDREN OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD
Nuclear
Household
Extended
Household
Total
Nuclear
Household
Extended
Household
Total
Without education 0.00** 0.01** 0.01 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.05
Primary education 0.55*** 0.71*** 0.6 0.68*** 0.63*** 0.67
Secondary education 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.33 0.22*** 0.28*** 0.23
University education 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05
Age 43.71*** 48.85*** 45.13 14.49*** 20.50*** 16.13
Has health insurance 0.43* 0.45* 0.43 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.32
Note: Stars indicate whether the mean for each household type is significantly different from the mean of the other
type (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1).
Children are also more likely to have primary education and health insurance in
nuclear households. This may be due to the fact that children in nuclear households are on
average younger (14.5 years) compared to extended households (20.5 years). Therefore
they are more likely to follow education and be covered by health insurance (33 per cent
against 30 per cent in extended households).17 These first descriptive results show clearly
that spouses and children in nuclear households seem to have invested more in human
capital (they have on average more education). This may be due to a higher earning
potential (as the data for spouses show).
17 In Albania children 0-7 years old and those following education are automatically covered by health
insurance.
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Households use different methods to cope with uninsured health expenditures.
Borrowing money is one of the most frequently used methods among them (see Table 4.3)
attesting for the mutual help among household and community members (in the absence
of formal mechanisms). The data show that nuclear households are more likely to borrow
money compared to extended households. The next two popular methods are selling
agriculture products or animals. These methods are more popular for extended households
which  live  mostly  in  rural  areas  and  rely  more  on  products  or  animals  as  a  form  of
insurance (e.g. almost 24.5 per cent of extended households have declared to have sold
animals for raising money against 17.6 per cent of nuclear households).
Table 4.3. Methods to raise money to pay for health care
NUCLEAR
HOUSEHOLDS
EXTENDED
HOUSEHOLDS
MEAN OF THE
TOTAL SAMPLE
Method to raise money -borrow money 0.653*** 0.589*** 0.626
Method to raise money - sell animal 0.176*** 0.245*** 0.205
Method to raise money - sell products 0.125*** 0.181*** 0.149
Method to raise money - sell valuables 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.007
Method to raise money – other methods 0.110** 0.097** 0.104
Note: Stars indicate whether the mean for each household type is significantly different from the mean of the other
type (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%).
In order to investigate how individual characteristics influence informal payments to
medical staff we use two different models for the probability of payments (the probit
model) and amount paid (the Ordinary Least Squared model).  The probability of paying
informally can be considered as dependent on the individual characteristics of patients and
other household members. Hence the probability of paying can be expressed as:
iix eb + if 0>iy (1)
   0 if 0=iy
Where iy refers  to  the  amount  paid  informally  to  medical  staff, ix denotes a vector
characteristics of individual patients and their household members, b represents a vector
of estimated coefficients corresponding to such characteristics, and
ie is  a  vector  of
residuals errors that have a normal distribution.
Similarly, the amount paid informally to medical staff can also be considered as
determined by individual characteristics of patients and their households. In such case the
amount is expressed as:
iii xy eb += (2)
This later equation is estimated using OLS. All models are run separately for nuclear
and extended households. As our interest lies on testing for possible differences between
coefficients for these two types of households, we use a generalised Hausman specification
test (Weesie, 1999). This post-estimation test allows us to compare coefficients in the
models estimated for nuclear and extended households. The advantage of such
specification test is that it makes use of the sandwich covariance estimator to adjust for any
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heteroskedasticities in the outcomes. Our models are estimated separately for inpatient
and outpatient care. For comparative purposes, we follow the same procedure to estimate
similar models for the total amount of out-of-pocket expenditures for health care.
4.4 Results and discussion
Table 4.4 gives the probit estimation results for the incidence of informal payments in
outpatient and inpatient care as well as the generalised Hausman tests for differences
between coefficients for nuclear and extended households. Results show that generally
households seem more likely to pay for spouses than for household’s heads (the reference
category) and that this is statistically significant in extended households for outpatient
care.  On  the  other  hand,  paying  informally  for  children  is  less  likely  than  paying  for
household heads. This is especially the case for outpatient care (where coefficients for both
nuclear and extended households are statistically significant) and to a lesser extent for
inpatient  care.  This  significant  effect  in  outpatient  care  may  be  due  to  the  specifics  of
illnesses for each household member as for example women needing more health care than
men (Cleary et al., 1982; Bertakis et al., 2000). The differences in the probability of paying
informally  between  two  types  of  households  are  not  statistically  significant  both  for
outpatient and inpatient care, suggesting that patients are faced with similar probabilities
of paying for these services. The positive (but not significant) coefficient for children living
in nuclear households and visiting inpatient care may suggest that  whenever households
face an increased risk of paying informal payments (descriptive statistics showed that the
probability  of  paying  is  very  high  in  inpatient  care)  nuclear  households  may  be  more
willing to pay for their children.
The number of children in the household lowers the probability of paying informally
to medical staff especially for outpatient care (statistically significant). The number of
siblings in the household lowers the probability of paying informally for health care
(Behrman et al., 1980) and in addition children are more likely to be covered by health
insurance. The effect is not as strong for inpatient care where the influence of health
insurance is lower and informal payments are more spread. The nature of illness (having a
sudden/acute  condition)  has  a  positive  effect  for  both  types  of  households  in  outpatient
care. The results show that nuclear household patients with sudden illness have lower logs
of  probability  to  pay  informally  of  0.09  times  compared  with  extended  households.  The
nature of illness has the opposite effect for the inpatient care for both types of households.
The variable for the timing of the survey (2002/2005) shows that the incidence of
informal  payments  has  decreased  for  outpatient  care  for  both  types  of  households.
However, this is not the case for inpatient care where informal payments have decreased
for nuclear households but increased for the extended ones (for inpatient care this is 0.25
times higher for extended households compared with nuclear ones). The significant
difference in coefficients, when the generalised Hausman test is applied, shows that when
confronted with inpatient care such households are more likely to pay in 2005 than they
were in 2002 and that this is definitely higher than for nuclear households. This can be due
to the higher needs these households may have over time (e.g. having older household
members who need extensive care).
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Health insurance decreases the probability of paying informally both for nuclear and
extended households in inpatient and outpatients care. This is encouraging, especially for
inpatient care where the link between the contributions and service provision has been
weaker. On the contrary, household income per capita does not have any significant effects
indicating that informal payments affect patients throughout income distribution.18
The effect of the methods chosen by the household to raise money for health care on
the incidence of informal payments does not vary between different types of households.
However, a generalised Hausman test rejects the hypothesis of equal coefficients between
nuclear and extended households for the method to raise money. The differences show
that  it  is  more  difficult  for  extended  households  to  raise  money  through  borrowing  or
selling products or valuables. This indicates that they may use more often other ways for
raising money like for example transfers from other relatives (even though the survey does
not allow us to control for this).
Age of the patient has a negative effect on the probability of paying informally, except
for  extended  households  in  inpatient  care.  This  confirms  our  expectations  about
investments in health care for aging members of such households. A higher education of
the patient has a negative effect on informal payments. But, as expected, the generalised
Hausman test shows more differences between types of households (especially for
outpatient care where effects are statistically significant). Mincer and Polacheck (1974)
argue that households invest more on members who will ensure higher returns in the
future.  Households  choose  to  invest  in  those  members  with  higher  returns  to  human
capital investments and children’s payback time is longer and returns are higher (Becker,
1976). In fact, a higher education of the child in nuclear households increases the
probability of informal payments to medical staff suggesting that people in such
households are willing to invest more in human capital (therefore they are more likely to
pay for their higher educated children). Being a nuclear household increases the log of
paying informally by 0.36 times more (compared with extended households) in outpatient
services. On the other hand, spouses with higher education in extended households are
less likely to pay informally especially for outpatient care. Having more education (and
probably less resources) translates to more bargain power with medical staff. On the same
time having higher education gives more chance to work in the formal market and to have
health insurance.
Table 4.5 gives the OLS estimation results for the amount paid informally as well  as
the generalised Hausman tests for differences between coefficients for nuclear and
extended households. The amounts paid informally in outpatient and inpatient care differ
significantly from each other. The amounts paid for inpatient care are much higher (due to
the  severity  of  the  conditions)  and  households  have  to  prioritise  the  allocation  of  health
expenditures based on the particular position of household members.
18 Results  using the  total  expenditures  yield  also  similar  results  (available  from the  authors)  but  we
have used household income to reflect better the income distribution.
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Results show that in inpatient care nuclear households and extended households
differ significantly in the amount paid informally for spouses (as compared to the
household head and children). Nuclear households pay significantly higher amounts for
spouses than extended households. The differences are also confirmed by the generalised
Hausman test. Extended households are concentrated mostly in rural areas and the
average age is higher than in nuclear households. This means that extended households
are more exposed to health risks, and therefore they allocate fewer resources mostly to
spouses. Even though they seem more likely to pay for spouses (see the right side of Table
4.4) they allocate on average fewer resources to them. Another reason could be the lower
bargaining power that spouses may have in extended households (they are less educated
and less likely to work).
The number of children is negatively associated with the amount paid informally in
both nuclear and extended households. The effect is larger for extended households
visiting inpatient care.  This is consistent with what Behrman et al.,  (1980) have found on
investments on education. Households with many children are constrained to divide
resources among a larger number of household members and therefore children with more
siblings may receive fewer resources for health care than children with fewer siblings.
The coefficients indicating the years of the survey are not significant for neither the
household  types  (contrary  to  what  we  observed  in  models  for  the  incidence  of  paying)
showing that informal payments have changed in numbers but not in substance (i.e. the
amount paid). Health insurance appears to be important in lowering the amounts paid
both for inpatient and outpatient care but the effect for extended households in inpatient
care  is  lower  than  for  nuclear  ones.  This  may show that  such  households  may have  less
bargaining power against medical staff.
The level of income per capita does not have any significant effect on the amount paid
by both types of households. On the other hand, the generalised Hausman test indicates
that methods to raise money for health care differ between types of households. When
paying informally extended households are more likely to borrow or sell products, animals
or valuables. This shows that shocks associated with health care events are more severe for
these types of households. By affecting their income generating capabilities such events
may have more long-term consequences for these households.
Age of the patient generally lowers the amount paid even though this effect may vary
between types of households. For example, the Hausman tests show that older heads of
extended households pay higher amounts for outpatient care but they pay lower amounts
for inpatient care.  Such change may be determined by the lower ability to pay for health
care of the extended households.
Generally, households seem to be willing to pay more for males than for females and
this may be again related to the theory of human capital (Albania is still a patriarchal
society where males have more income generating power than females). Once more,
education plays an important role in determining the amounts paid informally. Higher
educated spouses in extended households pay significantly more than their counterparts in
nuclear households. This indicates that education gives them more bargaining power
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within the household. Similar to the incidence of payments, nuclear households pay more
for their higher educated children.
Table  4.6  presents  estimates  for  the  amounts  paid  out-of-pocket  for  inpatient  and
outpatient care. Out-of-pocket includes all the costs related to service fees, medicines,
laboratory work, and transportation costs. In order to see the difference between out-of-
pocket expenditures and informal payments, we have not included informal payments in
the out-of-pocket payments. We use the same control variables in order to make results
comparable  with  those  on  informal  payments.  The  results  confirm the  trend for  the  total
amount paid out-of-pocket in inpatient care for spouses and children. Households seem to
pay  more  for  spouses  than  they  do  for  children  (compared  to  the  household  head  and
other members of the households). This may be due to the better health insurance coverage
of the children (paying less for formal fees or medicines) but also to the changes in specific
health care needs.
The results show that out-of-pocket payments have decreased throughout the years
for outpatient but not for inpatient care. As we can see from the table, health insurance
turns out to be not significant for the amounts paid for inpatient care. This is evidence for
the smaller role that such mechanisms have in this service.
The Hausman tests indicate that nuclear households are again more able to borrow
money for health care than the extended ones when paying informally for outpatient care
(and thus confirming their higher borrowing abilities). However both types of households
do not show a clear pattern when paying for inpatient care demonstrating that the level of
out-of-pocket payments can be well beyond their immediate strategies for raising money.
The age of patients has a negative effect on the amount of out-of-pocket payments for
the  adults  while  the  age  of  children  has  (mostly)  a  positive  effect.  It  appears  that
households tend to spend more on out-of-pocket for older children than for the younger
ones. This may also be related to older children’s ability to generate an income and have a
better position within the household in terms of resource distribution. Contrary to what we
have found for informal payments, education of the spouse increases the amount of out-of-
pocket paid for nuclear households.  This change may reflect the complex composition of
out-of-pocket payments (including fees, medicines, laboratory, and transport) showing
that higher educated women in nuclear households spend more resources on higher
quality services (e.g. by buying more expensive drugs or laboratory tests).
The nature of informal payments is different from that of total out-of-pocket payments
and this may also contribute to slightly different results. However, the comparable
findings for most of the variables suggest that informal payments are well embedded in
the health care system of the country.
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4.5 Conclusions
We do not find strong differences between household types in the probability of
paying informally, indicating that these payments are widespread and requested, and
imposed on all households. Contrary to that, for the amounts paid there are differences
between households in the way they allocate resources between their members. If we
consider informal payments as an indicator of investment in health care, we can say that
nuclear  households  appear  to  be  more  likely  to  invest  in  the  health  care  of  children  and
spouses.  They  spend  higher  amounts  on  children  and  spouses  (compared  to  the  other
members of the households) than extended households. Spouses and children in such
households  are  also  likely  to  get  more  education  and  more  likely  to  earn  income  from
employment.
The  findings  generally  support  the  hypotheses  of  health  care  as  a  human  capital
investment and give insight into how households in Albania react to informal payments in
health care. We consider such informal payments an uninsured risk (as it is also often not
entirely dependent on health insurance). In such situations households choose to allocate
their resources over the individuals with the highest earning potential or the highest
bargaining power within the household.
Nuclear and extended households differ in their decisions to allocate resources over
their members in investing in medical care. The main factors relate to the specific position
of the member (whether he/she is the head, the spouse, or the child) but also on other
factors like age, education and gender. Our results show that households seem to be more
likely  to  allocate  resources  to  spouses  than  to  children.  As  children  in  Albania  are  more
likely  to  be  covered  by  health  insurance  this  may  indicate  a  better  protection  against
informal payments for children, and thus, less informal payments for them. The effect may
also reflect the different type of health care needed for children and spouses. We find no
significant differences between households in choosing to pay for different households
members, but there are more differences when the amount paid is considered. The results
show that for inpatient care nuclear households pay significantly higher amounts for
spouses demonstrating that spouses (which are in most of the cases females – see also
Tables A4.1 and A4.2) may have better bargaining power in nuclear households.
Descriptive statistics show that spouses in such households are on average older and better
educated than in the extended households. They therefore may have higher income
generating abilities and this may influence their bargaining power within the household.
In fact, we show that education of the spouses influences significantly the amount paid
informally in extended households (when compared to the nuclear ones).
The quality of human capital investments in children depends on the resources
available, and resources available depend on the type of households. We show that both
the incidence and the amount paid declines if households have a higher number of
children. The education level of children seems to influence the decision on the amounts
allocated for informal payments. Households choose to invest more on members that will
ensure higher returns in the future (Mincer and Polachek, 1974) and children with higher
education are the perfect example of this investment (Becker, 1967). Individuals also
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choose to pay (invest) more on males knowing that they may generate higher returns (this
is also given the patriarchal Albanian society).
In general, we find that patients in inpatient care seem to be more exposed to informal
payments to medical staff. This could due to limited health insurance for inpatient care and
due to more severe health conditions treated. Higher payments and less protection from
health insurance expose especially children and spouses to whom fewer resources are
allocated.  The positive effect that health insurance has on decreasing informal payments in
outpatient  care  is  encouraging.  However,  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  may  have  the  same
effect in inpatient care where a more complex organisation and more resources are needed.
Experiences from other former-socialist countries show that compared to tax-based
funding, social health insurance may have a questionable social benefit (Rechel and
McKee, 2009; Pavlova et al., 2000; Atanasova et al., 2011). This calls for more attention of
policy  makers  in  evaluating  the  social  benefits  (e.g.  macro-efficiency  and  equity  in  the
public health care sector) of introducing the health insurance in inpatient care in Albania.
Our  findings  show  that  in  absence  of  protection  by  formal  mechanisms  individuals
with less bargaining power in the household (e.g. household members with lower
education) are likely to get fewer resources to pay for informal payments to medical staff
for health care. Extended households will tend to pay for members with more bargaining
power  and will  invest  less  in  children.  Such  differences  should  be  taken  into  account  by
public policies which should compensate this by redistribution mechanisms targeting
disadvantaged groups. Such mechanisms include for example, cash transfers conditioned
on utilisation of health care by small children and young mothers, and subsidised health
care for particular age groups.
The immediate coping strategies of households (i.e. borrowing money or selling
products, animals or valuables) cannot mitigate the increased risk of large payments for
health care and may also hamper their long-term income generating capabilities. This calls
for more attention towards policies protecting the vulnerable households against
uninsured risks. The intra-household allocation of resources for health care to children and
spouses  is  certainly  susceptible  to  the  provision  of  such  formal  protection.  The  possible
crowding-out effects of private transfers towards public transfers or social health insurance
certainly  remains  a  field  for  further  research  in  the  future.  Also  governments  should
implement effective measures for dealing with informal patient payments in general.
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4.6 Appendix 4A.
Table A4.1. Descriptive statistics for nuclear and extended households for outpatient care
NUCLEAR FAMILIES EXTENDED FAMILIES
MEAN OF THE TOTAL
SAMPLE
Incidence of the amount paid
informally
0.262 (0.440) 0.24 (0.427) 0.252 (0.434)
Log of the amount paid
informally
5.518* (0.799) 5.429* (0.655) 5.481 (0.744)
Log of the amount paid as out-
of-pocket payment1
6.847** (1.019) 6.770** (0.972) 6.814 (1.000)
Head of the household 0.341*** (0.474) 0.267*** (0.443) 0.309 (0.462)
Spouse of the household 0.366*** (0.482) 0.219*** (0.414) 0.303 (0.460)
Children of the household 0.293*** (0.455) 0.148*** (0.355) 0.231 (0.421)
Number of children into the
household
2.111*** (1.471) 1.920*** (1.238) 2.029 (1.379)
Sudden illness 0.457** (0.498) 0.417** (0.493) 0.44 (0.496)
Year of the survey (year 2002=0;
year 2005=1)
0.393* (0.489) 0.424* (0.494) 0.406 (0.491)
Health insurance 0.571 (0.495) 0.586 (0.493) 0.578 (0.494)
Log income per capita 8.425** (1.100) 8.333** (1.115) 8.386 (1.108)
Living in rural area 0.440*** (0.496) 0.504*** (0.500) 0.467 (0.499)
Method to raise money –
borrowing money
0.437*** (0.496) 0.362*** (0.481) 0.405 (0.491)
Method to raise money – animal,
products & valuable
0.161*** (0.368) 0.197*** (0.398) 0.176 (0.381)
Method to raise money - other
methods
0.070*** (0.256) 0.045*** (0.208) 0.059 (0.237)
Age of the household head 19.315** (27.881) 17.243** (29.185) 18.424 (28.464)
Age of the household spouse 18.297*** (25.238) 12.356*** (23.938) 15.741 (24.858)
Age of the household child 2.777** (6.504) 2.283** (7.623) 2.564 (7.011)
Gender of the household head 0.044*** (0.206) 0.064*** (0.245) 0.053 (0.223)
Gender of the household child 0.150*** (0.357) 0.059*** (0.235) 0.111 (0.314)
Level of education of the hh
head2
0.751*** (1.411) 0.438*** (1.079) 0.616 (1.288)
Level of education of the hh
spouse
0.627*** (1.156) 0.291*** (0.761) 0.482 (1.019)
Level of education of the hh
child
0.187*** (0.563) 0.123*** (0.488) 0.160 (0.533)
1 Out-of-pocket payments here are including service fees, medicines, laboratory work and transportation costs.
2 Level of education is represented as a categorical variable where: (0) “Without education”; (1) “Primary education”;
(2) “ Secondary education”; (4) “University education”; (5) “Postgraduate education”
Note: In outpatient care the amount of informal payments is the average per visit. Stars indicate whether the mean
for  each  household  type  is  significantly  different  from  the  mean  of  the  other  type  (***  p<.01,  **  p<.05,  *  p<.1).  All
prices are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in June 2002 (Bank of Albania, 2010.
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Table A4.2. Descriptive statistics of nuclear and extended households for inpatient care
NUCLEAR FAMILIES EXTENDED FAMILIES
MEAN OF THE TOTAL
SAMPLE
Incidence of the amount paid
informally
0.573 (0.495) 0.55 (0.498) 0.563 (0.496)
Log of the amount paid
informally
6.015 (1.443) 6.066 (1.498) 6.037 (1.466)
Log of the amount paid as out-
of-pocket payment1
6.215 (1.448) 6.304 (1.433) 6.253 (1.442)
Head of the household 0.297*** (0.457) 0.217*** (0.413) 0.263 (0.440)
Spouse of the household 0.409*** (0.492) 0.210*** (0.408) 0.324 (0.468)
Children of the household 0.294*** (0.456) 0.144*** (0.352) 0.23 (0.421)
Number of children into the
household
2.471*** (1.413) 2.024*** (1.334) 2.279 (1.397)
Sudden illness 0.248 (0.432) 0.25 (0.434) 0.249 (0.433)
Year of the survey (year 2002=0;
year 2005=1)
0.464* (0.499) 0.515* (0.500) 0.486 (0.500)
Health insurance 0.434 (0.496) 0.45 (0.498) 0.441 (0.497)
Log income per capita 8.282 (1.155) 8.255 (1.270) 8.27 (1.205)
Living in rural area 0.482*** (0.500) 0.581*** (0.494) 0.525 (0.500)
Method to raise money –
borrowing money
0.557*** (0.497) 0.463*** (0.499) 0.516 (0.500)
Method to raise money – animal,
products & valuable
0.197** (0.398) 0.249** (0.433) 0.219 (0.414)
Method to raise money - other
methods
0.056 (0.230) 0.038 (0.192) 0.049 (0.215)
Age of the household head 15.641 (25.092) 13.52 (26.347) 14.731 (25.650)
Age of the household spouse 17.507*** (22.662) 10.694*** (21.897) 14.584 (22.582)
Age of the household child 3.222 (7.037) 2.621 (8.434) 2.964 (7.670)
Gender of the household head 0.037 (0.188) 0.033 (0.179) 0.035 (0.184)
Gender of the household child 0.128*** (0.334) 0.052*** (0.223) 0.096 (0.294)
Level of education of the hh
head2
0.576*** (1.227) 0.287*** (0.778) 0.452 (1.068)
Level of education of the hh
spouse
0.682*** (1.160) 0.278*** (0.748) 0.509 (1.024)
Level of education of the hh
child
0.239** (0.646) 0.155** (0.571) 0.203 (0.616)
1 Out-of-pocket payments here are including service fees, medicines, laboratory work and transportation costs.
2 Level of education is represented as a categorical variable where: (0) “Without education”; (1) “Primary education”;
(2) “ Secondary education”; (4) “University education”; (5) “Postgraduate education”
Note: In inpatient care the amount of informal payments is the average per day hospitalised. Stars
indicate whether the mean for each household type is significantly different from the mean of the
other type (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1). All prices are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in
June 2002 (Bank of Albania, 2010
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Chapter 5. PAYING INFORMALLY
IN THE ALBANIAN HEALTH
CARE SECTOR:
A TWO-TIERED STOCHASTIC
FRONTIER MODEL
This chapter is based on the following article:
Tomini  S,  Groot  W,  Pavlova M.  (2011).  Paying informally  in  the  Albanian health  care  sector:  A two-
tiered  stochastic  frontier  model.  The  European  Journal  of  Health  Economics,  2011.  DOI:
10.1007/s10198-011-0331-1.
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Abstract
Informal payments are deeply ingrained in the health care sector of most Central,
Eastern and Southern European countries. Evidence suggests that the price paid informally
to medical staff is negotiated either directly or indirectly between patients and medical
staff.  The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  measure  the  imperfect  information  that  exists  on  the
amount  that  has  to  be  paid  informally  to  medical  staff.  We measure  the  extent  to  which
patients pay more than the amount medical staff expect informally and the extent to which
medical staff request less than patients are willing to pay informally. A two-tiered
stochastic frontier model is developed to estimate indicators of patients’ and medical staff’s
imperfect information on informal payments and the effects on the amount the other party
is minimally expecting or maximally willing to pay informally. The estimates are based on
informal payments to medical staff  in the inpatient health care sector in Albania.  We use
data from the Albania Living Standards Measurement Survey 2002 and 2005. The pooled
samples include 707 individual who have visited inpatient health care services in these two
years. Our results show that medical staff has less information on the patients’ maximum
willingness to pay informally than patients have on medical staff’s minimum expected
amount.  These  estimates  do  not  depend  on  categories  of  illnesses  but  on  certain  socio-
demographic characteristics.
PAYING INFORMALLY: A TWO-TIERED STOCHASTIC FRONTIER MODEL
77
5.1 Introduction
As  pointed  out  in  previous  chapters  paying  informally  for  health  care  services  is  a
wide spread phenomenon in many Central, Eastern and Southern European countries.
Evidence from many countries suggests that the amount paid informally, is negotiated
between patients and physicians either directly or indirectly (Belli and Shahriari, 2002;
Shahriari et al., 2001; Vian and Burak, 2006). The process is described as an ‘unofficial
health care market’ (Szende and Culyer, 2006) where physicians participate directly in the
negotiation process, or the negotiation is done by their ‘brokers’19 (Vian et al., 2006).
Despite the fact that the existence of informal payments is widely recognised, little
evidence  is  available  on  the  role  of  information  that  patients  and  physicians  have,  in
determining the amount paid informally.
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  estimate  the  imperfect  information  that  exists  on  the
amount paid informally to medical staff for inpatient health care and measure its effect on
the  actual  amount  paid.  Imperfect  information  in  health  care  markets  is  mostly  studied
either from the perspective of information on medical conditions and treatment (Arrow,
1963), or health insurance markets (Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). However,
physicians may (mis)use their power and market position to impose extra payments on
patients.  As  it  is  often  the  case  in  post-communist  countries  (Ensor,  2004),  these  extra
payments refer to money paid informally as gifts or under-the-table payments. Both
physicians and patients are aware of the “costs and benefits” involved, and are active
players in this “informal market”. Such payments allow patients to jump the queue,
receive higher quality of service and sometimes to receive more care (World Bank, 2006;
Lewis, 2000; Liaropoulos et al., 2008). From an economic perspective, informal payments
can be seen as a way to allocate scarce resources, where the market prevails over the
rationing systems thought up by the government. The market price (or the amount paid
informally) is influenced by the information that the medical staff has on the patient’s
willingness  to  pay,  and  information  that  the  patient  has  on  the  medical  staff’s  expected
amount.
As otherwise similar patients may pay different amount informally,  we focus on the
information that both parties (patients and providers) have on the final amount paid. Here,
the maximum willingness to pay refers to the maximum amount that the patient intends to
pay, and the minimum expected amount refers to the amount medical staff at least expects
to receive informally and is not related to the direct costs of health care. These are derived
from variation in the actual amount paid informally. We develop a two-tiered stochastic
frontier model to measure the effect of imperfect information of medical staff and patients
on the amount paid informally (Polachek andYoon, 1987; Groot and Oosterbeek, 1994;
Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2005).
19 ’Brokers’  are  evidenced by Vian et  al.,  2006  as  people  (not  necessarily  medical  staff)  who serve  as
intermediaries between patients and doctors. An example can be the nurse who tells how much a
patient should give to the doctor (some time this is also done by guards, etc),
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We use data from the Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey 2002 and
200520 (ALSMS)  to  obtain  estimates  of  informal  payments  for  inpatient  care.  As  in  other
chapters of this dissertation informal payments here refer to gifts paid to medical staff
either in cash or in kind.
As mentioned in Chapter 1 in the period 2002-2005 (when the data for our analysis
were collected), the financing of the health sector in the country was fragmented, with the
Health Insurance Institute paying for most of the salaries of primary care physicians,
selected drugs and few high-end diagnostics (World Bank, 2006). All other public health
care costs were covered by the Ministry of Health budget. Formal payments were limited
to a small fees paid mostly for outpatient care, while services in inpatient care were
supposed to be “free of charge”. Despite this, the scarcity of drugs, low paid medical staff
and inefficiency of the system has led to a situation where patients pay for (otherwise free)
drugs or services.21
The chapter is divided in seven sections. Section two reviews the international
empirical evidence on informal payments and discusses the main aspects of informal
payments in the Albanian health care sector. Section three outlines the theoretical model,
while section four and five discuss the dataset and empirical results.  Section six provides
the concluding remarks.
5.2 Theoretical background
There are no studies available that have analysed imperfect information of medical
staff and patients on the amount paid informally in health care. The studies reviewed here
include studies on the process of paying informally (when do patients pay informally,
what is paid for, to whom and how) and the determinants of informal payments and in
post-communist countries.
Studies find that both patients and medical staff may influence the amount paid
informally. Ensor (2004) argues that one of the main types of informal payments is when
medical staff misuse their power and market position to impose extra payments, (other
reasons  include  payments  for  extra  services  due  to  insufficient  funding).  Carlton  and
Perloff  (1989)  emphasise  that  the  availability  of  information  may influence  the  price  of  a
good by lowering it.22 This implies that the actual amount paid informally to medical staff
is  determined by  the  knowledge  of  consumers  and providers  about  the  actual  “informal
market” price.
We assume that determinants of the actual amount paid informally for inpatient care
are factors related both to the demand for health care (e.g. including income or wealth,
education, and age), and supply side factors (e.g. quality of the physician’s service and
20 Albania Living Standard Measure Survey. World Bank. www.worldbank.org/lsms.
21Although  Albanian  legislation  provides  for  free  inpatient  hospital  care  for  all,  out-of-pocket
expenditures in the event of hospitalisation are substantial, with informal payments accounting for at
least one-quarter of all payments (World Bank, 2006).
22 Carlton and Perloff (1989) show that improving information can lower the prices. When
information is more available customers may better estimate the real price.
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type of treatment). Patients’ motives to pay informally to medical staff in hospitals are
implicitly linked to patients’ maximum willingness to pay informally for better quality and
access to health care. Looking at the attitudes of patients towards publicly provided care in
Bulgaria, Pavlova et al., (2002) find that individuals are willing to pay if they are offered
good quality and quick access.
Wealth is usually considered an important determinant of health care demand.
Evidence shows that usually those who cannot afford to pay for health care find alternative
means (i.e. using saving, or borrowing money) to pay for such services (Falkingham, 2004;
Shahriari et al., 2001; Thompson and Witter, 2000). As a result, wealth and income are
believed to be less important in determining the amount paid than informal payments.
Although it is usually stated that in post-communist countries the rich pay more for health
care than the poor (Balabanova, 1999; Ensor and Savelyeva, 1998; Novak et al., 1996), when
it comes to the amount paid informally, no significant differences are documented between
these groups (Shahriari et al., 2001; Thompson and Witter, 2000).
Age and education, as determinants of health care demand, are also believed to
influence the amount of informal payments. Evidence suggests that elderly patients pay
lower amounts for health care (Shahriari et al., 2001) and higher educated people higher
amounts (Liaropoulos et al., 2008). However, the evidence remains mixed on how these
two factors  influence  informal  payments  to  medical  staff,  depending  also  on  the  type  of
services (Vian, 2006).
On the supply side, informal payments are believed to be triggered by restrictive
circumstances  like  the  low  wages  of  medical  staff  in  the  public  sector  (Ensor  and
Savelyeva, 1998; Healy and McKee, 1997; Shahriari et al., 2001). Shahriari et al., (2001)
argue that with the increase of the number of physicians,  the equilibrium price that they
charge should go down. In public health care of most post-communist countries, the prices
for services are fixed and what is observed in practice is a large variety of services that
would match patients’ increased expectations. Generally, the highest informal payments
are observed in hospitals and the lowest payments are made to general practitioners
(Shahriari et al., 2001). Given the specifics of some treatments (e.g. giving births) medical
staff may also be approached for an informal payment before the services are provided to
secure  their  availability.  In  these  cases,  negotiations  over  the  price  may  also  be  done  in
advance (Belli and Shahriari, 2002).
Studies looking at the determination of prices related to informal payments (in
Albania or elsewhere) are limited. However, there is evidence showing that the way
patients are asked for such payments vary. Based on qualitative data, a study conducted in
Albania (Vian et al., 2006), reports that patients mainly get information on the amounts to
be paid by: (i)  asking directly the nurse or the physician, or (ii)  getting information from
relatives or friends who have had similar procedures. The authors also mention that the
process  often  is  not  hidden at  all,  and in  cases  of  inpatient  treatment  (i.e.,  surgeries),  the
amount is often agreed beforehand while the payment is done after the treatment or
operation. The amount paid is not always fixed and is determined by certain characteristics
of both parties. Attributes of patients (e.g. economic status, place of residence, political or
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intellectual status) and features of providers (e.g. qualification of medical staff, speciality,
location of facility, etc) influence the amount of informal payments (Vian and Burak, 2006).
5.3 Methodology and model
In this section, we present the two-tiered stochastic frontier model used to measure the
effect  of  imperfect  information  on  informal  payments  in  inpatient  care,  and  also  discuss
some of its limitations.
We start by assuming that both patients and medical staff have less than perfect
information about the minimum expected informal payments or maximum willingness to
pay informally respectively. The main reasons behind this imperfect information are the
nature of informal health payments. Direct payments and gifts to medical staff in Albania
are not legally allowed, but they are very often tolerated. However, medical staff may face
legal  consequences  if  they  explicitly  ask  for  such  payments.  Often,  patients  are  aware  of
this,  but they are also aware of the fact that without such payments,  they may be denied
the service, or that the quality of services delivered will be simply poorer. Given this,
patients  could  try  to  get  a  certain  quality  of  treatment  with  the  lowest  amount  of  “gift”
possible.  They  could  try  to  seek  good  quality  medical  staff  and  pay  just  the  ‘minimum
expected amount’ for a particular service. However, in the absence of perfect information,
patients  may  end  up  paying  higher  amounts  than  the  minimum  expected  amount.  The
difference between the actual payment and the medical staff’s minimum expected amount
represents “patient’s ignorance”. On the other hand, the medical staff could try to
maximise the profits by asking for the amount that the patient is willing to pay. However,
the informal nature of such payments increases the costs of gathering information and
medical  staff  may also  end up in  getting  lower  amounts  than  the  maximum that  patient
would be willing to pay informally. The difference between the actual payment and
patient’s maximum willingness to pay informally represents “medical staff’s ignorance”
(Groot and Oosterbeek, 1994; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2005).
We assume that informal payments are a linear function of characteristics of medical
staff  and  patients,  respectively.  The  medical  staff’  characteristics  are  represented  in  our
model by illnesses or diseases (I). The patient’s characteristics include: demographic
variables (G),  insurance status (S),  the ln of household income (Y),  level of education (E),
number of days stayed in hospital (D) and whether the ‘gift’ to medical staff was voluntary
or expected/requested (R). The logarithm of the amount expected to be paid informally
(IP*) is determined by:
iiiiiii RDEYSGIIP 76543210
* lnln bbbbbbbb +++++++=         (1)
where b are coefficients that measure the impact of medical staff and patients
characteristics on the amount paid informally.  In our empirical analysis, we have used the
natural logarithm of the amount paid informally as this yielded better fitted models.
The observed (ln) amount of informal payment IP is assumed to be stochastic and can
be above or below the actual payment IP* depending on the characteristics of patients and
medical  staff  that  we  mentioned  above.  The  size  of  the  deviation  from  actual  informal
payment represents the effect of imperfect information of medical staff and patients. Let v
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(medical staff imperfect information) and w (patient imperfect information) represent
respectively the negative and positive deviations of lnIP* and h represents the normal error
term. The observed level of informal payments is then related to the expected level by:
iiiii wvIPP h+++=
*logln    (2)
If we combine equations (2) and (1) we obtain:
iiiiiiiiii wvRDEYSGIIP ++++++++++= hbbbbbbbb 76543210 lnln (3)
We assume that v and w are one-sided error terms with
expectations ( ) 0<-= vivE m and ( ) 0>= wiwE m . The term vm is the negative deviation of
informal payment from the actual payment, which can be interpreted as medical staffs’
informal market ignorance. Likewise, wm is  the  positive  or  upward  bias  in  paying
informally and can be seen as representing patients’ informal market ignorance.
Equation (4) constitutes a two-tiered stochastic frontier model developed by Polachek
and Yoon (1987). In order to derive the likelihood function, the following assumptions
regarding the error components are made: h has a normal distribution with zero mean and
variance 2us  ; -v and w follow the exponential distribution with vm and wm respectively;
andh , v and w are independent. Polacheck and Yoon (1987) derive the likelihood function
for this stochastic frontier model as:
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( ).F is  the  distribution  function  of  the  standard  normal  distribution  and n is  the
number of observations vq and wq measure relative medical staff’s and patient’s informal
market information, while vm and wm are the medical staff and patient informal market
ignorance.
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The disadvantage of the above model is that negative and positive stochastic
deviations based on medical staff and patient informal market ignorance (measured by
vm and wm ) are assumed to be the same for everyone. To avoid this, we have parameterised
them (Groot and Oosterbeek, 1994; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2005). This way, we
allow these parameters to vary with observable characteristics:
ivivivivivruralvvvi IIIRDG 621 6543210 aaaaaaaq ++++++= (5)
iwiwwiwiwruralwwwi IIIRDG 621 65143210 aaaaaaaq ++++++=   (6)
The first terms of equations 5 and 6 represent characteristics of patients like if they
come from rural areas ( ruralG ),  days  spent  in  hospital  ( iD )  and  if  the  gift  was
requested/expected ( iR ). Other variables in these equations represent information on
illnesses and diseases I1, I2 and I6 represent the illness and diseases of the categories 1, 2
and 6 respectively (see Table 5.2 for the full list of categories of illnesses/diseases).
Category  1  includes  very  mild  conditions  or  no  conditions;  category  2  is  more  related  to
blood and cardiovascular diseases; and category 6 groups together diseases of digestive
organs  and  those  caused  by  infections.  The  choice  of  these  categories  was  based  on  the
different  impact  that  these  illnesses/diseases  have  on  the  health  status  but  also  on  the
characteristics of the data (categories 1 and 2 have the highest incidences among all others)
5.4 Data
The data for estimating the two-tiered stochastic frontier model are taken from the
Albania Living Standard Measurement Survey (ALSMS) 2002 and 2005. These datasets
include a set of questions on health care visits and treatments concerning inpatient
services.  The variables that we use in our analysis come from identical questions used in
these two years. Individuals are asked if they have visited inpatient health care services in
the  last  12  months.  They  have  provided information  on  the  amounts  they  have  spent  as
out-of-pocket payments (including gifts to medical staff, drugs, laboratory work, transport,
and other treatment payments). Based on the information available in the survey, we have
only used the information about gifts paid to medical staff in the inpatient services
(hospitals).2324 The data we use come from two modules of ALSMS: the individual module,
and the household module.
The individual module includes information on 707 individuals who visited inpatient
services in 2002 and 701 individuals in 2005. For our analysis, we have omitted
observations with missing values or zero amount of informal payments. Our final sample
consists of 748 individuals who have visited inpatient services either in 2002 or 2005 and
have paid informally. The control variables included in the models represent
23 Based  on  broader  definitions  of  informal  payments  in  health  care,  they  may  include  also  other
expenses made privately that otherwise were supposed to be free of charge (i.e. medicines purchased
outside the hospital, etc). This detailed information can not be obtained from LSMS 2002 and 2005, and
therefore it is not used in this chapter.
24 The individual amounts of gifts paid in 2005 are deflated to reflect 2002 prices.
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characteristics of the patient (demand side), type of illness/disease (see previous Chapters
and Appendix 2A).
Table 5.1 shows the difference in characteristics between patients paying informally on
voluntary bases to medical staff and those who are requested or expected. As we can see
the mean value of informal payments is significantly higher for patients who have been
requested or expected to pay (the amount paid informally is approximately 2 times higher
when it is requested or expected compared to voluntary payments). The value of these
amounts can increase significantly when the patients are threatened not to receive the
service.  The  share  of  patients  being  requested  or  expected  to  pay  informally,  is  larger  in
2005 (56 per cent) than in 2002 showing that the situation has become worse in 2005. The
share of rural residents is much higher and statistically significant among those who have
been requested or expected to pay informally (61 per cent). The difference in the level of
per capita income, health insurance or level of education is not statistically significant
between groups where these informal payments are voluntary and requested or expected
respectively.
Table 5.1. Sample means of individual characteristics for patients that have paid voluntary or have
been requested or expected to pay informally
VARIABLES
VOLUNTARY INFORMAL
PAYMENTS
REQUESTED OR EXPECTED
INFORMAL PAYMENTS
Amount of informal payments per day
hospitalised (in Albanian Leks)
751.16*** (1452.31) 1339.22*** (3047.39)
Year of survey a 0.37*** (0.48) 0.56*** (0.50)
Monthly income per capita (in Albanian Leks) 6269.79 (6165.31) 7233.32 (10153.21)
Rural resident 0.48*** (0.50) 0.61*** (0.49)
Has health insurance 0.41 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49)
Level of education b 1.40 (0.63) 1.32 (0.60)
Number of observations 312 436
Note: Stars indicate if the mean for the group is significantly different from the mean of other groups (*** p<.01, **
p<.05, * p<.1); Standard deviations are in brackets.
All prices are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in June 2002 (Bank of Albania, 2010)
a Year of survey is “0” for 2002 and “1” for 2005
b Education level is categorical (“0” none education; “1” primary education; “2” secondary education; “3” university
education)
In order to increase the precision of the parameter estimates of our independent
variables,  we  have  reduced  the  number  of  variables  on  acute  and  chronic  illnesses  or
diseases by running a factor analysis on the 27 different types of them. We have extracted
eight factors (representing 8 groups of acute and chronic illnesses) with a factor loading 0.2
or more. In total, in both years there are 4906 individuals who provided information on
acute illnesses and 3654 on chronic illnesses. Out of these individuals, 954 individuals have
reported on both acute and chronic illness during these years. To estimate the factor
loadings, we have added one additional category for each variable, ‘no chronic disease’
(for those reporting only on chronic illness) and ‘no acute illness’ (for those reporting only
on sudden illnesses).
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Table 5.2. Diseases and illness grouped according to the factor analysis
CATEGORY 1
no chronic diseases; acute
illness cold /  flu;   no acute
illness
Category 1 includes very mild conditions or no conditions at all. Conditions
grouped here are:  acute cold /  flu,  having no chronic diseases,  or having no
acute illness.
CATEGORY 2
chronic diseases of blood
and blood  producing;
chronic other disability;
acute illness heart
Category 2 is more related with blood and cardiovascular diseases and
includes: chronic diseases of blood and blood producing organs, other
chronic disabilities and acute heart conditions. All these conditions have
similar consequences and affect the patients’ abilities (they contribute to
disability, and lower the quality of life).
CATEGORY 3
chronic congenital
abnormalities; acute
illness headache
Category 3 groups together diseases which are more related with chronic
anomalies and acute disorders and includes: chronic congenital abnormalities
and  acute  headache.  They  all  share  common  consequences,  (i.e.  constant  or
abrupt pain).
CATEGORY 4
chronic diseases of
respiratory organs; acute
illness lung
Category 4 groups diseases which are related with respiratory organs like;
chronic respiratory organs diseases, and acute lung illnesses. All these
conditions have similar causes and consequences, share the same symptoms
and they also may lead to irreversible conditions.
CATEGORY 5
chronic nervous system
and sense organ diseases;
acute illness kidney; acute
illness other trauma
Category  5  groups  together  conditions  of  the  nervous  system,  kidney  and
other traumas. Conditions included here are: chronic nervous system and
sense organ diseases, acute kidney illnesses and other acute traumas. They all
bring psychological problems as they are associated with pain and sensitivity
losses.
CATEGORY 6
chronic  infectious
diseases; chronic diseases
of digestive organs; acute
illness stomach; acute
other illness
Category 6 groups together diseases of digestive organs and those caused by
infections and include: chronic infectious diseases, chronic diseases of
digestive organs, acute stomach illnesses and other acute illnesses. All these
conditions have similar causes (infectious diseases, immunologic causes, or
dietetic issues), and share similar symptoms (nausea, diarrhoea, and similar
pain).
CATEGORY 7
chronic diseases of
urinary-genital system;
acute illness liver; acute
illness broken bone
Category 7 includes chronic diseases of urinary-genital system, acute liver
illnesses, and acute broken bone illnesses. These conditions share similar
consequences (broken bones are related with issues of other internal organs
resulting from traumas, such as liver rupture, and urinary problems).
CATEGORY 8
chronic  endocrine
diseases; acute illness
diarrhoea; acute illness
ear/nose/throat
Category 8 includes chronic endocrine diseases, acute diarrhoea illnesses, and
acute ear/nose/throat illnesses. Most of these conditions can be seen as related
to one another (i.e. diabetes causes diarrhoea, disorders of thyroids are
related to difficulties in swallowing, etc).
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Most of the factors combine diseases which are either related (categories 1 and 8),  or
can  be  symptoms  of  common  causes  (categories  4  and  6),  or  can  have  common
consequences  (categories  2,  3,  5,  6,  7),  or  have  in  common  that  they  provide  serious
discomfort or pain (categories 5, 6, 7).
5.5 Results
Table 5.3 presents the estimation results of three sets of estimates:  the ordinary least
square (OLS), two-tiered stochastic frontier model with constant terms for the one-side
error terms only, and two-tiered stochastic frontier model in which the one-sided error
terms vary by different characteristics. We use the OLS model as a benchmark for the
results of the two-tiered stochastic frontier estimates. The estimation results of the OLS
model and the stochastic frontier estimations show that the statistically significant
parameter estimates are overall similar.
Household size appears to be negatively related to the amount paid informally and
the effect is statistically significant in the three estimated models. The results are
comparable to the results of other studies on the effect of household size in reducing the
amount allocated for health care or informal payments (Behrman et al., 1980). Larger
households can be more exposed to the risk of being sick, have less to spend per capita,
and can also call upon informal care from the other family members.  They are more likely
to have young children or elderly individuals, and therefore, more likely to make use of
health services. The same holds for people living in rural areas.  Income per capita is also
more likely to be low in larger households, which reduces their ability to pay.25 An
additional argument is the lack of a universal child benefit in Albania which makes large
households more economically vulnerable.
Rural residents also appear to pay lower amounts informally. Previous evidence (Vian
and Burak, 2006) suggests that rural residents may pay less when getting services within
their village or community but they are likely to pay more when visiting facilities in big
cities. Giving the limitations of our data, we cannot control for such effects.
Age is represented by dummy variables and the category 16-30 years old is tested
against the other categories. The positive coefficient for this category shows that on
average older individuals pay smaller amounts informally in inpatient health care services
(probably because of more frequent health care visits and lower income at the same time).
This is in the same line with findings of previous studies (Balabanova and McKee, 2002).
Patients who are married and living together pay higher amounts informally to
medical staff compared to patients who are widowed, divorced or single. This may also
indicate the extent of intra-family support through adults of working age. Higher income
patients  pay  also  higher  amounts  suggesting  a  close  link  between  income  and  ability  to
pay (Falkingham, 2004; Gotsadze et al., 2005).
25 A  World  Bank  Report  (Albania  –  Urban  Growth,  Migration  and  Poverty  Reduction,  World  Bank
2007) mentions that in 2005 on average a rural resident had about 14 per cent less per capita
consumption if compared to an urban resident.
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Table 5.3. Parameter estimates OLS and two-tiered stochastic frontier model
OLS MODEL FRONTIER MODELS
q  Constant q  Varies
Coefficients of the deterministic part of the equation )(b
Constant term 5.011*** (0.559) 5.582*** (0.549) 5.878*** (0.641)
Household size -0.050** (0.025) -0.041* (0.023) -0.044* (0.023)
Civil status - married & living
together
0.284** (0.138) 0.323** (0.137) 0.292** (0.137)
Rural / urban area -0.202* (0.108) -0.208** (0.103) -0.222 (0.178)
Log income per capita 0.105** (0.048) 0.083* (0.048) 0.076 (0.048)
University education 0.384* (0.227) 0.383* (0.207) 0.356* (0.200)
Age of the individual (16-30
years old)
0.242* (0.135) 0.209 (0.138) 0.183 (0.139)
Insurance -0.156 (0.111) -0.149 (0.103) -0.129 (0.103)
Year (2002 – 2005) -0.104 (0.107) -0.115 (0.103) -0.111 (0.102)
Category of illness 1 0.517** (0.264) 0.511** (0.216) 0.101 (0.447)
Category of illness 2 0.032 (0.178) 0.060 (0.165) 0.191 (0.265)
Category of illness 3 -0.451 (0.379) -0.544 (0.356) -0.489 (0.338)
Category of illness 4 0.018 (0.243) -0.059 (0.240) -0.009 (0.232)
Category of illness 5 0.159 (0.226) 0.182 (0.208) 0.169 (0.194)
Category of illness 6 0.055 (0.242) 0.029 (0.215) -0.354 (0.762)
Category of illness 7 0.454* (0.253) 0.498** (0.209) 0.463** (0.208)
Category of illness 8 -0.017 (0.251) 0.009 (0.253) 0.031 (0.242)
Requested / expected gift 0.489*** (0.101) 0.508*** (0.096) 0.702*** (0.199)
Nr of day hospitalised -0.027*** (0.003) -0.027*** (0.002) -0.033*** (0.006)
Random error term )( uq 1.066*** (0.144) 1.073*** (0.116)
Coefficient of the negative one-sided error term )( vq
Constant term 1.180*** (0.222) 1.204*** (0.288)
Rural / urban area - - -0.053 (0.175)
Requested / expected gift - - -0.169 (0.181)
Nr of day hospitalised - - -0.002 (0.009)
Category of illness 1 - - 0.446 (0.357)
Category of illness 2 - - -0.236 (0.370)
Category of illness 6 - - 1.016 (3.917)
Coefficient of the negative one-sided error term )( wq
Constant term 3.124 (3.565) 4.401 (6.029)
Rural / urban area - - -0.496 (1.387)
Requested / expected gift - - 0.632 (1.696)
Nr of day hospitalised - - -0.016 (0.015)
Category of illness 1 - - -1.504 (4.496)
Category of illness 2 - - 0.357 (1.175)
Category of illness 6 - - -0.825 (1.515)
Log likelihood -1253.97 -1224.43 -1215.67
Number of observations 748 748 748
Note: Stars indicate: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. Standard errors are in brackets.
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Higher educated people pay higher informal payments to medical staff. This can relate
to the higher opportunity costs that they face when ill, which may increase their
willingness to pay for health care. Higher educated people invest more in their health and
are  also  more  able  to  generate  income  and  therefore  can  afford  to  pay  more  for  better
services or fast recovery (Becker, 1967; Mincer and Polachek, 1974).
Health  insurance  decreases  the  amount  paid  informally  but  its  effect  is  not  always
statistically significant. This shows that such insurance is of little relevance. This is mainly
because in 2002 and 2005 there was no direct and clear link between the Albanian health
insurance and inpatient care services (World Bank, 2006).
Out of eight categories of illnesses or diseases only category 1 and category 7 appear
to  have  a  statistically  significant  effect  on  the  amount  paid  informally  to  medical  staff.
Category  1  includes  very  mild  conditions  or  no  conditions  at  all.  The  positive  and
statistically significant effect may indicate that patients who do not use health care often
are more likely to pay informally if compared to other categories. Category 7 includes
internal organ disorders (liver and urinary-genital system) or broken bones. The positive
and statistically significant effect may indicate that patients with severe and life-
threatening illnesses or diseases pay higher amounts compared to patients with milder
illnesses or diseases. The lower level of significance for other categories presents evidence
for the homogenous amounts paid informally for illnesses and diseases. This shows that
the amount of informal payments is not much influenced by patients’ illnesses or diseases.
Patients  pay  higher  amounts  informally  when  they  are  asked  for  or  when  they  are
expected to pay (the coefficient indicating whether the informal payments were requested
is positive and statistically significant in the three models). This shows that informal
payments in Albania are not “gratitude payments” and that medical staff can influence the
amount  paid.  The  number  of  days  hospitalised  negatively  influences  the  amount  paid
informally. This relationship shows that patients with more hospitalisation days may have
more information on the informal amount expected from the medical staff and at the same
time they may also have less income (income is negatively correlated with health status).
5.6 Estimation of ignorance about informal payments
The lower part of Table 5.3 gives the estimates of the parameterised specification
of vq and wq when both q s are constant and when they vary by different characteristics.
Except for the intercept in the medical staffs’ equation, all other parameters are statistically
not significant implying that imperfect information of medical staff and patient is virtually
constant in our model and varies little by the characteristics included in the analysis. Table
5.4 gives the estimated values of the two one-side error terms for both medical staff and
patients. We interpret these terms as indicators of the effect of imperfect information on the
amount paid informally. The table gives the mean for total sample or sub-samples (Groot
and Oosterbeek, 1994; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2005). For each individual in our
sample, the observed value of the informal payment is either below or above the mean
value of these payments. The difference indicates the imperfect information that patients
and  medical  staff  have  on  the  amount  the  other  party  is  requesting  or  willing  to  pay
respectively.
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Table 5.4. Imperfect information of medical staff and patients for various subgroups
MEDICAL STAFF’S
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
PATIENT’S
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
Constant 0.56 1.43
Varies by characteristics
Total sample (mean) 0.57 1.45
Rural area resident 0.55 1.31
Requested / expected gift 0.53 1.23
Nr of day hospitalised 0.56 1.29
Category of illness 1 0.64 1.47
Category of illness 2 0.51 1.24
Category of illness 6 0.70 1.35
Medical staff’s imperfect information: ( ) ( )wweE m-= 1/1 Patient’s imperfect information: )1/(1)( vveE m+=
We calculate the means of medical staff and patients’ imperfect information of v and
w  for  the  sample  as  a  whole  and  for  some  specific  groups.26 The results indicate that
imperfect information for medical staff and patient is similar whenq s are assumed to be
constant and when theq s vary by sample characteristics. For example for the total sample
patients pay on average 45% more than the minimum value expected by medical staff (as
the error term is normalised to 1, the deviance is calculated as 1.45-1 = 45% for the positive
error term). On the other hand, patients pay on average 43% less that the maximum that
they are willing to pay informally (for the negative error term, the deviance is calculated 1-
0.57 = 43%). Generally, we observe that medical staff imperfect information is relatively
larger than imperfect information of patients for most of the groups. This indicates that
medical  staff  has  less  information  on  the  amount  that  patients  are  willingness  to  pay
informally than the patient has on the expected value of the medical staff.
Table 5.5 presents the maximum amounts that patients are willing to pay informally to
medical  staff,  the  minimum  amounts  that  medical  staff  are  expecting,  as  well  as  the
averages of the actual amounts paid. The values calculated in the table are based on the
coefficients of imperfect information indicators in Table 5.4.27  The results show that the
highest medical staff’s expected value is for the residents of rural areas who also pay the
highest amount. Another category with high expected value is the one representing
patients to whom informal payments are requested or expected. Medical staff in these
cases  can  set  their  expectations  higher  than  average  knowing that  they  can  impose  such
payments.
26 Indicators on imperfect information for patients and medical staff are calculated based on equations
(5) and (6). Values are calculated for each observations and the table displays means for the whole
sample. Different categories in the table represent the means for that sub-sample (i.e. imperfect
information for patient living in rural is calculated taking into account only those who live in these
area).
27Patient’s willingness to pay informally is calculated as the realistic value paid (the mean of the
amount paid informally for that particular service) over the difference between hundred percent and
imperfect information indicator of patients.
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Table 5.5. Willingness to pay informally to medical staff and amount expected by medical staff for
various groups
MEDICAL STAFF’S
MINIMUM EXPECTED
AMOUNT
PATIENT’S MAXIMUM
WILLINGNESS TO PAY
THE MEAN OF ACTUAL
AMOUNT PAID
Total sample (mean) 710 2020 1114
Rural area resident 875 1979 1359
Requested / expected informal payments 730 1441 1114
Nr of day hospitalised 580 1279 903
Category of illness 1 508 1582 833
Category of illness 2 573 1143 865
Category of illness 6 548 1441 933
Note: *) The amount paid informally is the average per day hospitalised. Amounts are in Albanian Leks
All prices are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in June 2002 (Bank of Albania, 2010)
Illnesses categories 1, 2 and 6 do not appear to have a big impact on the medical staff
minimum expected amount (though as we mentioned before they also have little
explanatory  power  on  the  imperfect  information  of  medical  staff  or  patients).28 Medical
staff’s expected values for all these categories appear to be lower than the total sample
showing that the amount medical staff is expecting does not depend significantly on the
illness but rather on other characteristics of the patients. The lowest patient’s willingness to
pay  informally  estimated  in  our  analysis  is  for  category  2,  which  includes  long  lasting
chronic conditions showing that patients in this category are less willing to pay (as they
know that such conditions will last longer).
5.7 Discussion
Generally, the findings show that the amount paid as informal payment to medical
staff is not entirely dependent on the level of income but depends also on social-
demographic characteristics (i.e. the household size, rural/urban area, education, and civil
status). This suggests that the final amount paid is (to a great share) prone to the particular
social situation and position of the patient seeking inpatient health care. Therefore, the
actual  amount  paid  informally  can  be  considered  as  the  final  outcome  of  a  (explicit  or
implicit) negotiating process between patients and medical staff. The information that each
party  has  on  the  other’s  minimum  expected  amount  or  maximum  willingness  to  pay
influences the actual amount paid.
We  found  that  medical  staff  has  less  information  on  the  patient’s  maximum
willingness to pay informally than patients have on medical staff’s minimum expected
amount. This seems reasonable as patients can gather more information on the medical
staff’s  minimum  expected  amount  (using  their  personal  network)  than  the  medical  staff
can gather on patient’s maximum willingness to pay (information is more costly to obtain
by  medical  staff  than  by  patients).  This  finding  is  consistent  with  what  previous  studies
have found on the ways that patients use to get informed on the doctor’s expected informal
28 Category  7  is  omitted  from  these  calculations  as  the  model  could  not  converge  when  this  was
included.
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payments (Vian and Burak, 2006). We show that thanks to this information patients can
reduce the amount of actual payment paid. However, the actual mean payment remains
slarge and in all cases is larger than the medical staff’s expected value. Groups like rural
residents or those to whom informal payments are requested from seem to be more
vulnerable  to  such  payments  as  they  also  pay  the  highest  amounts.  It  looks  like  medical
staff  is  expecting  much more  from such  patients  having  more  information  on  them (e.g.
knowing  that  patients  coming  from  distant  areas  have  higher  opportunity  costs  as
travelling costs and time costs are higher since hospitals are located in urban areas).
Although we have tried to use the full potential of the ALSMS data, there are some
limitations  to  what  we  can  actually  explore  on  the  interactions  between  patients  and
medical staff. Our data provide limited information on the specific treatment performed,
and on medical staff’s characteristics (i.e. position, salary, etc). Moreover, we cannot
distinguish between payments made to physicians or other medical and supporting staff.
Our analysis is therefore limited only to the amounts paid informally to medical staff. This
may  lead  to  an  underestimation  of  informal  payments  in  Albania.  The  specific  way  the
questions  are  asked  in  the  ALSMS  and  the  context  of  the  country  do  not  allow  us  to
distinguish between other formal and informal payments even if other categories of out-of-
pocket payments are considered.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown that the actual amount paid informally to medical staff
is influenced by imperfect information that patients and medical staff have on each other
maximum  willingness  to  pay  or  minimum  expected  amount.  By  using  a  two-tiered
stochastic frontier model we have estimated indicators of such imperfect information and
the  effect  on  the  actual  amount  paid.  These  indicators  are  an  important  tool  in
understanding how characteristics of patients or medical staff can increase or reduce
informal payments. Despite the fact that patients seem to have on average better
information than medical staff on the amount that the other party is requesting informally,
we show that the mean of amount paid remains considerable and the highest payments are
imposed on vulnerable group of society.  Such amounts call  for more measures that limit
the phenomenon in the health care sector. Policymakers could use the information on
expected  payment  or  maximum willingness  to  pay  informally  to  adjust  the  estimates  on
formal costs or to calculate the increase in patient’s fees that would be accepted both from
medical staff and patients. Future research could try to refine such measures by
differentiating between different types of treatments and services.
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5.9 Appendix 5A.
Table A5.1. Descriptive statistics
VARIABLES MEAN STD. DEV.
Informal payments made to the medical staff  (in Lek) 1113.60 (2566.64)
Household size 5.28 (2.00)
Civil status – married & living together 0.68 (0.46)
Civil status – widow & divorced 0.06 (0.25)
Civil status – single 0.09 (0.29)
Rural/urban area 0.55 (0.49)
Income per capita 6864.53 (8819.93)
Age of the individual (0-15 years old) 0.18 (0.38)
Age of the individual (16-30 years old) 0.21 (0.41)
Age of the individual (31-50 years old) 0.28 (0.44)
Age of the individual (51-65 years old) 0.18 (0.38)
Age of the individual - 65_plus 0.13 (0.34)
None educated 0.01 (0.11)
Primary education 0.55 (0.49)
Secondary education 0.21 (0.40)
University education 0.05 (0.21)
Health insurance 0.40 (0.49)
Year (2002 – 2005) 0.46 (0.49)
Category of illness 1 0.53 (0.49)
Category of illness 2 0.16 (0.37)
Category of illness 3 0.01 (0.13)
Category of illness 4 0.05 (0.23)
Category of illness 5 0.06 (0.24)
Category of illness 6 0.05 (0.23)
Category of illness 7 0.05 (0.21)
Category of illness 8 0.04 (0.21)
Requested/expected gift 0.58 (0.49)
Nr of day hospitalised 16.18 (19.31)
Number of observations 748
Note: *) The amount of informal payments is the average per day hospitalised. Standard deviations are in brackets.
All prices are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in June 2002 (Bank of Albania, 2010)
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6.1 Introduction
This dissertation contributes to the knowledge on informal payments in the health
care systems of transition economies. The main goal is to shed new light on the causes of
informal payments in public health care and to understand how such payments affect the
allocation of resources at the micro-level between patients and medical staff and within
households in Albania. Informal payments in this dissertation are measured through the
informal ‘gifts’ paid to medical staff in public health care services. Although classified as
gifts, these payments are often requested or expected and represent a considerable part of
out-of-pocket  payments  in  health  care  in  Albania.  They  are  paid  directly  to  the  medical
staff and do not include payments for drugs, diagnostic services or other health care
commodities. Gaining access to treatment, jumping the queue or getting better quality care
are the main reasons for such informal payments. The amount paid is not fixed and varies
greatly among patients, providers, treatment and other relevant or irrelevant
characteristics. The timing and form can also differ depending on patients and medical
staff characteristics. The payments may anticipate (ex-ante) or postdate (ex-post) the visit
or treatment, and can be paid in cash or as in-kind gifts.
Informal payments are considered in this dissertation as a way to allocate scares
resources where the market prevails over the rationing systems thought up by the
government.  This  definition  allows  looking  at  such  payments  both  as  a  consequence  of
poor governance (inability to provide sustainable alternatives of health care financing and
tolerance towards informal practices) and also as a result of demand-supply interactions.
The analysis throughout the dissertation is based on the household-level data from
Albania Living Standard Measurement Survey (ALSMS) 2002-2005-2008.
6.2 Main statements based on the research findings
This  section  presents  the  main  findings  of  the  dissertation  focusing  on  the  research
aims presented in the introduction. The main findings are presented in the form of six
main  statements  and  a  short  elaboration  of  the  results  is  given  for  each  of  them.
Subsequently,  they  are  followed  by  the  policy  recommendations,  limitations  and  the
suggestions for further research.
Despite the decrease of absolute poverty in Albania in recent years, the high
amount paid out-of-pocket for health care expenditures (including informal payments to
medical staff) has increased the risk of poverty for vulnerable households.
The high prevalence of out-of-pocket payments can increase the financial risks
associated  with  health  care  events.  Household  may  run  the  risk  of  poverty  if  such
payments are larger than a certain share of the total household expenditures. Both formal
and informal payments have contributed to increasing such risk. Data from ALSMS 2002,
2005 and 2008 are used to analyse the extent to which out-of-pocket health spending
impoverish the households in Albania. By using a multiyear analysis, chapter 2 of this
dissertation presents the dynamics of out-of-pocket payments over time and the share of
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informal payments on total out-of-pocket health care spending. Different thresholds are
used  to  compare  out-of-pocket  payments  to  total  non-health  spending  and  various
indicators are estimated for different sub-groups.
The  empirical  results  demonstrate  an  increase  in  real  value  terms  of  out-of-pocket
payments in 2005 and 2008. Informal payments, formal payments and private health care
spending have particularly contributed in this increase. The catastrophic headcounts for all
thresholds show that out-of-pocket spending may lead to catastrophic health care
expenditures in Albania. Although such catastrophic payments have decreased over the
years,  this  has  not  been  the  case  for  patients  from  the  poorest  quintiles  which  now  face
higher risks of falling in extreme poverty. These patients have experienced a rise especially
in informal payments paid in both outpatient and inpatient care and also on non-direct
costs (i.e. transportation costs).
Policy recommendations – The existence of catastrophic health care expenditures
should raise the concern of policy makers. Catastrophic health care expenditures do not
only  impose  a  higher  poverty  risk  for  people  seeking  health  care  but  may  also  impose
barriers to access for them. The Albanian authorities should seriously consider the
reduction of total out-of-pocket payments which amount to almost 60% of total
expenditures  for  health  in  the  country  (WHO,  2010).  This  is  best  achieved  through
ensuring the effectiveness and attractiveness of formal mechanisms of health care
financing (i.e. general tax revenues and health care insurance). While improving the
effectiveness of such mechanisms requires a better coordination and allocation of
resources, the attractiveness could be raised by adopting the structure of contributions and
co-payments so that they better reflect the income distribution. Some of the suggested
measures in this regard could be fee exemptions or price subsidies for vulnerable groups
which have proven effective in reducing catastrophic payments in other countries
(Pradhan and Prescott, 2002). Since non-direct costs related to transportation are becoming
an  increasing  burden  for  the  patients  in  poor  quintiles,  measures  like  subsidised
transportation for the poor or a better distribution of health care centres would also help in
this regard.
Limitations – One of the main limitations in studying the impoverishing effect of out-
of-pocket and informal payments is the lack of information on those patients that needed
health care but could not afford it.  The ALSMS collects information only on patients that
have  sought  health  care  and does  not  allow estimating  the  gap that  needs  to  be  filled  in
order to ensure equal access for everyone. Another limitation of the study is that the effect
of informal payments is most likely underestimated. The data provided by ALSMS allows
distinguishing only the part of informal payments paid as ‘gifts’ to medical staff. Other
definitions of informal payments would include more types of informal payments (see also
Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). Running the same analysis with additional data (allowing for a
more comprehensive definition of informal payments) may provide more insights on the
overall causes of informal payments and the burden imposed on households.
As  many  other  surveys,  ALSMS  may  be  potentially  limited  by  a  response  bias  in
answering questions on health care and health status. Questions and situations may be
perceived differently among different income or education groups. Moreover, the survey is
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randomized based on CENSUS 2001 information (demographic, geographical and socio-
economic information) but not necessarily based on health and health care related
information. This may lead to an underrepresentation of certain groups (especially high
utilization groups like the elderly or chronically ill).
Further research – Further research should be focused on identifying the effect of out-
of-pocket and informal payments on people who cannot afford such payments and are
therefore denied access to health care. Another interesting aspect for future research is also
the investigation of the effectiveness of policy measures, like fee exemptions and price
subsidies, in reducing the risk of falling in poverty among particular health care seekers
addressed by these policies.
Cultural factors can be seen as a mechanism that enables the existence of a system
of informal payments in public health care in Albania, while governance failure, lack of
accountability and economic shortages are the driving causes of the widespread and
high amounts paid informally.
Informal payments are considered in this dissertation as a consequence of a series of
factors. Such factors can be grouped as cultural (i.e., the culture to express the gratitude
through gifts), economic (free health care, inadequate funding, low salaries/investments),
and governance-related (lack of accountability, weak rule of law, and increased corruption)
causes. They are considered here in different models and tested using the evidence
provided by ALSMS.
While previous studies have indentified possible causes for informal payments, they
have  been  mainly  based  on  descriptive  analysis  of  the  data.  This  dissertation  employs  a
new approach to look at such causes by exploring the demand-side factors (i.e. patient’s
characteristics) and supply-side factors (i.e. provider’s characteristics) and looking at the
way they  influence  the  probability  of  paying  and the  amount  paid  informally.  Tobit  and
Heckman selection model are used in chapter 3 to determine the amount paid informally
to medical staff while propensity score matching is used to investigate how characteristics
of patients paying informally have changed over years.
Drawing a clear distinction between different causal models may be a difficult task as
they may also be interrelated to each other. Considering that cultural factors were also
mentioned in previous studies (Vian et al., 2006) we expected such model to play a
stronger role in determining informal payments in Albania. Contrary to this, the analysis
in  chapter  3  shows  that  this  is  not  the  case.  While  cultural  factors  can  be  broadly
considered as enabling the existence of informal payments, they cannot justify the
widespread and the high amounts paid (especially in inpatient care). The widespread of
payments in outpatient and inpatient care, the relative exploitation of certain groups of
patients (e.g.  rural patients visiting hospitals in Tirana) provide evidence in favour of the
governance-related issues. The influence of economic-related issues would be a reason for
the amounts paid informally to resemble ‘fee-for-service’ payments (e.g. varying based on
the type and intensity of service delivered). The different amounts paid for outpatient and
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inpatient care, and the positive influence of education, income on payments in inpatient
services support the existence of these economic–related issues.
Policy recommendations –  The  main  aim  of  public  health  care  policies  related  to
informal payments should be the elimination of such practices.29 Such  aim  although
explicitly stated in strategy papers (MoH, 2004), has not yet materialised in practice. From
an economic perspective, informal payments in many CEE and FSU countries make up for
a relatively small part of out-of-pocket payments (Lewis, 2007). This makes that they are
easily  ignored  by  policy  makers.  Moreover,  as  it  is  shown  in  this  dissertation  and
numerous previous studies (Delcheva et al., 1997; Chawla et al., 1998; Ensor and Witter,
2001), such payments are used to fill in the gaps created by increasing demand and the
non-responsiveness  of  supply.  This  further  lowers  the  interest  of  policy  makers  in
developing effective strategies against such payments. Such strategies would require
multiple measures linked to the financing and governance of the health care.
In brief,  effective policy measures against informal payments will  have to ensure the
rule  of  law (and deal  with  the  informal  and illegal  aspect  of  such  payments),  to  increase
accountability of public providers, to create rewarding incentives for medical staff and to
provide adequate resources.
The enforcement of the laws punishing informal payments is closely related to their
informal and illegal nature. Direct payments to medical staff in Albania are not legal and
paying ‘under-the-table’ for extra or better service is considered a form of corruption (and
punishable by law). Future measures would require specific sanctions for medical staff
engaging in inappropriate behaviour (i.e. explicitly requesting/expecting informal
payments).  In  addition,  public  providers  should  also  be  held  more  accountable  -  that  is
answerable for processes and outcomes (Lewis and Pettersson, 2009) – and further
sanctions should be imposed if such outputs have not been delivered.
Low wages and weak incentives for medical staff present a potential impediment for
eradicating informal payments in public health care (Ensor and Savelyeva, 1998; Ensor and
Witter, 2001; Chawla et al., 1998; Lewis, 2002; Vian et al., 2006). Medical staff’s wages can
only increase by generating additional revenues. It is often argued that converting informal
payments into formal fees (so that they can generate revenues for the institution and not
the medical staff alone) can solve the problem of informal payments. However, neither the
increase in wages nor formal charges are a panacea for eradicating informal payments
(Lewis and Pettersson, 2009). Formalising informal payments may even create adverse
effects for patients. If informal payments are formalised medical staff will need to pay
revenue taxes and other fiscal obligations on these revenues. This may lead to further
increases in the charges patients have to pay in order to keep net revenues for physicians at
the same levels as before. On the other hand such formalisation also formalises the barriers
to access to health care for patients who cannot afford to pay.
29 As demonstrated in chapter 1 informal payments affect the efficiency of health care systems,
increase corruption and unethical behaviour of medical staff and also deepen the inequalities in health
care delivered penalising the poor and vulnerable.
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Money should not be an argument in the relation between patient and physician.
Therefore, the government needs to be very careful in dealing with informal payments.
One of the most important messages that needs to be communicated to the public is that
health  care  is  not  ‘free’  any  more  (as  was  once  created  the  impression  under  the
‘Semashko’ system). People need to use ‘formal’ channels to contribute to the system
(contribute through health insurance or general taxes). The increased revenues could then
be used to compensate medical staff and invest more in health care equipment and
facilities. In addition, such measures would be much more effective if accompanied by
measures to strengthen professional norms and career opportunities for medical staff.
While an immediate increase in the overall public health budget may be difficult in
Albania,  a  lot  can  be  done  to  increase  the  effectiveness  in  collecting  and  allocating  the
available resources. Evidence has shown that in outpatient care where contractual
agreements exist with the Health Insurance Institute (HII), informal payments are less
frequent and amounts paid are lower for patients having health insurance. Although this
alone is not sufficient (as the results of chapter 3 show) the contracting of the inpatient care
through the HII and the increase in the number of insured population would decrease the
incidence and the amounts of informal payments.
Limitations – One of the limitations in investigating the determinants of informal
payments is that the ALSMS data do not allow us to distinguish between payments made
to  physicians  or  other  medical  staff,  nor  do  they  capture  the  payments  made  through
favours rendered. Furthermore, it is not possible to link the existing information with other
aspects of interactions between medical staff and patients (e.g. the social connections and
knowing the physicians beforehand) or with the attitude towards corruption in the
particular health care facility (e.g. the number of prosecuted cases for corruption in a
certain region or facility and/or number of penalised physicians for unethical behaviour).
In addition, the ALSMS household-level data cannot be directly linked with indicators
of some of the factors enabling or causing informal payments. Indicators such as the
persistence  of  the  culture  of  gift  (e.g.  historical  data  on  gifts  in  the  health  sector  or  the
extent of gifts in the other sectors) cannot be linked to household level data. The same is
also true for health budget indicators. The shares of regional financing, regional differences
in  medical  staff’s  wages,  etc.,  are  not  collected  by  ALSMS  and  therefore  not  primarily
included in the analysis.
Further research –  Understanding  the  main  causes  of  informal  payments  is  only  the
first step in understanding the phenomena and designing ways to restrict it. Further
research  should  involve  the  assessment  of  the  proposed  measures.  The  individual  and
aggregate analyses of policy measures like fee formalisation, resource allocation, increased
accountability, and better incentives for health care providers should be further
investigated in order to judge on their applicability in Albania and other CEE and FSU
countries.
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Fragmented measures taken over the last years, like financing primary care through
health insurance and increasing wages of general practitioners, have had little impact on
informal payments paid to medical staff in Albania.
The investigation of the informal payments paid by similar individuals over the years
requires longitudinal surveys which in many countries are not available. In the current
dissertation, this is overcome by using the potential of three cross section surveys ALSMS
2002, 2005 and 2008 (chapter 3) and applying propensity score matching techniques to
match patients paying informally over the years.
The past reforms and re-organisation of health care system in Albania have mainly
dealt with expanding the health insurance scheme in primary health care. The main
measures against informal payments have been limited to the contracting of primary care
services through the HII and increasing the salaries for primary care physicians. However,
salaries of medical staff have not been indexed constantly and the expansion of health
insurance has not been accompanied by an increase in the number of people contributing
to health insurance. Moreover the contracting of secondary or tertiary care by the HII has
lagged behind.
The analysis of the changes in informal payments paid by similar individuals during
the period from 2002 to 2008 in Albania suggests a moderate effect of such measures on
reducing informal payments. The results show that the amounts paid informally for
individuals with similar characteristics have not changed much between 2002 and 2005
and has decreased slightly between 2005 and 2008 (making the effects less clear between
2002 and 2008).
Having had health insurance during the years 2002 and 2008 has always decreased the
probability of paying  However, the results from propensity score matching show that the
effect of health insurance has decreased between 2002 and 2008 in both the services. Such
weaker  role  of  health  insurance  in  the  last  years  (especially  in  outpatient  care  where  the
financing is done entirely through health insurance) does not create the required incentives
that would push the informal market workers in the social health insurance scheme.
The propensity score matching techniques show that the burden of informal payments
bore by patients in the lowest quintiles or patients with difficulties to pay for health care is
at times similar (or larger) than that of others. The policy measures have failed to lower the
informal payments for these categories.
Policy recommendations – One of the aims of public policies addressing informal
payments should be to identify measures that would reduce informal payments and
improve  the  performance  of  the  health  care  system.  Policies  during  the  last  years  in
Albania  have  failed  to  keep  up  with  the  positive  outcomes  of  the  first  measures  in  this
regard. The persistence of the phenomenon over the years calls for more affirmative action
in addressing the economic and governance-related causes. Medical staff should be
punished if they use their power to extract informal payments. On the other hand, they
also should be rewarded appropriately for their performance. Resources should be
directed more towards the basic necessities (like providing medical supplies) or protecting
the poor.
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Limitations –  The  main  limitations  in  studying  the  effects  of  policy  measures  on
informal payments between 2002 and 2008 go back to the lack of detailed data on medical
staff. While the effects of informal payments on individuals are measurable, the effects of
such  payments  on  medical  staff  remain  largely  unknown.  It  is  often  argued  that  such
payments are not equally distributed among practitioners and that higher ranked
physicians capture most of these payments. However, little empirical evidence exists to
document this and to measure the incentives that such payments create for medical
doctors.
Further research –  One  of  the  areas  that  could  be  explored  in  future  is  certainly  the
effect  of  informal  payments  on  the  behaviour  of  medical  staff.  Medical  staff  may also  be
more or less motivated in the presence of informal payments. Such motivation may differ
based  on  the  specialization,  rank  or  the  access  that  medical  staff  have  on  such  informal
payments. The understanding of these incentives is important especially when considering
the shortfall that some of the CEE and FSU countries may have due to the brain drain and
migration of medical doctors,  or when considering how attractive are medical studies for
the new generations in these countries.
Albanian households – when confronted with informal payments in health care -
allocate their resources strategically over household members favouring individuals
with higher earnings potential or more bargaining power within the household.
Health care expenditures can be considered as investments in human capital (Becker,
1964; Grossman, 1972b). However, informal payments in health care may impose a heavy
burden on households’ expenditures (considered as uninsured risks). For this reason,
households may decide to allocate their resources in a way that differs between household
members and that may favour some members over others. Households may decide to
invest more on members with the highest bargaining power, higher earnings capacity or
with higher returns on human capital (i.e. the children). Chapter 4 employs generalised
Hausman  specification  test  to  compare  coefficients  of  probit  and  OLS  models  for  the
probability and the amount paid informally in nuclear and extended households. This
approach allows exploring the allocation of resources among household members and also
comparing the results between different types of households.
The analysis of intra-household differences in the probability of paying informally
shows few differences between nuclear households (households including only parents
and children) and extended households (including parents, children and other members).
This  indicates  that  payments  are  widespread  and  occur  among  all  types  of  households.
However there are differences in how the two types of households allocate their resources
over their members. Nuclear households allocate higher amounts of informal payments to
children and spouses compared to extended households while children in extended
households tend to pay lower amounts. Bargaining power within the household may also
affect the recourses allocated for informal payments by disadvantaging the lower educated
and the women.
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The analysis in the study in chapter 4, as in the other parts of this dissertation, shows
that the consequences of informal payments fall more heavily on the most vulnerable.
Having to face such uninsured risks, households will tend to cover the members with more
bargaining power and higher earning potential.
Policy recommendations – One of the main concerns policy makers should have with
regard to informal payments are the barriers these payments create to have access to health
care. The main aim of health policy is to ensure sustainable and equitable health care
policies. Households may choose to reduce payments for the most vulnerable members
(i.e. women or children living in extended households). Future strategies against informal
payments should ensure better protection of such groups by ensuring that they have access
to adequate health care services.
Limitations – ALSMS data are limited in the information they contain on household
members who need health services but cannot afford them (e.g. information on household
members that were denied treatment is given only at the household level and no amounts
required informally to be able to get such treatment are given). This limits the possibilities
of  analysing  the  barriers  to  health  care  raised  because  of  the  informal  payments.  Such
analysis would reveal more about the negative effects of such payments especially for the
poorest households.
An additional limitation is the lack of detailed information on the exact amount that
the employed and other income earner bring to the household. The availability of such
information would better reveal the bargaining power of individuals within the household
and the influence on the decision to pay informally for health care.
Further research –  The  focus  of  future  studies  should  be  on  those  members  of
households that have not visited health care or have delayed treatment due to informal
payments. This would allow understanding the restriction and equity aspects imposed by
such payments also between household members. It would also help in better identifying
the members of households that need to be protected by public policies.
The extent of the imperfect information that patients have on the medical staff’s
minimum expected amount of informal payment and the extent of the imperfect
information that medical staff have on patient’s maximum willingness to pay informally
differs by characteristics of the patient and the treatment received, and influences the
actual amount paid informally.
Medical staff have little information on the maximum amount that patients are willing
to pay informally. On the other hand, given the informal nature of these payments,
patients also face uncertainty and have little information on the medical staff’s minimum
expected amount. Chapter 5 develops a two-tiered stochastic frontier model to measure
how this imperfect information is influenced by individual characteristics of patients and
medical staff in the inpatient care. Estimates of imperfect information are calculated for the
whole sample and for separate characteristics of patients and providers. To the best of our
knowledge, such analysis has not been performed before. More importantly, it helps to
increase our knowledge about the information that patients and medical staff have on the
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price to be paid informally when the market overrides the financing systems thought up
by the government.
Characteristics of patients (like urban/rural residence, or days hospitalised) and
characteristics of medical staff (like the speciality of treatment or the fact that the payment
is  requested  or  expected)  can  increase  or  reduce  the  information  on  the  amount  that  the
other  party’s  willing  to  pay  or  expecting  to  get,  and  thereby,  it  influences  the  actual
amount paid informally. The findings suggest that medical staff have less information on
patients’ maximum willingness to pay informally compared to the information that
patients  have  on  the  minimum amounts  medical  staffs’  expect  to  receive.  This  finding  is
consistent  with  the  findings  of  previous  studies  on  informal  payments  in  Albania  (Vian
and Burak, 2006) suggesting that patients collect prior information on the payment that
physicians expect to receive. Results from the two-tiered stochastic frontier model
demonstrate that the highest amount medical staff expect to receive are for residents of
rural areas or for patients from whom informal gifts are requested/expected. This shows
that medical staff can differentiate the expected amounts by what patients are willing to
pay. They set expectations higher than average, knowing that such patients pay also higher
amounts informally (Chapter 3).
In general, the results from the analysis in chapter 5 show that medical staff’s expected
values for illness categories appear to be lower than the average expected payments
(showing that the expected amounts do not depend significantly on the illness but rather
on other characteristics of the patients). Such finding is very important and reinforces the
previous  statement  that  the  main  causes  of  informal  payments  are  to  be  seen  in
governance-related and economic causal factors.
Policy recommendations – The main aim of policy measures in this regard is to have
good  estimates  of  the  monetary  amounts  that  patients  are  willing  (and  able)  to  pay  for
having quality health care services and the monetary amounts that medical staff would
require to stay motivated. The estimates generated in Chapter 5 can be used to adjust the
formal fees so that they would be accepted by patients.  Similarly,  the information on the
minimum expected amount could be used to adjust the wages of medical staff.
The higher amounts that medical staff expects from residents of rural areas call for
more attention towards this population group. Such expectations are most likely built  on
the  higher  opportunity  costs  that  such  patients  face  (e.g.  extra  travel  expenditures,  lost
days  of  works,  etc).  Policy  makers  should  carefully  assess  any  inequalities  in  access  that
such groups may have and develop measures addressing them (e.g. provide quality
services in regional hospitals by creating incentives for specialists to take the jobs in such
hospitals).
Limitations - Although the analysis in Chapter 5 uses the full potential of the
Albanian LSMS data, there are some limitations to what can actually be explored between
patients  and  medical  staff.  The  survey  data  provide  little  information  on  the  type  of
treatment performed on patients and their prior contacts with medical staff. This limits the
accuracy in measuring the amount of imperfect information. Furthermore, questions on the
rank,  salary  or  specialisation  of  medical  staff  are  not  asked  in  the  survey.  This  makes  it
difficult to measure the effects of the interaction between medical staff and patients.
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Consequently, it is difficult to capture the effect of the bargaining process between medical
staff and patients on the final price paid informally.
As mentioned previously, the specific way the questions are asked in the ALSMS does
not allow us to distinguish between formal and informal payments (if  other categories of
out-of-pocket payments are considered). This may lead to an underestimation of informal
payments in Albania and therefore the estimated amounts that patients are willing to pay
refers only to the gifts paid to medical staff.
Further research – The interaction between patients and medical staff is certainly one
of the fields where future research should be focused on. Additional information on the
treatments (e.g. type and intensity) and medical staff would allow us to better understand
the bargaining process that determines the final amount paid informally.
Informal payments in Albania are a way to allocate resources where the market
prevails over the rationing system thought up by the government, but they lack
progressive redistributive effects and their burden falls mostly on the poor and the
vulnerable.
The  results  throughout  the  various  studies  of  this  dissertation  have  shown  that
informal payments prevail in an environment characterised by a lack of good governance
and adequate resources. From this perspective, individuals consider informal payments as
a way to gain access and/or receive better quality care and medical staff. However, the
analyses have shown that such payments tend to be regressive (most often the poor pay a
similar  amount  as  the  rich)  (Chapter  3)  and  are  more  likely  to  be  charged  to  the  lower
educated or rural residents (Chapter 3). Moreover, medical staff also impose higher
amounts on those patients who have more difficulties to pay for health care (Chapter 3).
Previous studies have argued that informal payments may actually have redistributive
effects, such as price discrimination by physicians by charging more to the rich. Such
effects are not observed in Albania.
The  final  aim  of  health  care  policies  should  be  to  set  up  a  health  system  that  is
efficient, sustainable and equitable. Informal payments may seem as a good alternative
when governance in the sector is weak and the resources are scarce. However, they cannot
be  considered  as  a  long-term  solution  to  such  problems.  As  shown  throughout  this
dissertation, informal payments seriously lack progressive redistributive effects and the
protective mechanisms that public policies should ensure and therefore they burden
mostly the poor and vulnerable. The reduction of this phenomenon should always be seen
as a consequence of a series of measures that would provide solid financing mechanisms,
increase efficiency in using the available resources and moreover ensure an equitable
health care system.
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Formele en informele eigen betalingen door patiënten zijn een belangrijke bron van
financiering van de gezondheidszorg in de meeste voormalige communistische landen van
Midden-en Oost-Europa (CEE) en voormalige Sovjet-Unie (FSU). De gezondheidszorg van
deze landen heeft een aantal gemeenschappelijke kenmerken, zoals de erfenis van het
voormalige “Semashko” systeem, lage publieke investeringen in de gezondheidszorg,
gebrek aan goed bestuur en toenemende corruptie. Onder dergelijke omstandigheden,
vinden eigen betalingen in de gezondheidszorg vaak plaats buiten de door de overheid
ingestelde formele kanalen. Deze ongereguleerde eigen betalingen worden vaak
bestempeld als 'onder-de-tafel betalingen', 'enveloppe betalingen', 'under-the-counter
betalingen', 'giften', en zelfs 'zwart geld'. Ze worden meestal gedefinieerd als betalingen
aan zorgaanbieders, voor diensten die worden geacht te zijn verstrekt zonder kosten voor
de patiënt. Deze kunnen verschillende vormen aannemen van contante betalingen tot
bijdragen in natura of het geven van geschenken tot informele doorberekening van kosten.
Vanuit een meer pragmatisch perspectief kunnen de informele betalingen in de
gezondheidszorg worden opgevat als strategieën toegepast door patiënten en medisch
personeel om om te gaan met slechte medische prestaties en gebrek aan middelen.
Patiënten betalen informeel om bijvoorbeeld naar een hogere plaats op de wachtrij te
springen, een betere kwaliteit van dienstverlening of meer zorg te ontvangen. Eveneens
maken aanbieders van medische zorg gebruik van deze betalingen als een middel om hun
lage lonen te verhogen.
Het belangrijkste doel van dit proefschrift is om nieuw licht te werpen op de oorzaken
van informele betalingen in de openbare diensten voor gezondheidszorg en te begrijpen
hoe dergelijke betalingen van invloed zijn op de toewijzing van middelen op micro-niveau
tussen patiënten, medisch personeel en huishoudens in Albanië. Informele betalingen in
dit proefschrift worden gemeten door middel van informele 'giften' betaald aan medisch
personeel in de publieke gezondheidszorg. Hoewel deze betalingen als cadeau zijn
bedoeld, worden ze vaak gevraagd of verwacht en vertegenwoordigen ze een aanzienlijk
deel van eigen bijdragen in de gezondheidszorg in Albanië.
Albanië is één van de laatste landen in Midden- en Oost Europa die zich vanuit een
gecentraliseerd systeem heeft ontwikkeld tot een markteconomie. Deze veranderingen
gingen gepaard met veel economische en sociale uitdagingen, waarvan de
gezondheidszorg één van de sectoren was die het hardst getroffen werd. Informele
betalingen zijn de laatste 20 jaar gebruikelijk in Albanië vooral voor zorg waarbij een
opname vereist is. Deze zorg zou gratis moeten zijn voor de gehele bevolking (inclusief
langdurige behandeling), ongeacht of de patiënten verzekerd zijn of niet. De situatie is
bijzonder dramatisch voor arme mensen die tot vier keer meer moesten betalen dan rijke
mensen.
De universele gezondheidszorg, geërfd van het vorige communistische regime in
Albanië, had een wijdverspreide openbare gezondheidszorg en een beperkt aantal
particuliere aanbieders. In de periode 2002-2008 (waarin de gegevens voor de analyse van
dit proefschrift werden verzameld), was de financiering van de gezondheidssector in het
land gefragmenteerd omdat het Health Insurance Institute het grootste deel van de
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salarissen van huisartsen betaalde evenals geselecteerde medicijnen en -voor zover
aanwezig– diagnostiek van hoge kwaliteit. Alle andere openbare gezondheidszorgkosten
werden gedekt door het budget van het Ministerie van Volksgezondheid. Ondanks de
schaarste aan medicijnen, de laag  betaalde medische staf en de inefficiëntie van het
systeem leidde dit tot situaties waarin patiënten moesten betalen voor de (anders gratis)
medicijnen of diensten. Formele betalingen bleven beperkt tot enkele vergoedingen voor
poliklinische zorg.
Het proefschrift bestaat uit een serie empirische studies waarin met behulp van
gegevens uit de ‘Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey’ (ALSMS) 2002, 2005,
2008, het fenomeen van de informele betalingen voor de gezondheidszorg wordt
onderzocht.
Het tweede hoofdstuk van het proefschrift onderzoekt het catastrofisch effect van de
eigen bijdragen kosten en informele betalingen dat huishoudens in armoede duwt. Kosten
voor  de  gezondheidszorg  worden  beschouwd  als  catastrofisch  als  ze  voor  individuen  of
huishoudens tot een significante daling van de levensstandaard leiden, nu of in de
toekomst. De resultaten tonen aan dat deze uitgaven kunnen bijdragen aan armoede onder
Albanese huishoudens. Zowel het armoede percentage als de armoede kloof worden groter
nadat er eigen betalingen zijn gedaan voor gezondheidszorg. Dit leidt tot een verhoogde
kans op armoede onder patiënten. De gevolgen kunnen nog dramatischer zijn als we
bedenken dat arme mensen minder mogelijkheden hebben om toegang te krijgen tot
medische hulp.
Het derde hoofdstuk onderzoekt de oorsprong en de oorzaken van informele
betalingen. Deze oorzaken zijn gegroepeerd in (i) het culturele model, (ii) het economische
model, en (iii) het bestuurlijk model. Door het beheersen van de belangrijkste factoren aan
de vraagzijde, is geprobeerd om te bepalen wie betaalt, voor wat en hoeveel. Het culturele
model beschouwt informele betalingen als specifiek gedrag van patiënten, om hun
dankbaarheid te uiten in de vorm van giften voortkomend uit waarden en tradities. Het
economische model verklaart informele betalingen aan de toegenomen vraag naar zorg,
onvoldoende budget, maar verklaart ook ineffectief beleggingsbeleid. Het bestuurlijk
model verklaart deze betalingen van gebrek aan controle en verantwoording in de
gezondheidszorg, een zwak rechtsstelsel en zwakke corruptiecontrole.
Voor Albanië, werd het cultureel model in eerste instantie beschouwd als een
veelbelovend model om informele betalingen te verklaren. Echter, de resultaten bevestigen
niet deze verwachting. Een reeks van feiten en cijfers lijken een voorkeur te geven aan
factoren gerelateerd aan de economische en bestuurlijke modellen. Ook al is het moeilijk
om een duidelijke scheidslijn tussen deze twee modellen te trekken. Een laag budget voor
de gezondheidszorg, de ongelijkheden tussen landelijke en stedelijke gebieden evenals het
gebrek aan verantwoording en de aanwezigheid van corruptie, worden gezien als enkele
van de belangrijkste oorzaken van informele betalingen.
Hoofdstuk vier analyseert de verschillen binnen een huishouden in de uitgaven aan
informele betalingen voor gezondheidszorg indien verschillende leden van een
huishouden zorg nodig hebben. In landen als Albanië, waar gezinnen hun patriarchale
structuur behouden hebben, is het belangrijk om te kijken of de besluitvorming over de
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uitgaven voor gezondheidszorg afhankelijk is van de positie die de patiënt heeft in het
huishouden. De resultaten tonen aan dat huishoudens strategisch middelen toewijzen aan
gezondheidszorg, door te  investeren in menselijk kapitaal dat de hoogste opbrengst heef.
Huishoudens met ouders en kinderen investeren veel meer in kinderen dan uitgebreide
huishoudens. Het aantal kinderen heeft een negatieve invloed op de omvang van de
bedragen die betaald worden voor elk kind. De onderhandelingsbevoegdheden binnen de
huishoudens zijn ook van invloed op de toewijzing van middelen voor de
gezondheidszorg waardoor de lager opgeleide echtgenoten worden benadeeld.
Informele betalingen worden in hoofdstuk vijf beschouwd als een manier om schaarse
middelen toe te wijzen, waar de markt prevaleert boven rantsoeneringsystemen opgezet
door de overheid. De marktprijs (of het informeel betaalde bedrag) wordt beïnvloed door
de informatie die de medische staf heeft op het maximale bedrag dat de patiënt bereid is
om informeel te betalen, en informatie die de patiënt heeft over het minimumbedrag dat de
medische staf verwacht. De resultaten suggereren dat medisch personeel minder
informatie heeft over het maximale bedrag dat de patiënt bereid is om op informele wijze
te betalen dan de informatie die de patiënten hebben over wat de medische staf verwacht.
Als gevolg van de gebrekkige informatie kunnen patiënten het daadwerkelijke bedrag van
de gift verminderen. Echter, de daadwerkelijke gemiddelde betaling blijft nog steeds groot
en in alle gevallen is het groter dan de waarde van het bedrag dat de medische staf
verwacht te ontvangen.
Informele betalingen lijken een alternatief als het bestuur in de sector zwak is en de
middelen schaars zijn. Echter, ze kunnen niet worden beschouwd als een lange termijn
oplossing voor dergelijke problemen. Het uiteindelijke doel van gezondheidszorgbeleid
moet zijn het opzetten van een systeem voor gezondheidszorg, dat efficiënt, duurzaam en
rechtvaardig is. Zoals beschreven in dit proefschrift, hebben informele betalingen geen
herverdelingseffecten en geen beschermende mechanismen die worden gegarandeerd door
overheidsbeleid waardoor ze meestal een last vormen voor de armen en kwetsbaren. Dit
proefschrift suggereert dat de reductie van dit fenomeen altijd moet worden gezien als een
gevolg van een reeks van maatregelen dat voorziet in solide financieringsmechanismen,
verhoging van efficiëntie in het gebruik van de beschikbare middelen en bovendien het
zorgen voor een billijke gezondheidszorg.
Gedurende de laatste jaren is het in het beleid in Albanië niet gelukt om informele
betalingen te elimineren. De hardnekkigheid van het fenomeen door de jaren heen (en de
algemene publieke opvatting), roept op tot meer actievere aanpak van de economische en
bestuurlijk gerelateerde oorzaken. Echter, de Albanese praktijk heeft tot nu toe aangetoond
dat dergelijke maatregelen, zoals het contracteren van de intramurale diensten via Health
Insurance Institute en de toename van het aantal verzekerden, het doen van informele
betalingen en de omvang van deze bedragen kan verlagen. Aan de andere kant zijn
mensen nodig om 'formele' kanalen te gebruiken om bij te dragen aan het systeem (door
een bijdrage te kiezen via ziektekostenverzekering of algemene belastingen), maar geld
mag geen rol spelen bij de toegang tot de gezondheidszorg. De strategieën voor het
omgaan met informele betalingen dienen vergezeld te gaan van een juiste beoordeling van
het effect op de totale kosten van de gezondheidszorg ten laste van huishoudelijke
budgetten evenals met een juiste bescherming voor de armen.
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Pagesat direkte formale dhe joformale të bëra nga pacientët janë një burim i
rëndësishëm financimi i shërbimit të kujdesit shëndetësor në shumicën e vendeve ish-
komuniste të Europës Qendrore dhe Lindore (EQL) dhe ish-vendet e Bashkimit Sovjetik
(BS). Sistemet e kujdesit shëndetësor të këtyre vende kanë disa tipare të përbashkëta si
trashëgiminë e sistemit ‘Semashko’, investimet e ulta publike në kujdesin shëndetësor,
mungesën e mirëqeverisjes dhe korrupsionin në rritje. Në rrethana të tilla, ndodh shpesh
që pagesat për kujdesin shëndetësor të bëhen jashtë kanaleve zyrtare të vendosura nga
qeveria. Këto pagesa direkte joformale janë etiketuar shpesh si ‘pagesa në zarf’ ‘pagesa nën
dorë’, ‘dhurata’, madje edhe ‘pagesa korruptive’. Në literaturë këto pagesa joformale janë
përkufizuar kryesisht si pagesa që i bëhen ofruesve të kujdesit shëndetësor për shërbimet
që  janë  falas  ndaj  pacientëve.  Nga  një  pikëpamje  më  praktike,  pagesat  joformale  në
kujdesin shëndetësor mund të konceptohen si strategji të përshtatura nga pacientët dhe
nga stafi i kujdesit shëndetësor për t’u përballuar me performacën e dobët dhe mungesën e
të ardhurave dhe investimeve. Pacientët paguajnë në mënyrë joformale për të mënjanuar
rradhët e pritjeve, për të marrë cilësi më të lartë shërbimi, ose thjesht për të pasur më
shumë kujdes shëndetësor. Ofruesit e kujdesit shëndetësor i pranojnë këto pagesa si një
mjet për të rritur pagat e ulëta.
Qëllimi kryesor i këtij dizertacioni është të hedhë dritë mbi shkaqet e pagesave
joformale në shërbimet publike të kujdesit shëndetësor në Shqipëri si dhe për të kuptuar se
si pagesa të tilla ndikojnë në shpërndarjen e burimeve në nivelin mikro-ekonomik midis
pacientëve, midis personelit të kujdesit shëndetësor, si dhe midis pjesëtarëve të familjes.
Në këtë dizertacion pagesat joformale maten duke përdorur informacionin mbi ‘dhurata’
joformale që i paguhen stafit të kujdesit shëndetësor në shërbimet publike. Edhe pse janë
klasifikuar si dhurata, shpesh ndodh që këto pagesa kërkohen direkt ose indirekt (pritet që
pacienti të paguajë) nga punonjësit e kujdesit shëndetësor. Si të tilla, pagesat joformale
përfaqësojnë një pjesë të konsiderueshme të pagesave direkte në kujdesin shëndetësor në
Shqipëri.
Shqipëria është një nga vendet e fundit në Evropën Qendrore dhe Lindore që ka
lëvizur nga një sistem ekonomik i centralizuar drejt ekonomisë së tregut. Ndryshimet u
shoqëruan me shumë sfida ekonomike dhe sociale, dhe kujdesi shëndetësor ishte një nga
sektorët që ‘vuajti’ më shumë. Gjatë dy dekadave të fundit pagesat joformale kanë qenë
shumë të zakonshme në Shqipëri veçanërisht në shërbimet spitalore ku shërbimi ofrohej
falas për të gjithë popullsinë (duke përfshirë edhe trajtimin afatgjatë), pa marrë parasysh
nëse pacientët ishin të siguruar apo jo. Situata ka qenë veçanërisht dramatike për pacientët
në 20 përqinshin më të ulët në shpërndarjen e të ardhurave të cilët raportojnë se paguajnë
katër herë më shumë se pacientët në 20 përqindëshet më të larta.
Shqipëria trashëgoi një sistem shëndetësor të përhapur gjeografikisht në të gjithë
vendin. Gjatë periudhës 2002-2008 (periudhë në të cilën janë mbledhur të dhënat për
analizën e këtij dizertacioni), financimi i shërbimit shëndetësor në vend ishte i
fragmentuar. Instituti i Sigurimeve të Kujdesit Shëndetësor (ISKSH) paguante për
shumicën e pagave të mjekëve të kujdesit parësor, ilaçet e listës së rimbursimit dhe disa
analizave të shternjta.  Të gjitha shpenzimet e tjera të kujdesit shëndetësor publik
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mbuloheshin nga buxheti i Ministrisë së Shëndetësisë. Gjate atyre viteve pagesat direkte
formale ishin kryesisht të përqendruara në kujdesin parësor dhe sekondar. Pavarësisht nga
kjo, mungesa e barnave mjekësore, pagat e ulta të personelit shëndetësor dhe inefiçensa e
sistemit shëndetësor në përgjithësi çuan në situatën ku pacientët duhet të paguanin për
ilaçet ose shërbimet (megjithëse këto të fundit ishin të parashikuara të ishin falas).
Ky dizertacion përbëhet nga një seri studimesh empirike që përdorin të dhënat e
Anketës së Vlerësimit të Standardeve të Jetesës (AVSJ) 2002, 2005, 2008 për të vlerësuar
fenomenin e pagesave joformale në kujdesin shëndetësor në Shqipëri.
Kapitulli i dytë i dizeratcionit analizon efektin katastrofik që kanë pagesat direkte dhe
joformale (si pjesë e pagesave direkte) në shtyrjen e familjeve në varfëri. Konsiderohen
katastrofike ato shpenzime të kujdesit shëndetësor që i detyrojnë individët apo familjet e
tyre të ulin standardin e jetesës tani apo në të ardhmen. Rezultatet tregojnë se këto
shpenzime mund të kontribuojnë në varfërimin e familjeve shqiptare. Njëkohësisht raporti
i varfërisë dhe thellësia e varfërisë rriten me rritjen e shpenzimeve për kujdesin
shëndetësor. Kjo tregon një rritje të rrezikut të rënies në varfëri tek individët që marrin
kujdes shëndetësor. Këto pasoja bëhen edhe më dramatike kur merret në konsideratë që
njerëzit e varfër nuk kërkojnë kujdes shëndetësor.
Kapitulli i tretë analizon origjinën dhe shkaqet e pagesave joformale. Këto shkaqe janë
parë të grupuara në tre grup modele (i) modeli kulturor, (ii) modeli ekonomik, dhe (iii)
modeli i qeverisjes. Duke kontrolluar për faktorët nga ana e kërkesës, është përpjekur për
të identifikuar kush paguan, për çfarë, dhe sa.
Modeli kulturor i shpjegon pagesat joformale si një lloj i veçantë sjelljeje (që e ka
zanafillën në traditat dhe vlerat e vendit) i pacientëve të cilët shprehin mirënjohjen e tyre
duke ofruar dhurata. Modeli ekonomik i shpjegon pagesat joformale me rritjen e kërkesës
për kujdes shëndetësor, buxhetin e pamjaftueshëm të alokuar, si dhe politikat joefektive të
investimeve. Modeli i qeverisjes i lidh këto pagesa me mungesën e kontrollit dhe
llogaridhënies në sektorin e kujdesit shëndetësor, mos funksionimin e ligjit dhe
mosluftimin e korrupsionit. Modeli kulturor u konsiderua fillimisht modeli më premtues
për të shpjeguar pagesat joformale në Shqipëri. Megjithatë, rezultatet nuk konfirmuan
pritjet. Një seri faktesh treguan se janë pikërisht modeli ekonomik dhe ai i qeverisjes ata që
shpjegojnë ekzistencën e këtyre pagesave. Megjithëse është e vështirë të hiqet një vizë
ndarëse midis këtyre dy modeleve, buxhet i ulët për kujdesin shëndetësor, pabarazia në
kujdesin shëndetësor ndërmjet zonave rurale dhe urbane, mungesa e llogaridhënies dhe
ekzistenca e korrupsionit janë parë si disa nga shkaqet kryesore të pagesave joformale në
Shqipëri.
Kapitulli i katërt i këtij dizertacioni analizon sesi ndryshojnë këto pagesa joformale kur
anëtarë të ndryshëm brenda familjes kanë nevojë për kujdes shëndetësor. Në vende si
Shqipëria, ku familjet kanë ruajtur strukturën e tyre patriarkale, është e rëndësishme të
shikohet nëse vendimmarrja për shpenzimet shëndetësore varet nga pozicioni që ka
individi në familje. Rezultatet tregojnë se familjet i shpërndajnë strategjikisht burimet për
kujdesin shëndetësor duke favorizuar individët me kapital njerëzor dhe kthyeshmëri më të
lartë. Familjet e përbëra vetëm me prindër dhe fëmijë investojnë më tepër tek fëmijët se sa
familjet e zgjeruara. Numri i fëmijëve ndikon negativisht në ulen e këtyre pagesave për çdo
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fëmijë. Fuqia vendimmarrëse brenda familjes ka ndikim në shpërndarjen e burimeve për
kujdes shëndetësor duke  disfavorizuar gratë me shkollim të ulët.
Pagesat joformale në kapitullin pestë janë konsideruar si një mënyrë shpërndarjeje e
burimeve të pamjaftueshme, ku tregu mbizotëron mbi sistemet e racionimit të hartuara
nga qeveria. Çmimi i tregut (ose shuma e paguar joformalisht) ndikohet nga informacioni
që personeli shëndetësor ka mbi gatishmërinë e pacientit për të paguar joformalisht, dhe
informacioni që pacienti ka mbi pagesën që personeli shëndetësor pret nga ai. Rezultatet
tregojnë se personeli shëndetësor ka më pak informacion mbi gatishmërinë e pacientit për
të paguar joformalisht krahasuar kjo me informacionin që pacientët kanë mbi sasinë e
pritshme të personelit shëndetësor. Për shkak të mungesës së këtij informacioni pacientët
mund të zvogëlojnë sasinë aktuale të pagesës. Megjithatë, pagesa aktuale në të gjitha rastet
e studiuara mbetet më e lartë sesa pagesa e pritur nga stafi mjeksor.
Pagesat joformale në sistemin shëndetësor mund të shikohen si një strategji
alternative, kur kemi një qeverisje joefektive dhe kur burimet janë të pamjaftueshme.
Megjithatë, ato nuk mund të konsiderohen kurrësesi si një zgjidhje afatgjatë. Qëllimi
kryesor i politikave të kujdesit shëndetësor është të ndërtojë një sistem të kujdesit
shëndetësor efikas, të qëndrueshëm dhe të barabartë për të gjithë. Siç përshkruhet edhe në
këtë dizertacion, pagesat joformale nuk kanë efekt rishpërndarës dhe në to mungojnë
mekanizmat mbrojtëse, të cilat sigurohen nga politikat publike. Barrën kryesore të këtyre
pagesave e mbajnë shtresat e varfëra dhe të pambrojtura të popullsisë. Ky disertacion
argumenton se reduktimi i fenomenit të pagesave joformale duhet të shoqërohet me një
sërë masash që të sigurojnë qëndrueshmëri financiare, rritje të efikasitetit në përdorimin e
burimeve të disponueshme dhe mbi të gjitha sigurimin e një sistemi të barabartë të kujdesit
shëndetësor.
Politikat  qeveritare dhe masat e ndërmarra ndër vite për eliminimin e pagesave
joformale në Shqipëri kanë dështuar. Vazhdimësia e këtij fenomeni gjatë gjithë këtyre
viteve (dhe perceptimi i përgjithshëm publik) bën thirrje që vëmendja të përqëndrohet
kryesisht në adresimin e shkaqeve që lidhen me modelin ekonomik dhe atë të qeverisjes.
Megjithatë, evidencat në Shqipëri tregojnë se kontraktimi i shërbimeve spitalore nëpërmjet
Institutit të Sigurimeve Shëndetësore dhe rritja e numrit të personave të siguruar mund të
ulë incidencën dhe masën e pagesave joformale. Nga ana tjetër njerëzit duhet të përdorin
kanale ‘formale’ për të kontribuar në sistemin shëndetësor (sigurimet shëndetësore ose
tatimet), por paratë nuk duhet të jenë asnjëherë një problem në qasjen ndaj kujdesit
shëndetësor. Strategjitë që do të ndërmerren për uljen apo eleminimin e pagesave
joformale duhet të shoqërohen me vlerësime të kostos së përgjithshme të kujdesit
shëndetësor mbi buxhetin e familjes dhe me mbrojtjen e duhur për shtresat e varfëra dhe të
pambrojtura të shoqërisë.
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